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Abstract 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on the role of  the  Organisation 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in (de)stabilising oil prices by 
identifying and critically investigating a gap in the extant literature with 
respect to OPEC’s actions in the oil markets, vis-à-vis its stabilisation policies. 
Two research questions were addressed, namely: to what extent could OPEC 
have stabilised global oil prices within a particular target price band; and to 
what extent were OPEC’s stabilisation policies rendered ineffective by market 
forces? Consistent with the positivist’s research paradigm, unrestricted vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models were applied to monthly data over the 13 year 
period 2000-2012 on a range of relevant variables identified from the 
literature. Granger causality tests, impulse response functions (IRFs) and 
forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) were obtained from the VAR 
estimates to enable a critical analysis to be undertaken of the complex 
dynamics at play between OPEC and other key market players.  
The major contributions of the study are: it establishes that OPEC failed over 
the period 2000-2012 to operate as an effective cartel for controlling oil 
prices; it provides an innovative contribution to research methodology by 
utilising VAR impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decompositions to describe the complex interactions between various players 
with diverse objectives in the markets; it contributes to the OPEC cartel 
literature in a novel way; it should enable regulators to better understand the 
political, social and economic interaction between key players in the oil 
markets, thereby increasing chances of policy embracement by all parties; it 
also makes a theoretical contribution by employing a framework based on 
target (price) zone theory; and finally it establishes that oil price band policy 
has the potential to be an important element of price stability in the oil 
market.  
19 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Volatility of oil prices and its effect on the oil market has been the subject of 
recent research interest (Kohl, 2002; Regnier, 2007; Al-Qahtani et al., 
2008b). Many factors (such as supply-demand fundamental, speculation, 
geopolitical events, absence of market transparency and governance) have 
been proffered as causes of this volatility (see Kaufmann et al., 2008, Florini 
and Sovacool, 2009; Slaibi et al., 2010; Florini and Saleem, 2011; Martina et 
al., 2011). Perhaps the most frequently cited factor in the literature and 
Western media is the role played by (OPEC). Indeed, OPEC has been widely 
vilified as an international cartel of oil producers which coordinates its 
members’ actions towards restricting crude oil production with a view to 
promoting high oil prices to the detriment of oil consumer nations, notably 
the Western economies (Simpson, 2008; Hyndman, 2008; Shaffer, 2009; 
Graefe, 2009; Sovacool, 2011). These allegations against OPEC date back to 
1973 when the organisation placed an oil embargo on the U.S. and the 
Netherlands which led to oil prices quadrupling from $3 to $12 per barrel 
(Kisswani, 2014). No one would dispute the fact that OPEC took decisive 
action to increase oil prices in the early 1970s which brought an end to what 
is referred to as “the era of cheap oil” Tsoskounoglou et al. (2008).  
The 1973 oil price shock, as it is popularly recognised, not only led to ill 
feeling against OPEC but also spawned a response from Western nations who, 
in 1974 established a consumer counter body to OPEC: the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). In addition to this, the price shock instigated the 
creation of a strategic petroleum reserve in 1975 by the U.S. as part of 
energy security measures. A second oil price shock occurred in 1979 
following the Iranian revolution, which further increased the political pressure 
on OPEC as a cartel whose actions led to sharp and sustained high oil prices 
(see Al-Qahtani et al., 2008a). Furthermore, various energy policy acts were 
enacted in 1992, 2005, and 2007. Paradoxically, the allegations against OPEC 
completely contradict the provisions of OPEC’s first resolution and official 
statute, which state that the organisation’s responsibility is to promote price 
stability in the oil markets.  Interestingly, a study by Kepplinger and Roth 
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(1979) concluded that the media created panic in the minds of the public by 
exaggerating OPEC’s actions in order to achieve a predetermined motive. 
Kilian (2008) and Colgan (2014) partly lent support to the findings of 
Kepplinger and Roth (1979) by stressing that the crisis and effect of the 
embargo were mainly overstated.  Kilian (2008) argued that production by 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was unusually high in September 1973, and that it 
would not have been so if the embargo had been effective as exaggerated by 
the media. However, it can be cogently argued that the impetus for OPEC’s 
action came from what might be construed as an attempt to limit the 
exploitative harvesting of their oil reserves by the international oil companies 
(IOCs) (see Chalabi, 2010). 
Furthermore, the last one and a half decades since 2000 have witnessed a 
rather more complex situation in the oil price history (Cifarelli and Paladino, 
2010; Lombardi and Robays, 2011). Oil prices in both real and nominal terms 
exceed those prices in the previous three decades (see figure 1.1). A number 
of forecasts for low oil prices have not yielded any foreseeable positive results 
in favour of low international oil prices despite the extraction of shale oil 
reserves in the U.S.1 and other parts of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. Davidson (2008) noted that oil 
prices rose fivefold since 2001 to a level over $130 per barrel in 2008. Part of 
the change from 2001 to 2005 involved an increase of nearly 103% making 
the event similar to that of 1970s (Campolmi, 2007). Another development 
resulting from increased positions in the futures oil market by the financial 
investment firms was observed to have been consistently growing over the 
remaining periods (see Cifarelli and Paladino, 2010; Alquist and Gervais, 
2011; Lombardi and Robays, 2011). The permission to carry out this type of 
trading was granted since 1991 by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) to the firms just a year before the U.S. first Energy Policy 
Act in 1992. Over the last decade, the oil market has witnessed a fresh 
injection of investment funds totalling billions of dollars. From 2003 to 2008 
alone, the financial holding in the futures markets rose from $13billion to 
over $260billion, which raised concerns on the effect this would have on oil 
                                                          
1 It is important to know that shale revolution in the US has brought down energy prices 
domestically much lower than the Europe (see Haywood, 2014). 
22 
 
price volatility (Cifarelli and Paladino, 2010). Evidence of increasing 
speculation in oil markets is well documented in the literature2, suggesting 
that oil prices are very high and volatile due to factors beyond oil market 
fundamentals. In its early reports in 2008, CFTC denied claims that investors 
are systematically engaged in promoting high oil prices 3 . However, new 
findings emerged suggesting evidence contrary to the earlier conclusions, 
which made the markets more complex (see Cifarelli and Paladino, 2010). 
Other international groups such as G20 (Group of 20), Joint Organisations 
Data Initiative (JODI) 4  (Joint Organisation Data Initiative) have also 
acknowledged the effect of speculation in promoting high oil prices. Similarly, 
Aune et al. (2010) also noted that evidence of change in investment 
behaviour among the international oil companies was observed towards the 
end of the 20th century which further raised question about the real impact of 
OPEC in the price formation over the last decade; a period which coincided 
with many market developments5 (Russell and Ibrahim, 2013).  
In this regard, the debate over the real cause of the sustained high oil prices 
has continued in the literature with a sizeable number of conflicting views 
about the role of OPEC in the oil market. Two prominent strands of opinion 
have emerged in this direction. The first strand believes that the imbalance 
between oil supply and demand (i.e. excess of oil demand over supply) as a 
result of OPEC operating as a cartel is the major cause for the high oil prices 
(see Adelman, 2002, Morris and Meiners, 2013). Therefore, this strand, 
mainly popularised by the Western politicians and media, argues that OPEC 
deliberately attempts to punish the Western economies by limiting the 
amount of oil those economies need to satisfy their demand for 
industrialisation. This has led to OPEC being challenged or sued before 
international courts or attempts to invoke antitrust laws against the 
organisation and sometimes calls on U.S. Congress’s intervention to force 
OPEC to act in the Western interest (see Waller, 2002; Doggett, 2008 and 
                                                          
2  See Büyükşahin and Robe (2014) for evidence based on both publically available and 
privileged data. 
3 See CFTC Task Force report released on 22/07/2008 
4 JODI has acknowledged that absence of accurate, reliable, and timely data were responsible 
for the speculative activities and that collective effort of the relevant stakeholders would make 
a clear difference in stabilising oil prices (JODI, 2013) 
5  Some of the market developments include discovery and investments in unconventional 
energy and renewable sources and sand oil in Canada. 
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Lautenberg, 2004; Saxton, 2005). For example, Saxton’s 2005 report clearly 
accused OPEC of not only restricting production, but also of absence of 
transparency and corruption as mentioned below: 
“OPEC also aggravates price volatility. It cannot manipulate its 
rate of output to match changing market conditions precisely and 
thus causes or magnifies swings in the supply and the price of oil. 
OPEC conceals important industry information and is not 
forthright in sharing its output plans and price objectives. 
Transparency International ranks most OPEC members near the 
bottom of its worldwide corruption index. Given the capital 
intensity of oil operations, the cartel's behavior increases risk and 
uncertainty for non-member investors and slows their market 
responses.”(Saxton, 2005:I) 
In contrast, the other strand believes that speculation and geopolitical 
tensions, and not oil market fundamentals are responsible for the high oil 
prices observed in the last decade (see Yousefi and Wirjanto, 2004; Bina and 
Vo, 2007; Chung, 2008; Bina, 2008; Juhasz, 2008; Blas, 2009; Cifarelli and 
Paladino, 2010; Slaibi et al., 2010). This view is closer to that of OPEC stated 
in most of its reports. Kaufmann et al. (2009) were of the opinion that 
although market fundamentals have contributed to the volatility in oil prices, 
speculation exacerbated the prices above what fundamentals could have 
achieved. Similarly, Miller and Ratti (2009) examined the long-run dynamics 
between oil prices and stock prices in six OECD nations using cointegrating 
and error correcting models in different periods segregated with breaks. The 
results found strong evidence of a relationship between the stock prices and 
oil prices over the last decade suggesting evidence of market bubbles. 
Despite a sizeable review of literature on OPEC and its influence on oil prices, 
the conclusions still remain mixed (De Santis, 2003; Kaufmann, 2011; and 
Schmidbauer, and Rösch, 2012). 
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Figure 1.1: Crude Oil Prices 1861-2012 U.S. Dollars per Barrel and 
World Events 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 
Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the major historical events that influenced 
crude oil prices from 1861 to 2012 in both money of the day and 2012 real 
money terms. Oil prices were stable and low for ninety years prior to the 
establishment of OPEC in 1960. This is because, prices were mainly constant 
for the period (i.e.1959 to 1964) given that they were posted in bulletins 
issued by the IOCs where the nominal price per barrel never exceeded $2.97 
(Ballinger and Dwyer, 2004; Hammad, 2011). They were also comparably 
stable during the first 12 years of OPEC’s existence. This is consistent with 
Dvir and Rogoff (2009) who reviewed oil price evolution from 1861 to 2008 
by spitting the entire sample periods into sub-periods. The study empirically 
finds similarities between 1861-1878 and 1972-2008 when industrialisation 
growth was faced by uncertainty surrounding oil supply in which Texas 
Railroads and OPEC played important roles as monopolies.   
Furthermore, the prices rose dramatically between 1973-1979 due to 1st and 
2nd oil price shocks and then steadily declined to relatively low levels in 1986 
(due to oil price fall of 1986)  through 1998. Prices began to rise towards the 
end of the 1999. Due to adverse consumer nations’ reaction to such high oil 
prices, OPEC responded in March 2000 by introducing oil price band (OPB6) 
                                                          
6 The OPB mechanism was set between $22 and $28 per barrel for the OPEC basket price. 
Beyond the upper limit, the consumption of OPEC oil is likely to be discouraged; and below the 
lower limit investments by OPEC nations, non-OPEC and IOCs is likely going to be discouraged. 
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policy aimed at stabilising oil prices within a given target range (Farrell et al., 
2001) which is also consistent with the mission statement 7  of the 
organisation. Following OPB premature suspension in 2005 due to a number 
of factors highlighted in OPEC’s reports and bulletins (see, for example, OPEC 
bulletin 09, 20108), volatility in oil prices continued with a sharp rise and 
decline in oil prices in 2008 as a result of speculation and global economic 
recession (see Sonnete et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, no one will dispute the fact that, despite technological 
advancements in the renewables and shale energy developments; the costs 
of renewable and shale extraction remain more expensive when compared 
with the fossil fuels, most particularly OPEC oil (see, for example, Bull, 2001; 
Chalabi, 2010). The U.S. shale revolution has reduced energy prices 
domestically 9  when its consumption of the OPEC oil has significantly 
declined10. Figure 1.2 presents the U.S. shale gas production in billion cubic 
feet day from 2000 to 2012. Has the international oil price come down in the 
light of these developments? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The policy was designed to automatically get triggered with increases (cuts) of 500 000 barrels 
per day should the oil prices exceed (or fall below) the target range for 20 (10) consecutive 
trading days.  
7 OPEC’s mission statement is “..to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member 
Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic 
and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return 
on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry”.  
8 The information on some of the reasons that led to the suspension of the OPB can be found 
from the link below:  
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OB092010.
pdf 
9 See Haywood (2014). 
10 The decline in the US oil consumption is shown in figure 3.2 in Chapter 3 of this study.  
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 Figure 1.2: U.S. Shale gas production by play 2000-2012 
 
Sources: LCI Energy Insight gross withdrawal estimates as of January 2013 and converted to 
dry production estimates with EIA-calculated average gross-to-dry shrinkage factors by state 
and/or shale play. 
Figure 1.2 shows the U.S. shale gas energy production by play from 2000 to 
2012. The different components grew dramatically with some of them 
commencing from zero to a level high. Most of the increase took place during 
the second half of the total periods.    
In the light of the background issues, it can be observed that the literature 
about the role of OPEC is not conclusive; a position consistent with Brémond 
et al. (2012). Furthermore, the market developments suggest there is a need 
for a new perspective with which to study the effectiveness of OPEC 
stabilisation policies. In response, this research empirically and critically 
assesses the effectiveness of OPEC’s stabilisation policies vis-à-vis changes in 
the oil prices and the collective actions of other key market players.  
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem  
In today’s world, the term “cartel” is widely considered synonymous with 
OPEC, most particularly in the allegation for oil price instability (see Adelman, 
2002, 2004; Morris and Meiners, 2013); although such allegations run 
diametrically contrary to the objectives11 claimed by OPEC for establishing the 
organisation in 1960. This self-assigned responsibility has led OPEC to 
                                                          
11  In its first resolution in 1960, it was clearly defined “...that Members shall study and 
formulate a system to ensure the stabilisation of prices by, among other means, the regulation 
of production, with due regard to the interests of the producing and of the consuming nations.” 
Although OPEC was established to coordinate and unify its members’ policies towards 
identifying best means to safeguard their interests, one of the organisation’s aspirations is to 
ensure stability in oil prices. 
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undertake some actions in addition to adjustments of its members’ 
production quotas in an attempt to achieve oil price stability (Ghouri, 2006). 
One of these actions is the introduction of the oil price band (OPB) policy 
introduced in March, 2000 as part of the response to the increasing pressure 
from the oil consuming nations. In the light of the policy and OPEC 
commitment to achieve oil price stability, a repeated increase in oil 
production was observed in the early periods following the policy introduction 
(Farrell et al., 2001 and Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). Furthermore, in 2001, 
the Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI) was established by six global 
energy stakeholders under the International Energy Forum (IEF) to enhance 
and promote data transparency in the markets which was expected to reduce 
speculation with the sole aim of stabilising oil prices (JODI, 2013). Despite 
the attempts to stabilise oil prices, figure 1.2 shows that the prices exceeded 
the target set by OPEC in 2003 shortly following Iraq's invasion. The prices 
have continued to rise above the upper limit of the band and in February 
2005, OPEC made an official withdrawal due to reasons it claimed were 
beyond its control (Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). Subsequently, prices sharply 
rose to about $148 per barrel at the beginning of 2008 for nearly half a year 
before falling to less than $40 just a few weeks after July 2008, which had 
raised further puzzle between the interest groups in the oil markets (Hache 
and Lantz, 2013).  
The debate which has been heating up about the nature of OPEC since the 
1973 oil price shock still remains inconclusive (Brémond et al., 2012). This 
could be partially attributable to the following factors: First, most of the 
literature on OPEC and oil price has mainly concentrated on the supply-side in 
modelling the oil market vis-à-vis OPEC’s structure (see Benchekroun and 
Withagen, 2012). By so doing, many of the prominent incentives for the high 
oil prices originating from the actions of the major oil consumers might 
remain concealed, making it difficult to figure out the real cause of increased 
oil prices in the market. Second, most of the important media channels 
disseminating information to the oil market participants are owned and 
controlled by the U.S. and evidence showing consolidation of these media 
channels is still emerging (Chomsky, 2002, CEC, 2007). In the same 
connection, it has been cogently argued that the U.S. media often engaged in 
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some analysis based on wrong or misleading figures in the energy sector 
(see, for example, Koomey et al. 2002; Khadduri, 2005) and conflicting 
figures in the reporting of OPEC in the international markets (Sornette et al., 
2009; Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). 
Thirdly, the previous studies have considered the incentives for the actors in 
the oil market to behave politically in pursuing their economic objectives 
(Chalabi, 2010; Slaibi et al., 2010; Radetzki, 2012). In this regard, some 
useful philosophical concepts are crucial in a framework to underpin any 
complexity (see, for example, Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012 who introduced 
energy justice as well as other concepts, and Slaibi et al., 2010 who 
considered the effect of military strategies/activities and politics in achieving 
economic objectives within the target zone theoretical framework). 
In the light of the general background which identifies evidence of lack of 
consensus about the specific role of OPEC (Brémond et al., 2012) and the 
market developments (e.g. the role of speculative activities, changes in the 
balance of power with discoveries in shale and other forms of energy), and 
the growing accusations against OPEC as a villain in the oil market, there is 
an emerging question about the specific role of OPEC’s stabilisation policies in 
keeping the oil prices within a target price band given the growing 
complexities of the oil market. Therefore, this gap needs to be filled for the 
role of OPEC in the oil market to be established, thereby contributing to the 
general long debate about whether OPEC is a cartel or not.  
1.3  Justifications for and Significance of the Study 
It has been established from the preliminary review, and the problem 
statement that a gap exists in the literature about the actual role of OPEC in 
the oil market (Brémond et al., 2012), with most reviews concluding that 
OPEC is the stumbling block in the oil market (Morris and Meiners, 2013). The 
wide allegations and criticisms against OPEC (mostly by Western politicians 
and media) have sparked a range of energy policies in the Western nations 
and proposals for a tight regulatory framework aimed at making OPEC 
powerless (Lautenberg, 2004; Saxton, 2005). A successful implementation of 
such actions as proposed by the reports above will not only be detrimental to 
OPEC but further raises complexities in the structure of oil markets given that 
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the literature has remained without any consensus to date (see Schmidbauer, 
and Rösch, 2012). Evidence supporting this inconclusive nature of OPEC’s 
study can be observed in many studies and the type of research questions 
they addressed. For example, “Does OPEC still exist as a cartel?” (Brémond 
et al., 2012); “Does OPEC act as a residual producer?” (Bandyopadhyay, 
2009); “Does OPEC influence crude oil prices? Testing for co-movements and 
causality between regional crude oil prices” (Bentzen, 2007); “Does OPEC 
matter?” (Kaufmann et al., 2004); “Does OPEC Matter After 9/11?” (Demirer 
and Kutan, 2006).  
In view of the development in the oil markets (e.g. shift in the balance of 
power, new oil discoveries from unconventional and renewable sources, 
technological advancements), a need arises for a critical review of the role of 
OPEC in stabilising oil prices within a given target band consistent with its 
objectives and policies. The issues addressed by this study are of economic 
importance to both OPEC and non-OPEC policy makers as well as the 
international agencies responsible for the regulation of the oil markets. 
Consequently, the study will make a potential contribution to the existing 
body of literature on the role of OPEC in general and its specific policies in the 
stability of oil prices.  In addition to this, the study will contribute to the 
literature by enhancing our understanding of the factors that influence oil 
prices. More than that, it will also connect evidence of perceived demise in 
the previously powerful position played by OPEC with the factors that led to 
the high oil prices in the light of the shift in the balance of power from OPEC 
to non-OPEC producers and the increasing allegations against OPEC. The 
contribution will be made through.  
1.4 Main Research Questions 
In the light of the issues raised in sections 1.1 and 1.2, two research 
questions of interest are identified as follows:  
1. To what extent could OPEC have stabilised global oil prices within a 
particular target price band? 
2. To what extent have OPEC’s stabilisation policies been obstructed by 
the actions of other key players in the oil market? 
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Based on the above research questions the following research aim, and 
objectives are developed in subsection 1.5. 
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
The main aim of this study is to critically review OPEC’s oil price band policy 
and to analyse the barriers that may have impeded its success. To achieve 
this aim, the following objectives are developed: 
i. to critically examine the extent to which OPEC’s stabilisation policies 
were/are able to keep oil prices  within a given target band; and 
ii. to critically examine the effect of the actions of key market players in 
obstructing OPEC’s ability to stabilise oil prices within a target band. 
1.6 Theoretical Framework Introduced 
To address the key question raised by this study in section 1.5 two different 
approaches are adopted to the investigation, namely: assessment of the 
extent to which OPEC stabilisation policies ensure oil price stability within a 
given target price band, and also assessing the factors that might obstruct 
such policies to achieve the desired targets. Therefore, the study focuses on 
the empirical examination of the effectiveness of OPEC stabilisation policies in 
stabilising oil prices within a target oil price band and the role of the other 
market players’ actions on OPEC’s ability to achieve such a stated objective- 
which is consistent with its first resolution and mission statement as 
enshrined in the official OPEC statute. Target price zone theory is employed 
to underpin this study given its compatibility with the econometric models 
applied in this research. Some important moral philosophies that are found 
useful in describing the individuals who make up institutions are also 
employed in the framework to aid in the interpretation of the results obtained 
from the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 of the study. 
1.7 Research Methodology Introduced 
The study adopts a quantitative approach to the analysis of monthly data for 
a 13-year period (from 2000 to 2012). The main sources of data were four 
important and credible databases, namely: OPEC, Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), International Energy Agency (IEA), and British 
Petroleum (BP).  Unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) models were 
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estimated for two models consistent with the two research questions. VAR 
models have multivariate forms that can capture the complex dynamics in 
terms of the association between OPEC’s stabilisation policies and interaction 
of the key market players in the oil market institution. Prior to building the 
VAR models, a series of tests was considered in an effort towards building 
BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimates) models. These tests include unit root 
(parametric and non-parametric – Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philips 
Perron respectively). Johansen system cointegration tests are also considered 
to establish the long-run relationships.  In view of the sensitivity of the VAR 
models to the included lag, various lag length selection criteria were 
evaluated with a view to establishing the optimal lag for the estimation of the 
VAR. In addition, Granger causality tests were also carried out to explore 
additional evidence about the nature of the relationships between variables. 
Finally, some diagnostic tests were applied to avoid any possible 
misspecifications and enhance the validity of the results. 
1.8 Summary and Conclusion  
Studies on OPEC have received significant interest since the first oil price 
shock of 1973. A large proportion of the literature has concluded that OPEC 
had operated as an effective cartel since the early 1970s (see Morris and 
Meiners, 2013). However, other studies (for example, Kiswani, 2014) failed 
to agree with the fact that OPEC had operated as an effective cartel. 
Brémond et al. (2012) who applied cointegration and panel data approach 
concluded that OPEC’s market power was gradually influenced by the oil 
pricing system evolution over time indicating that its behaviour is not static 
and major events have accounted for such changes. Splitting the members 
into two groups (savers and spenders), they noted that cartel behaviour was 
applicable in only sub-groups, but OPEC operated in most periods as a price 
taker.  
Furthermore, OPEC had a declared policy to maintain oil prices within a 
specific price range by introducing oil price band policy in the year 2000. The 
inconclusive nature of research findings in this area and the fact that OPEC 
had received wide media criticism for its inability to keep oil prices within its 
set target require further research. In this regard, a target price zone theory 
was introduced as a theoretical basis and within econometric modelling 
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framework to test the extent to which OPEC had attempted to stabilise oil 
prices within the band and why it had failed in pursuing its self-imposed OPB 
policy.  
To summarise the entire chapter, section 1.1 provided a background to the 
study, followed by the statement of the research problem and justification of 
the study in sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively. Section 1.4 presented the 
main research questions this study set to address. Section 1.5 discussed the 
research aim and objectives. Theoretical framework and the research 
methodology used in this research project were introduced in sections 1.6 
and 1.7 respectively. Finally, figure 1.3 presented a diagrammatical structure 
of the entire thesis. 
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Chapter Two Role of OPEC in Setting Oil prices 
2.1 Introduction  
Understanding the role OPEC plays in setting oil prices is a fundamental step 
in unravelling the complexities in the oil market. According to recent OPEC 
data12, almost 80% of global proven oil reserves lie within the boundaries of 
OPEC members. However, only 40% of world production is from OPEC 
(Forbes, 2013). One interpretation of this mismatch between the ownership 
of the world’s reserves of oil and the actual production of oil is that OPEC 
must be holding back production, presumably to keep prices high, and 
consequently, OPEC must be acting as a producers’ cartel which is 
responsible for most oil price volatility in the oil market (see Russell and 
Ibrahim, 2013). This claim which is strongly supported by the Western media 
is totally contrary to the proclamations of price stability as contained in 
OPEC’s first resolution and its objective statements (i.e. articles 2(a-c)). One 
of this study’s objectives is to contribute in a significant way to the literature 
on whether or not OPEC is an effective cartel. The starting point for this 
analysis is to carry out a critical review of the extant literature on this topic, 
and this review is reported below. In preparation for the review, an overview 
of the role of OPEC in the oil markets is presented.  
2.2 Origin of Oil and Emergence of OPEC  
Oil plays an influential role in the current energy mix and, for the foreseeable 
future, will continue to play such a role in generating energy for the 
industrialised nations (EIA, 2013). Oil and gas play a central role in driving 
the economies of both oil consuming and producing nations (Bastianoni et al., 
2005; Bastianoni et al., 2009; Mauro and Peri, 2011). Fan et al. (2008) 
summarised oil as the blood of industries across the globe. In this regard, oil 
and gas cannot be disconnected from the countries’ and global politics. 
Therefore, to understand this role in relation to OPEC’s actions, the following 
questions should be borne in mind as the history of oil and OPEC is explored 
in the subsequent sub-sections: What was happening to oil prices prior to the 
establishment of OPEC? What led to the emergence of OPEC? What is the 
historical perception of OPEC’s role in oil price formation? The answers to the 
                                                          
12 See OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2013. 
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above questions should aid in the process of understanding and describing 
specific roles and complexities of the evolution of oil, OPEC, oil prices, and 
the oil markets from a wider perspective. Additionally, it will contribute to the 
establishment of the underlying assumptions in the study of OPEC and oil 
markets. As argued by Painter (2012: 24), understanding this recorded trend 
will be an essential step towards understanding the 'consequences of U.S. 
global dominance'. Based on this, the section is split into two with the first 
sub-section discussing the historical development of oil and nature of oil 
prices before OPEC, while the second sub-section reviews the emergence of 
OPEC and its historical role in the oil price formation.  
2.2.1 The Origin of Crude Oil  
Prior to August 1859, lubricants and other solvents used to be generated 
from different sources; e.g. "……from lard or whale, alcohol from agricultural 
products, and turpentine from wood” (Hamilton, 2011:2). Colonel Drakes’ 
innovative activity resulted in the substance first recognised as today’s 
commercial crude oil from a 69-foot well at Titusville in Pennsylvania. 
However, Drake never imagined the complexity of the industry and the 
markets as it is today (Bockem, 2004). The first large oil reservoir was found 
when the drilling technology used in searching for water was applied on 
shallow fields. Crude oil is an important energy source usually derived from a 
complex mixture of hydrocarbons and other biological particles and liquid 
compounds resulting from some geological formations (i.e. usually from 
intensive heat) far down beneath the Earth.  According to organic theory, 
crude oil is believed to have been formed long ago from the remains of 
animals and plants that lived millions of years ago (Rahimi and Gentzis, 
2005; Wright and Gallun, 2008). Oil and gas discovery has had an important 
impact on the industrial revolution of the consuming nations as most 
transportation systems are based on oil (Mauro and Peri, 2011). 
The U.S. took the initiative in oil production in the early days and was the 
leading nation in possession of the technological know-how which made it the 
universal prime producer for almost 70% of the twentieth century (Painter, 
2012). Historically, the International Oil Companies known as “seven sisters” 
(with each company having its own vibrant history) have developed the 
international petroleum industry as the demand for the U.S. oil became 
37 
 
global between 1920s and 1970s (Sampson, 1980; Parra, 2004). While the 
global demand increased with industrialisation, the search for the precious 
commodity spread across the globe. However, the massive quantity of such 
resources was proved to be concentrated in the Middle Eastern and Latin 
American countries and again was much cheaper than not only the other 
sources of energy in the resource-rich countries but also with the oil with the 
U.S. origin (Parra, 2004; Chalabi, 2010). After the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
in the early 1920s, Middle East oil was regarded as the “spoils of war” with 
Britain, France, and the U.S. being the recipients of the spoils (Parra, 
2004:8). It is not too difficult to see the significance to the industrialised 
nations of having powerful oil companies with close connections to the 
governments of these nations (Parra, 2004; Cortese, 2006). As the 
development of more reserves grew with the demand for industrialisation, 
major oil companies by the name of “Seven Sisters” emerged and were 
strategically in control of oil prices between 1920s and the early 1970s 
(except for the 1964 OPEC intervention13).  
The system of operation by the “Seven Sisters” was long-term concession 
agreements (whose legal framework had been designed prior to 1950) 
between those corporations and the government of those resource-rich 
nations (Parra, 2004 and Chalabi, 2010). Parra (2004) noted that, from the 
historical perspective, the now discarded foundation and the implementation 
processes of the concessionary system are crucial in understanding the 
nature of the current international petroleum industry. Notably, as poor 
nations as they were, five to six core developing nations (i.e. Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela) that later made up the existing 
OPEC membership provided the raw crude oil needed for the global industrial 
growth in the 1950s; and about ten of them did the same in the 1960s 
(Parra, 2004). The nationalisation process of the oil companies which started 
from Mexico, Russia and Romania prior to the 1930s, appear to have made a 
significant impact on the nationalisation process in the current OPEC nations 
following the Second World War (see Chalabi, 2010).  
                                                          
13 OPEC’s intervention in early 1964 succeeded in achieving a constant level ($1.80 per barrel) 
of posted prices which were originally falling; as well as influencing taxation rules and practice 
that improve the revenue accruing to the nations who possess those natural resources (see 
Fattouh, 2010 and Chalabi, 2010). 
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It is important to note that the U.S. oil reserves reached a peak in the early 
1970s as predicted by Hubbert14  in 1956 (Stoft, 2008). With the political 
event in 1973, following OPEC’s decision to enforce an oil embargo on the 
U.S. and its allies who supported Israel during the Arab-Israel war; oil prices 
quadrupled in response to a shortage in the supply from OPEC. The period 
between 1970 and 1973 marked a significant change in the balance of power 
from the international oil companies (IOCs) to OPEC in relation to oil price 
formation (Fattouh, 2010). This change in control led to the break of the then 
existing horizontal and vertical integration and control in the oil market by 
the renowned “Seven Sisters." However, this control was limited due to the 
lack of technical skills and capacity (due to the capital intensive nature of oil 
business) of the oil-producing nations to develop the resources and transport 
it to the final consumers. Given the extent of technical know-how possessed 
by the IOCs (mainly owned by the Western countries) and the perceived 
threat of OPEC’s action on their national securities, it will be of interest to find 
answers to some questions, particularly where commitments in alternative 
energy are made by the International Energy Agency (IEA) group. Could the 
IOCs or Western countries (most particularly the U.S.) have invested in such 
areas considered high, costly and risky (e.g. Gulf of Mexico, Alaska, North 
Sea) without exerting pressure on the oil prices to rise to the level at which 
oil extraction from those areas becomes profitable? 
As a journalist while analysing some political speeches during the 1973 oil 
price crisis, Sampson (1980:5) raised some important questions in fear of 
what the outlook for the oil market would be in the future. First, he 
considered what the consequence would be with a switch of pricing control 
from oil consuming nations to oil-producing nations. Another important 
question raised was “would the old powers of the companies and the 
consumers reassert their role, to divide and to rule?” Fattouh (2010) 
described the origin of OPEC as similar to that of a ‘trade union’. The only 
great distinction between the major IOCs and OPEC was the ownership of the 
resources in question. While the “seven sisters” were fully in possession of 
the know-how and control of the prices, OPEC was in possession of the 
                                                          
14 Marion King Hubbert was a Shell researcher who predicted America’s oil reaching its peak 
between 1965 and 1970 in a presentation at American Petroleum Institute (API) located in 
Texas. 
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resources and was agitating for higher revenue they considered fair for such 
resources.  
2.2.2 Historical Development of OPEC’s Control of Oil Prices 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) came into 
existence following the Baghdad Conference in September 1960 by five-
member-countries namely: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 
Other countries joined the organisation in the subsequent years are as 
follows: Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates 
(1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), and Gabon (1975). 
Ecuador and Gabon later withdrew from the organization in 1992 and 1994 
respectively for various reasons. The major source of revenue to sustain the 
organisation comes from the dues receivable from member nations. As part 
of their obligations to the organisation, genuine members are required to pay 
their regular and compulsory annual dues amounting to $1,000,000.00, 
which confirms additional rights to them as against the rights attributable to 
“shadow members." Shadow members are allowed to participate in the 
discussions during debates relating to quantity controls but do not have any 
voting rights on any proposals (see Mason and Polaski, 2005 for details on 
this). The structure of OPEC was intended by the members to be similar to 
the Texas Railroad Commission (Colgan, 2014). 
Among the members of OPEC, Venezuela first made a breakthrough in 1943 
in its effort to benefit from a significant chunk of oil revenue when it signed a 
50-50 profits-sharing contract, with a major IOC (Chalabi, 2010). Venezuela 
revised its tax system to accrue more revenue from its oil resources in the 
late 1940s. Subsequently, other producers took participation in a similar 
arrangement in the 1950s. When the IOCs staged an effort to retaliate 
against Venezuela’s tax decision, a significant shift was noticed in demand 
from Venezuelan oil to other Arab nations’ oil. Venezuela tactically responded 
by convincing and seeking cooperation of other producer nations to make 
similar tax changes.  
Whilst the origin of OPEC was indeed similar to a “trade union” (Fattouh, 
2010) the primary motive for coming together under a single umbrella was to 
harmonise production policies of the member nations with a view to 
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influencing oil prices. This coalition became determined to resist the making 
of unilateral decisions by the “Seven Sisters” via the “posted prices’ (see 
Parra, 2004; and Chalabi, 2010). Chouri (1980) summarised three basic 
motivations for establishment of OPEC. 1 Fear of price-cuts by the IOCs 
which had powers over oil prices through a system of “posted prices”; 2 
Perception that new entry of participants with lower production prices could 
threaten the existing developed markets; and 3 Possession of the technical 
know-how that increased the confidence of the producers to risk an attempt 
towards control of the market against the exploitative interests of the oil 
consuming nations and the IOCs. OPEC took the first step towards 
systematically influencing the post price when Libya first increased the tax 
rate to 55% from the initial 50%.  
Subsequently, the implementation by Iran and Kuwait consolidated a move 
by OPEC in Caracas (in December, 1970) to adopt the same policy and 
further demanded that posted price should reflect any changes in foreign 
exchange rates. The non-compliance or rejection of OPEC’s proposal by some 
of the IOCs resulted in a total sanction/embargo from the OPEC. OPEC’s 
strategic approach was carrot and stick, which could be seen as a 
combination of negotiation and sanction. The outcome was favourable to 
OPEC. Chouri (1980) noted that, historically oil companies had been exerting 
significant political and economic influence in the pricing of oil, which led to 
intense pressure within the host nations. For example, an 8% price cut was 
followed by a further 6% unilateral cut in the posted price by the 
international oil companies (Chouri, 1980). The objective of OPEC to attain 
higher but fair oil prices initially appeared impossible given the evidence that 
the establishment of the organisation in September 1960 recorded little or no 
impact on oil prices (see Colgan, 2014).  
The period between 1970 and 1973 marked a significant change in the 
balance of power to determine oil prices from the IOCs to the members of 
OPEC (Fattouh, 2010). Prior to the establishment of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, oil prices were fundamentally 
cheap15 and hardly fluctuated beyond a range of $2.50 and $3 per barrel 
                                                          
15 Tsoskounoglou et al. (2008) attempted to analyse factors responsible for oil price changes 
with a view to answer whether the era of cheap oil has past. A good background of what 
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(Williams, 2010) or less than 1% volatility (Regnier, 2007). Oil prices more 
than quadrupled in 1973 generally due to OPEC’s policy and actions resulting 
from Arab-Israel war. Opinion is divided with the majority attributing this 
sharp increase to the restricted oil supply by OPEC, which brought about 
shortage of oil (Adelman, 1992 and 2004; Pirog, 2007; Dvir and Rogoff, 
2009). Another strand of opinion cast doubt on OPEC’s ability to raise oil 
prices four-fold (see Kepplinger and Roth, 1979). Other studies such as Kilian 
(2008) and Colgan (2014) supported the view of Kepplinger and Roth (1979) 
that the action of OPEC was deliberately exaggerated by the media. As 
mentioned earlier, it is important to note that the beginning of the 1973 oil 
price shock coincided with the period when the U.S. oil had already reached 
its own peak.  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this study, a range of policy 
measures were introduced in response to the 1973 oil price shock which 
included: establishment of the U.S.-SPR in 1974 and the creation of the IEA 
in 1975. Furthermore, investments were seen to be growing into the high 
costly areas such as Alaska, Gulf of Mexico, North Sea. (Chalabi, 2010). This 
evidence conforms to the earlier argument that volatile oil prices have 
implications on OPEC’s revenue in the long run (see Byzalov, 2002; Horn, 
2004). While approaching the end of the first oil price shock, when oil prices 
began to decline towards the pre-price shock period, the crisis in Iran in 
which the U.S. government was involved indirectly, led to what was 
considered the second global oil price shock in 1979, which lasted until 1982 
(see Gately, 1986).  
Furthermore, the 1979 second oil-price-shock ended in 1986 and there was a 
subsequent oil price fall for over a decade until the end of the 1990s. No one 
will dispute that Saudi Arabia is one of the America’s friends in the Middle 
East. Cheating by OPEC members (members ignoring the output limits set by 
OPEC) has been evident since the day OPEC first introduced the first quota 
system in the early 1980s (Chalabi, 2010). In 1986, Saudi Arabia and its 
allies within OPEC took a decisive action to consistently increase their oil 
                                                                                                                                                                             
makes up cheap oil can be found in their paper titled:- The end of cheap oil: Current status 
and prospects. 
42 
 
supply (Gately, 1986). Evidence of increased stockpiling can be observed 
from figure 2.1 below: 
Figure 2.1: U.S. Monthly Oil Closing Stock in Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR) from October, 1977 to December, 2013 
 
Source: U.S.-EIA, 2013 
As shown in figure 2.1, the U.S. increased its stockpile of oil as the oil prices 
declined in the early 1980s following the second oil price shock. Demand for 
OPEC oil fell by more than 40% since 1982 (as prices went down) and 
remained low even after the price fall (Gately, 1986). In August 1985, more 
than half of the OPEC’s 4 million bpd increase in output came from Saudi 
Arabia, and this finally led to the oil price collapse of 1986 (Gately, 1986).  
However, high oil prices were observed towards the end of the 20th century 
and grew into the new century to what resembles the oil price surge in the 
1970s. This period equally witnessed growing investment into the alternative 
energy sources, most particularly from the renewable sources due to the 
perceived effects of greenhouse carbon emissions on the environment or 
global climate change. Although increased oil prices during this period are 
allegedly attributed to the actions of OPEC in the oil market, the high costs of 
substitute sources of energy might not be ruled out easily; although it is 
often attributed to measures being taken by the IEA members for energy 
security. However, a more promising source of energy in terms of consistent 
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supply exists but costly in the short-run (see Sioshansi, 2006). Shale energy 
revolution is taking place in the U.S. that might potentially restore its status 
as the global energy producer consistent with EIA (2014) U.S. energy 
projection under three cases scenarios as highlighted earlier in Chapter 1 of 
the thesis. For the high scenario (which implies highest energy production) to 
be achieved, one of the key assumptions being that understanding is 
achieved between the U.S. government and the public who often end up 
becoming the major burden bearers of high costly energy policies. It remains 
an important challenge to reconcile the conflicting policies; one from cleaner 
sources of renewables and the other from a riskier process of fracking but, 
which potentially guarantees energy independence from OPEC members. In 
almost a decade since 2004, investments in the renewables have seemed to 
be on the decline (see figure 2.2 below). 
Figure 2.2: Trend in Renewable-Energy Investments 
 
Source: McCrone 2014, Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
Figure 2.2 presents trends in the investments in renewable which seem to be 
on the consistent increase since 2004, slowed by the 2008 global economic 
recession and reached the peak in 2011. Thereafter, it begins to decline by 
10% in 2012 and 11% in 2013. The increased investments by the OECD/IEA 
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members in the alternative energy have led to significant decline in 
consumption of OPEC oil as discussed later in the chapter. However, this 
important move by the OECD/IEA accords them some degree of energy 
independence. The questions remain: Is the decision to be less dependent on 
OPEC that is naturally endowed with low extraction cost resources helping the 
affordability objective by OECD/IEA members in the short-run? Is it plausible 
that the increased investment in the alternative sources of energy is the main 
driver for sustaining high oil prices or vice versa? Most EIA projections (e.g. 
EIA, 2013) often look into the prospects of the long-run in pursuing energy 
security objectives. Oil as a major source of energy provides nearly two-third 
of energy demand and is likely to fuel the energy demand of the 
industrialised nations over the next decades (Alvarez-Ramirez et al., 2003; 
Bernabe et al., 2004; OPEC, 2010; EIA, 2009). The real as against the 
nominal average crude oil price has exceeded $41 per barrel from 1986 to 
2003 and has witnessed a consistent annual increase (e.g. by average of 
23% annually and to more than $145 in the first half of the 2008) from 2003 
to 2008 (Ji-Hyang and Lee, 2012; King et al., 2012). 
2.3 OPEC Structure in the Oil Market  
Many studies have been carried out on the role of OPEC in the international 
oil price formation. The pattern  of relationships between different variables 
has been considered with a view to generating evidence on whether the 
organisation operated or still operates as a cartel or not. In this regard, the 
review of the literature attempts to explore the objective, nature and 
behaviour of OPEC and its members as well as how those characteristics 
influence the oil market in general and oil prices in particular. A very good 
start for this review is the study by Allsopp and Fattouh (2011) where they 
highlighted various models about alternating from classic cartel, “clumsy” 
cartel, dominant firm model, oligopolistic, monopolistic, and bureaucratic 
cartel. These different structures have been investigated against OPEC, and 
the outcomes are crucial in understanding why OPEC is generally regarded as 
a cartel in most literature as highlighted by Morris and Meiners (2013). 
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2.3.1 OPEC Models in the Oil Market 
There is much debate about whether the organisation of petroleum exporting 
countries (OPEC) is, in essence, a cartel of producer nations that restricts oil 
production with a view to influencing international oil prices at the expense of 
oil consuming nations. This cartel allegation often linked to OPEC has its 
origin from 1973 when oil prices quadrupled in what is perceived to be the 
initial oil price shock. The name “OPEC” was rarely known by many since 
inception until the events in the 1973 which was perceived to be the first oil 
price shock when oil prices quadrupled (Chalabi, 2010).  However, since then 
the organisation has been directly or indirectly alleged to be responsible for 
most sharp and sustained high oil prices over the last four decades (Adelman, 
2004; Saxton, 2005; Morris and Meiners, 2013). Although the literature does 
not conclusively support this viewpoint, the media and politicians in the 
Western world invariably describe OPEC as a “cartel” (Bina and Vo, 2007; 
Chalabi, 2010; Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). OPEC’s objectives as clearly 
contained in its statute include: ensuring fair prices while stabilising oil prices 
in the global oil market in the general interest of its members (OPEC, 2008). 
This objective is perceived to be inconsistent with cartel structure (Noguera 
and Pecchecnino, 2007). OPEC meets regularly to discuss issues associated 
with oil prices and the output of its members. In this direction, different 
models/theories were tested on OPEC market behaviour in relation to 
changes in oil prices. 
The current OPEC data shows that about 80% of global proved conventional 
reserves are owned by its members which ostensibly make the organisation 
(i.e. OPEC) the leading global corporate oil producer which contributes more 
than 40% of the world’s oil supply. OPEC’s status of being the key decision 
maker with respect to oil production is, however, open to challenge as 
current disclosure of reserves of shale energy made by the EIA implies there 
has been a shift in the balance of power and control from OPEC to non-OPEC 
producers (Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). Nevertheless, the sizeable reserves 
held by OPEC’s members should, ceteris parabus, enable OPEC to be in a 
position to exert pressures and control on the oil prices globally (Cairns and 
Calfucura, 2012; Coleman, 2012). However, OPEC leaders have been 
reiterating their position that events such as those in the 1970s would not 
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repeat themselves in the future. A view supporting this assertion has two 
strands in the literature. Some oil market analysts and researchers (e.g. 
Sodhi, 2008) believed that OPEC market power has diminished with time 
given the development in the shale energy which has spawned new 
dimension and shift in the balance of power from OPEC to non-OPEC 
(Omondude, 2002; Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). Similarly, Bernabe et al. 
(2004) argued that, changes in the OPEC reserves since the oil price shocks 
in the 1970s have already resulted in OPEC losing the power to dictate oil 
prices to the other market forces.  
Similarly, other studies carried out to assess the fact about ‘cartel’ claims 
against OPEC (Kepplinger and Roth, 1979; Splimbergo, 2001; De Santis, 
2003; Bina and Vo, 2007; Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013; Colgan, 2014) have 
expressed varying results but mainly doubt OPEC’s ability to stabilise prices. 
Is this reputation still valid? Kepplinger and Roth (1979) perceived the 
OPEC’s action as being exaggerated. Bina and Vo (2007) also examined the 
effects of OPEC’s output decisions using event's studies and find no evidence 
that OPEC operates as a cartel or holds any market power of promoting high 
oil prices. This finding is consistent with Alhajji and Huettner (2000a) who 
also argued that 40% of the market share to OPEC does not give OPEC the 
market power to operate as a cartel to control oil prices. In his attempt to 
highlight the weak nature of OPEC in the oil price formation and the oil 
market, Colgan (2014) believed that OPEC’s action during the 1973 oil price 
crisis was hugely misunderstood but such actions could not have triggered 
the high prices. If OPEC had noted its capacity limitation to control the prices, 
should it have introduced the OPB policy in the first place? 
Prior to the establishment of OPEC, the international cartel16 of most powerful 
oil companies popularly known as “Seven Sisters17” were in absolute control 
of global oil prices through a system of “posted prices 18 ” which have 
remained stable (see figure 1.1) for a considerable period known as “era of 
cheap oil” (Tsoskounoglou et al., 2008). Following the 1973 and 1979 first 
                                                          
16 Seven Sisters are considered international cartel because they comprised of multinational 
corporations with the monopoly of know-how and capital strengths in both upstream and 
downstream activities for oil resources.  
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and second oil price shocks respectively, OPEC becomes the central 
mainframe for reference as villain obstructing oil price stability in the oil 
market. The oil price surged in the last decade, which in nominal value 
resembles that of the 1973 (see figure 1), is directly or indirectly linked to 
OPEC’s action or inactions in relation by the IEA and most of the mass media. 
A number of attempts have been made seeking antitrust laws to enforce (see 
Waller, 2002; and Doggett, 2008) against OPEC’s actions or seeking the U.S. 
Congress’s intervention to force OPEC to act in the Western interest (see 
reports- Lautenberg, 2004; Saxton, 2005). However, this claim clearly 
contradicts the primary mission19 for creating the organisation. Furthermore, 
the cartel behaviour is incompatible with the organisation’s disclosed efforts 
for oil price stability (Alhajji and Huettner, 2000a) and that previous models 
provided insufficient evidence distinguishing between cartel practice and 
competitive firm (Smith, 2005). Most often, OPEC leaders reiterated their 
commitments to avoid the recurrence of events similar to that of 1973 oil 
price crisis due to its effects to both oil consuming and producing nations. 
2.4 Cartel and Non-Cartel Debate 
Theoretically, the basic belief of the pure capitalist economic system is that 
businesses are usually out to make profits. How businesses achieve such a 
motive is subject to different interpretations. This is a foundation built in the 
classical study of cartel behaviour. According to Al-Qahtani et al. (2008b), 
cartel hypothesis assumes a firm or influential part of the firm to operate as 
“a monolithic wealth-maximizing monopolist." It is behaviour where a firm 
places a constraint on production/supply of resources with the sole intention 
of maximising its profits by pushing the prices as high as possible. Several 
studies were conducted to examine the OPEC’s or its members’ incentive to 
produce; and whether OPEC (individually or collectively) operates as a cartel 
or not (Allsopp and Fattouh, 2011). However, some studies (e.g. Moran, 
1981; Gately, 1984; Bockem, 2004) doubted the ability of the classical 
theoretical models of a firm to offer comprehensive explanations as to the 
                                                          
19  OPEC’s mission statement is “….. to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its 
Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, 
economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a 
fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry”. More information could be 
about OPEC’s mission can be found from the following link: 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm 
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actual role of OPEC in the oil market. For example, Moran (1981) believed 
that oil market and OPEC structure are unpredictable from the economics 
perspective. Gately (1984) further noted the challenge by describing it as still 
an open question for OPEC behaviour to be best modelled. Bockem (2004) 
acknowledged that from both theoretical and econometric modelling 
perspective, designing the optimal model capable of describing OPEC 
behaviour will be highly challenging. Furthermore, Smith (2005) 
acknowledged such fact that studies about OPEC behaviour in the oil market 
still remained largely inconclusive. 
It should be noted that, the differences in approaches and assumptions of 
these studies on OPEC have impacted on the results- classifications and 
explanations of OPEC behaviour as a cartel or non-cartel (as noted by Smith, 
2005). This sub-section reviews evidence by previous literature in classifying 
OPEC as a cartel.   
2.4.2.1 OPEC as a Cartel 
As earlier mentioned, the term “cartel” has become synonymous with the 
name of OPEC in the literature on OPEC. A sizeable proportion of the 
literature portrays OPEC as an evil cartel. The evidence cuts across studies 
such as Osborne (1976); Adelman (1982, 1986, 1990, 1993, 2001 2002, 
2003, 2004); Salant (1976); Cremer and Weitzman (1976); Pindyck (1979, 
2001); Newbery (1981); Morrison (1987); Greene (1991); Griffin (1992); 
Berg et al. (1997); Dahl and Celta (2000); Byzalov (2002); Thompson 
(2010). In most cases, the studies applied cartel models and reached such a 
conclusion that OPEC deliberately took actions to promote high oil prices at 
the expense of the Western nations. 
Most of these studies adopted sophisticated theoretical assumptions (such as 
game theory where it is difficult if not impossible for the equilibrium position 
to reflect some moral and ethical considerations) in their analysis. For 
example, Salant (1976) first introduced a market system where OPEC (as a 
cartel) is modelled as a dominant producer while the remaining non-OPEC 
producers are price takers (i.e. a fringe). In his analysis, certain crucial 
assumptions were set for the results to be obtained in this direction. One of 
these critical assumptions is “zero extraction costs” to the cartel which, 
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arguably, is unrealistic. Assuming OPEC cartel to operate in a “dominant 
extractor” model as a limiting case of 'asymmetric Cournot oligopoly,' it was 
found that the competitive fringe acts more like Nash players20 rather than 
price takers. Ulph and Folie (1980) re-examined the model by introducing 
positive and constant marginal extraction costs as against the zero extraction 
costs by Salant (1976) but still applied the open-loop Nash equilibrium 
concept. Following improvement to Salant’s model, it was generalised by Ulph 
and Folie (1980). However, the model suffered from the same criticism in its 
assumption relating to cost of extraction. More crucially, inventory costs of 
spare crude oil capacity and also environmental costs of such extraction were 
overlooked.  
Some weaknesses in the open-loop Nash equilibrium approach were identified 
(see Polasky, 1990). Subsequent studies (such as Groot et al., 2003 and 
Benchekroun and Withagen, 2012) used closed-loop assumptions of game 
theory. Benchekroun and Withagen (2012) explored further the price-taking 
behaviour in the oil market between the cartel and the fringe under imperfect 
competition within “open-loop" and "closed-loop" cartel-fringe games. Their 
study concluded that OPEC operated as a cartel over the time horizon by 
setting production quotas that helped determine the price paths.  
Griffin (1985) attempted to empirically investigate a cartel hypothesis on 
OPEC and its members by establishing any “market-sharing behaviour” 21 
using different strategies. His attempts to test various models on both OPEC 
and non-OPEC producers concluded that the competitive model only 
fittednon-OPEC producersl. Although, Gülen (1996) employed a relatively 
different approach (i.e. cointegration and Granger causality in the time 
series), and found evidence of causality (between 1982 and 1993) and cartel 
behaviour by OPEC, while the subsequent period showed an absence of 
causality. In the same vein, Adelman (1982, 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2002) 
                                                          
20 Nash condition or equilibrium is an assumption in game theory based on rational choice 
model (i.e. that an action is chosen by a player while forming a belief about other market 
player’s action profile in a correct manner with some degree of certainty). For details, see 
Osborne (2002). 
21  Griffin (1985) believed that by correlating productions values between OPEC individual 
members and the entire OPEC’s, the correlation coefficient could say a lot about market-
sharing behaviour to justify the entire OPEC’s behaviour as a cartel or non-cartel in the oil 
market. Jones (1990) extended Griffin’s (1985) study and produces invariably similar position. 
For a detailed review of their findings, see Al-Qahtani et al. (2008b).  
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found that scarcity never existed in the oil market, over the last three 
decades, rather OPEC (which according to him holds the oil market power) 
deliberately restricted supply, despite their low production costs, while non-
OPEC producers attempted to maximise their production. Rejecting 
application of a cartel model to OPEC, Dahl and Yücel (1991) found 
interesting variation in the pattern of behaviour by the members of OPEC. For 
instance, they documented evidence of target-revenue and swing producer 
goals among some members. However, Loderer (1985) could not reject the 
null hypothesis that OPEC did not operate as a cartel during the 1980s, 
although he established the absence of a significant effect of OPEC decision's 
announcements upon the oil prices.  
Furthermore, other research of a similar nature was also carried out (see 
Griffin, 1985; Jones , 1990; Youhanna, 1994; Dahl and Yücel, 1991; Gülen, 
1996; Byzalov, 2002; Almoguera et al., 2011; Brémond et al., 2012; 
Coleman, 2012; Lin, 2013). Perhaps of most interest to this thesis the work 
of Byzalov (2002) highlighted challenges facing OPEC members regarding 
their cartel habit as the consumers (most particularly the West) tailor their 
activities in forward-looking behaviour aimed at demand-reducing 
investment. In his dynamic model, which was adopted from Fershtman and 
Pakes (2000)22, Byzalov (2002) argued that from the evidence of collusive 
behaviour of OPEC in the spot market, which increased the tendency of 
moving the substitution-effect outward as the consumer nations intensified 
their search for an alternative energy, such activity made OPEC worse-off in 
the long run. However, the study did not incorporate new demands from the 
emerging economies such as China and India, as well as the increasing 
energy demands as the world’s population grows higher.  
Almoguera et al. (2011) used estimates obtained from a simultaneous 
equation switching regression model to test OPEC cartel behaviour based on 
data over a 30-year period (from 1974 to 2004). Their study found evidence 
of a switch between collusive and non-collusive behaviour and they concluded 
that OPEC behaved as a cartel in some periods but in most some periods, it 
                                                          
22 Fershman and Pakes (2000)’s dynamic collusive framework based on Pakes and McGuire 
(1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) with numerical analysis to demonstrate how price wars 
are generated and consumer surplus achieved.  
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was not effective in raising oil prices systematically beyond Cournot 
competition levels. OPEC is therefore constrained with limited power by 
competition to actively operate as a cartel. In an attempt to understand how 
power is exercised in the oil market. Lin (2013) examined collusion in OPEC 
and oligopolistic behaviour in non-OPEC producers over a 35 year period 
(from 1970 to 2004) using dynamic models. The study found evidence of 
collusion among OPEC members, while non-OPEC producers collectively 
exhibited the characteristics of an oligopolistic fringe. On this basis, the study 
concluded that OPEC operated as a cartel over the period considered while 
non-OPEC operated as a fringe. However, in an effort to model the structure 
of the oil market, both studies were mainly supply-driven studies and also 
silent about the policies of oil consuming nations, which might also affect oil 
markets.  
Brémond et al. (2012) introduced cointegration and panel data approach to 
the same issue in an attempt to provide an answer to whether OPEC still 
operated as a cartel and found partially similar results. Furthermore, 
Brémond et al. (2012)’s study concluded that OPEC’s market power was 
gradually influenced by the oil pricing system evolution with time indicating 
that its behaviour is not static and major events have accounted for change. 
Splitting the members into two groups (savers and spenders), they note that 
cartel behaviour is applicable in the sub-groups, but OPEC operated in most 
periods as a price taker. Coleman (2012) investigated the relative influence 
of speculation in the futures markets in relation to oil prices, security threats 
in some OPEC members’ region, and other shocks by employing monthly data 
over a period 25-year period (1984–2007). The study concluded that the oil 
market is dominated by OPEC as a cartel of producers, and that volatility in 
prices was usually due to its ability to leverage such dominance.  
In an effort to answer the cartel question on OPEC, Brémond et al. (2012) 
investigated the coordination in production policies amongst OPEC members 
using “cointegration and Granger causality tests” on monthly data between 
1973 and 2009. Their results indicated that OPEC is a price-taker, although a 
cartel-like action was observed in a subgroup within OPEC. Yousefi and 
Wirjanto (2005) moreover, documented evidence of Saudi Arabia’s behaviour 
resembled that of the market leaders. In search for factors relating to OPEC 
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that influence oil prices, Kaufmann et al. (2004) employed a unit root test23 
(augmented Dickey Fuller test and Dickey Fuller), cointegration test, and 
HEGY24 test statistics to investigate causality between independent variables25 
and dependent variable (oil prices) on the other side. The study concluded 
that the independent variables granger-cause the oil prices and not in the 
reverse form. Sankey et al. (2010) also noted that OPEC operated as a cartel 
and that depletion decisions left in the hands of the nationalists' governments 
of OPEC nations have not only led to a restriction of oil production but also 
investments into the new capacity.  
2.4.2.2 Non-Cartel Hypothesis 
Despite the sizeable literature in support of OPEC operating as a cartel, other 
studies have failed to find convincing evidence that the organisation is a 
cartel (see, for example, Kepplinger and Roth, 1979; Plaut, 1981; Loderer, 
1985; Griffin, 1985; Dahl and Yücel, 1991; Al-Saif, 1997; Morse, 1997; 
Alhajji and Huettner, 2000a; Bentzen, 2007; Kaufmann et al., 2008; 
Reynolds and Pippenger, 2010; Colgan, 2014; Cairns and Calfucura, 2012). 
In developing arguments against a cartel hypothesis, Plaut (1981) highlighted 
that OPEC does possess the market power to influence oil prices higher than 
what should have been obtainable competitively if OPEC had not restricted its 
oil production. Loderer (1985) found evidence of collusion after 1980 by 
OPEC members’ production behaviour but did not find any evidence that 
OPEC operated as a cartel in the 1970s.  
Among the studies which rejected the cartel hypothesis on OPEC or its cores 
are: Alhajji and Huettner (2000a, 2000b); Kaufmann et al. (2004); and 
Brémond et al. (2012). Brémond et al. (2012) attempted to study whether 
OPEC acted as a cartel in the periods considered. The study used a panel data 
setting, co-integration, and Granger causality tests over production decision 
data (of all the 11 OPEC member nations and 4 key non-OPEC producers). 
The study found that OPEC operated as a price taker in most periods except 
the period after the oil counter- shock when it acted as a price setter, mostly 
                                                          
23 The unit root tests are discussed in Chapter 5 of this study. 
24 HEGY stands for initials in the study conducted by Hylleberg, S., Engle, R. F., Granger, L. W. 
J. and Yo, B. S. (1990). 
25 Kaufmann et al. (2004) identified the key variables as “OPEC capacity utilisation, OPEC 
quotas, the degree to which OPEC exceeds these production quotas, and OECD stocks of crude 
oil.” 
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within a subgroup of its members distinguished as either ‘savers’ or 
‘spenders’ depending upon the cheating incentives (Brémond et al., 2012). 
Reynolds and Pippenger (2010) failed to accept the cartel hypothesis on 
OPEC after applying a case study approach to the study of Venezuelan oil 
production relative to OPEC. 
Furthermore, Brémond et al. (2012) did not find evidence that OPEC operated 
as a cartel during most of the periods they considered, and they concluded 
that OPEC is best described as a price taker. A study of some significance is 
that of Fan and Xu (2011) who studied relative factors that have affected oil 
prices from 2000 to 2008 by splitting the periods into two, i.e. 2000-2005 
(“Relative Calm Market”) and 2004-2008 (“Bubble Accumulation”). In both 
periods, the study documented evidence that speculation played a key role in 
driving oil prices high.  
2.4.2.3 Other Models of OPEC in the Oil Markets 
The pricing policy of OPEC has received particular attention from the model 
builders following the major oil price shocks of the 1970’s and 1980s. From 
1975, there has been much modeling attempts to explain the economic 
reasons behind the first jump in prices, October 1973 – January 1974. 
Following the 1973 oil price shocks, a significant review of literature (Fischer 
et al, 1975; Ezzati, 1976; Loderer, 1985; Geroski et al., 1987, Green, 1988; 
Jones, 1990; Dahl and Yücel, 1991; Griffin and Nielson, 1994; Gülen, 1996; 
Gault, et al., 1990, and Gault et al., 1999; Alhajji and Huettner, 2000a and 
2000b; Spilimbergo, 2001; and Ramcharran, 2001 and 2002; De Santis, 
2003) has been developed  to model the structure of OPEC behaviour in the 
light of volatile oil prices in the oil market. As noted above, most of the model 
assumptions on OPEC were examinations of cartel behaviour in an attempt to 
explain the price shock. After the second jump in oil prices 1979, the 
modelers tried to link the two price increases in the hope of giving a plausible 
economic explanation for OPEC’s conduct. The dominant firm models assume 
both cartel and price leadership on OPEC or OPEC core.  
In this direction, a number of scholarly studies have been carried out using 
different approaches to produce empirical evidence of the structure of OPEC 
and how it influences the oil market. Various models partially linked to cartel 
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or non-cartel are therefore identified to include: Low discount theory (Johany, 
1980); monopolistic structure (Cremer and Weitzman, 1976; Dong and 
Whalley, 2012); oligopolistic structure (Stackleberg oligopoly26 Nogueraa and 
Pecchecnino, 2007); collusive behaviour (Adelman, 1982; Danielsen and Kim, 
1988; Al-Sultan, 1995); dominant producer (Mabro, 1975; Erickson, 1980; 
Plaut, 1981; Griffin and Teece, 1982; Wirl, 2009); swing producer (Dahl and 
Yücel, 1991); competitive firm (MacAvoy, 1982; Alhajji and Huettner, 
2000a), revenue targets27 (Ezzati, 1976, 1978; Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani, 
1980; Teece, 1982; Coleman, 2012); bureaucratic syndicate (Smith, 2005);  
changes in ownership model in OPEC (Johany, 1979); political models (Ezzati, 
1976); property right models (Johany, 1979 and 1980; Odell and Rosing, 
1983; Gülen, 1996; Hansen and Lindholt, 2008) and others (e.g. Slaibi et al., 
2010) target capacity and target price models.  
2.5 OPEC Quota System, Cheating and Oil Prices 
One of the major problems faced by OPEC has been the ability to coordinate 
effectively the actions of its members (i.e. “collective action problem”) in 
accordance with its policy statements and objectives (Rousseau, 1998; 
Chalabi, 2010). This is what has been termed in the OPEC literature as 
“cheating behaviour” in OPEC (Dibooglu and AlGudhea, 2007). Cheating 
emerges as a result of the self –imposed quota system introduced by OPEC in 
1982 as a stabilisation measure, although the agreement to unify their policy 
has been in the Statute of the organisation as far back as 1960 when the 
organisation was established. In analysing OPEC’s incentives for higher 
production among members, Gately (2004) perceived two groups emerging 
from OPEC that is embarked in a “constant sum game," namely:  the one 
which initiates  a move and the other that responds, which poses a challenge 
in coordinating the overall objectives of the cartel. Cheating emerges where 
the members produce and supply oil beyond the officially allocated quotas.  
Logically, one would expect the cheating to be beneficial to the market 
considering the allegation that oil market is undersupplied due to restriction 
exercised by OPEC. If this position holds true, then a negative association 
                                                          
26 This is a market structure where the cartel (i.e. OPEC) takes the leadership position even in 
the oligopoly while other players follow (see Nogueraa and Pecchecnino, 2007). 
27 Alhajji and Huettner (2000b) could not reject the model on certain OPEC members such as 
Algeria, Libya and Nigeria. 
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should be expected, which translates that increased OPEC cheating should 
lower oil prices (see Abraham, 2000). Reduced cheating in OPEC, however, 
might result in higher oil prices because OPEC official production is not 
sufficient to accommodate the global oil demand. Furthermore, the Granger 
causality between OPEC cheating behaviour and the oil prices should flow in a 
bi-directional form as follows: OPEC cheating, whether positive or negative 
might influence oil prices; and that change in oil prices is likely to dictate the 
level of OPEC cheating in accordance with the theory of demand and supply. 
In the light of the findings in some previous studies, OPEC was found to be a 
non-cartel but other core of OPEC were believed to have operated as price 
leaders or dominant sub group of OPEC. This action, according to Yousefi and 
Wirjanto (2004), resulted in greater disagreements by creating segmentation 
within the organisation.  
A sizeable literature is documented on cheating behaviour in OPEC. For 
example, Rousseau (1998) noted that incentive to cheat on OPEC exists in 
each member by producing in excess of its official allocation. He further notes 
that “However, all members have a similar incentive to increase production – 
i.e.; they all want to free ride on the collective good. The incentive to cheat 
implies that cartels are traditionally short-lived enterprises.” Individual 
members were studied, and some interesting characteristics about them are 
documented in the OPEC literature. As an illustration, a case study approach 
was utilised to examine if OPEC operated as a cartel with particular reference 
to Venezuela’s production decisions using Granger's causality. It was found 
that bidirectional causality occurs between Venezuela’s production and OPEC 
production in different times in the short run indicating cheating by Venezuela 
after cuts, which ultimately suggest a ‘tit-for-tat oligopoly game28’ but far 
from anti-competitive behaviour Reynolds and Pippenger (2010:6045). 
However, the study found a unidirectional causality running from Venezuela’s 
production to OPEC in the long run, suggesting that weakness in OPEC’s 
output coordination as against the way it reacts to such output. A further 
examination using VECM suggested that no evidence of Venezuela’s 
production converging towards OPECs quota assigned to Venezuela. Hamilton 
                                                          
28 Tit-for-tat simply goes beyond a simple English meaning of "equivalent retaliation" to include 
a highly sophisticated strategy considered effective by a particular player in a game theory. 
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(2011), who studied events that led to the volatility in oil prices since the first 
oil price shock to 2010, concluded that Saudi Arabia had engaged on 
“cheating behaviour” by unilaterally taking a deliberate decision to alter 
production with a view to influencing oil prices, considering its reserves 
advantage. This finding is consistent with that of Dibooglu and AlGudhea 
(2007). 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) modelled the relationship between variables in OPEC 
nations and oil prices using time-series analysis. Quotas and cheating were 
examined and found to be crucial determinants of elasticity of production 
response by OPEC nations. The study concluded that OPEC does not control 
oil prices as often proclaimed but evidence suggests that it can influence the 
prices in a sense. In an earlier study, Kaufmann et al. (2007) also 
documented evidence of competitive elements in OPEC behaviours. Finally, 
the study concludes that all nations other than Saudi Arabia show some form 
of production sharing behaviour, which may imply that OPEC shares 
“mismatches” between the call for OPEC production and OPEC quotas.  
Some studies (such as Mabro, 1989; Gault et al., 1990; Bakhtiari, 1992; 
Alsalem et al., 1997,  Morse, 1997; Al-Saif, 1997; Kaufmann et al., 2004) 
have attempted to analyse OPEC quota decisions. Gault et al. (1999) 
evaluated OPEC’s quota allocation to members in their quest to understand 
OPEC behaviour.  Gault et al. (1999) believed that OPEC’s imposition of 
production cuts since February 1998 has been mainly arbitrary, and the 
bases of such allocations were not disclosed.  Quota violations among the 
OPEC members have been attributed to what members perceived as “unfair” 
distribution of allocation quotas (see Ait-Laoussine, 1997; Salman, 1997). 
Gault et al. (1999) added that an ‘explicit allocation formula’ would increase 
what constitutes “fairness” to member nations.  
Mazraati and Jazayeri (2004) studied the relationship between OPEC’s 
compliance with the pre-set production agreements and the global oil price 
volatility on monthly historical data for a seven-year period (1995-2002) 
using compliance techniques, intervention analysis and econometric models. 
The study concluded that, a compliance level within the range of 94-99% 
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achieved higher oil prices while a less compliance level attracted a lower oil 
price and more volatility.  
Kaufmann et al. (2004) attributed the oil price rise in the early beginning of 
the last decade to four reasons as follows: (1) OPEC capacity utilisation; (2) 
OPEC production quotas; (3) excess of OPEC production to the announced 
quotas; (4) OECD private inventories. Cheating increases with a decrease in 
oil prices and presence of “soft market”29 and vice versa. There is a perceived 
or implied price band in the OPEC pricing strategy even in the period when it 
was not officially declared by OPEC.  The importance of having a lower limit 
became apparent with OPEC’s experience of oil price collapse in the 1980s. 
The methodology of this research is based on the target pricing zone to 
evaluate the success or otherwise of OPEC policies in stabilising oil prices. 
The target price zone (TPZ) theory is chosen for this work due to its unique 
quality to explain the situation.   
OPEC leaders (such as Lukman and El-Badri) have often made reference to 
OPEC statute (2008) and reiterated the commitment of OPEC to oil price 
stability while ensuring steady and fair return streams for their members and 
external investors in the industry (Lukman, 2000 and El-Badri 2004). 
Noguera and Pecchecnino (2007) stated that OPEC's goals can be classified 
into two, namely: microeconomic (which seeks to lower the price volatility in 
the oil markets) and macroeconomic (which seeks to promote the interest of 
the members by enhancing their economic development). This perception is 
contrary to the belief and understanding of some participants in the oil 
markets. Furthermore, Noguera and Pecchecnino (2007) observed that the 
goals had been creating chaos since the cartel’s tools of achieving those 
objectives are output quotas.  Gault et al. (1999) attempted to model how 
quotas are allocated within the OPEC members with a view to understanding 
the organisational set production-ceiling. However, according to Business 
Week (2008), members have been defaulting quota policies without severe 
measures being taken by OPEC to punish or end such practice. Studies (e.g. 
Reinfenberg, 1996; Belton, 1998; Colitt, 1998; Cortzine 1998; Checci, 2007) 
documented evidence of OPEC members engaging in ‘black market activities’ 
                                                          
29 Soft market refers to the period and state when oil prices are stagnant and reasonably low 
due to high or excess supply and low demand. 
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and the outcome of such activities have led to over-production by the 
members in the OPEC allocated quotas. According to Fritseh (1997) and 
Belton (1998), this made the organization ineffective and less powerful in the 
view of the major players in the oil market.  
In conclusion, the effect of the OPEC quota system has been weakened by 
cheating behaviour in the organisation. Therefore, in this regard, the clear 
assessment of OPEC's quota system is often incomplete and confusing 
depending on how cheating has been incorporated in the OPEC allocation 
decisions. 
2.6 OPEC Crude Oil Spare Capacity and Price Stability 
Many studies have argued that OPEC spare capacity has a long term 
implication on the global oil market (see Gately, 2011). Consistent with this, 
IEA has often reiterated that the basis for their oil price projection is the low 
OPEC spare capacity observable in OPEC (see Simenski, 2013). Crude oil 
capacity is usually set by OPEC to accommodate any unanticipated future 
disruption to oil supply. Arguably, the purpose of reserves held by most 
OECD/IEA members (for example, U.S., UK, and Japan) is meant, in 
principle, to support similar disruption in order to avoid any potential serious 
harm to their economies. However, as noted earlier, maintaining reserves of 
oil for this type of reason requires some diligence. The literature on the actual 
role played by OPEC spare capacity on the oil price is mixed but with the 
majority contending that speculation around the capacity might be a key to 
influencing high oil prices. More importantly is the cost that is involved in 
maintaining these capacities and reserves from an accounting perspective. 
Although, relatively few studies (e.g. Hedenus et al., 2010) made attempts to 
model the cost of disruption in the oil supply, this review did not find any 
study that empirically analysed and compared such costs of disruption with 
the accounting cost of keeping inventory. However, a trade-off between the 
above decisions is needed somehow.  
Figure 2.3 Presents WTI oil prices and OPEC spare capacity from January, 
2000 to December, 2012. 
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Figure 2.3: WTI Oil Prices and OPEC Spare Capacity 
 
Source: EIA, 2013 
Key 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
Figure 2.3 presents data about OPEC spare capacity and oil prices over 13-
year period from 2000 to 2012 (i.e. on the horizontal axis). The logged 
values of oil prices are presented on the left vertical axis of the graph. Right 
vertical axis presents the monthly spare capacity of OPEC based on EIA 
dataset. The trend shows rather a mixed conclusion about the nature of the 
relationship between OPEC spare capacity and oil prices. While in some 
periods, such as 2003 to 2004 when oil spare capacity was increased despite 
ignoring Iraq’s spare capacity by OPEC-10, oil prices continued to rise 
showing a positive association. However, evidence suggests that earlier 
periods such as the year 2000 to 2002 produced a relatively negative 
relationship, indicating that high spare capacity is associated with low oil 
prices in accordance with the claim by EIA and IEA when making oil price 
forecast. In 2008, high spare capacity is associated with low oil prices. One of 
the possible reasons could be that low oil demand during recession might 
allow OPEC members to accumulate the required excess capacity. The period 
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after, from 2009 up to 2010, increasing spare capacity could not result in low 
oil prices despite a consistent decrease in the OECD/IEA consumption of 
OPEC’s oil (see, for example, figure 3.2 for the U.S. consumption). Research 
shows that private companies struggle to create spare capacity (see Wood, 
2002), which indicates a potential problem with respect to the OPEC’s ability 
to create any sufficient spare capacity. 
More specifically, the war in Iraq has impeded OPEC’s ability to maintain the 
expected spare capacity in view of the fact that Iraq was a major contributor 
in creating OPEC’s capacity prior to the war (Chalabi, 2010). Although many 
other geopolitical events took place during the period considered in this 
study, only the effect of Iraq war was measured due to the following reasons. 
The impact of dramatic rise in oil prices when the war was at its peak 
demonstrated how important OPEC was during the last decade. Over this 
period, evidence suggested that Iraq war was well planned by the U.S. and 
its allies (see Chomsky, 2002; McChesney, 2004; Kramer and Michalowski, 
2005; Challabi, 2010). It was a war that led U.S. to utilise its Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to make up the shortfall in the global oil supply 
(see Bamberger, 2010). However, it is really challenging to distinguish 
between the effects of other geopolitical events such as Iran nuclear crisis, 
which was on and off for a period of time and other factors such as Arab 
spring. Similarly, it is challenging to isolate the impact of war in Libya from 
the the Arab spring.  
 
Furthermore, Chalabi (2010) had documented evidence of long and historical 
Western rivalry for the control of Iraq’s oil. A narrative historical analysis of 
Iraq’s oil invasion and the U.S. aggression has also been documented in 
Kramer and Michalowski (2005) and Chalabi (2010). The views of other 
scholars such as Chomsky (2002), McChesney (2004) are that, the U.S. 
media was used to plan the invasion which targeted Iraq’s oil. U.S. and its 
allies received wide criticisms for the war which in the U.N. Kofi Annan’s 
viewpoint was an offence against the Iraq’s sovereignity (Kramer and 
Michalowski, 2005). The effect of the U.S. led war against Iraq has been 
widely documented in the literature (see Kramer and Michalowski, 2005; 
Guidi et al., 2007).  A sizeable review of the literature (see Chomsky, 2002; 
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McChesney, 2004; Kramer and Michalowski, 2005) concluded that the U.S. 
and its allies had made their way out of Iraq with huge barrels of crude oil 
which remained unaccounted for. Understanding key motivation for such an 
invasion is very crucial in this type of study. For example, the official period 
marking the end of the war witnessed a consistent rise in the production of 
shale energy which later gave the U.S. strategic ability to significantly reduce 
its production costs of energy while international oil prices continued to rise 
in the markets30. 
2.7 OPEC Oil Price Band Policy and Price Volatility 
There are several questions raised in relation to the above decision. First, 
should OPEC have introduced the OPB system in the initial instance? Why the 
policy was temporarily suspended in both 1992 and 2005? Does the OPB 
policy address the initial objective? Should OPEC have declined to introduce 
the policy knowing the forces in the oil markets were beyond its control? Was 
there any change in the market developments such as a shift in the balance 
of power that might have motivated OPEC to withdraw the policy? A number 
of arguments were advanced to address the issues in the literature. A point 
worthy of note is that, OPEC never made any official documentation about 
the OPB policy. However, some statements were made by key OPEC 
officials31, which were assumed to be formal in the OPEC pricing strategy. 
Therefore, identifying determinants of OPEC OPB will go a long way in 
interpreting the situation better. Although it is beyond the scope of this study 
to detail and model factors responsible for oil prices, effort should be 
specifically made to highlight appropriate evidence surrounding OPEC’s 
attempt to stabilise the oil prices within a target. This is consistent with the 
policy, whether it is officially in force or implied. 
Understanding the determinants of the OPB will help in addressing whether 
the framework in the first place considers the most essential components 
(e.g. market realities) that address the objective the system is out to achieve 
(oil price volatility). Therefore, this will address the following concern about 
whether the policy is reflective of the market realities; whether it considers 
                                                          
30 See evidence in figure 1.2 in Chapter 1. 
31 Example of this is the announcement by former OPEC head- Ali Rodriguez of an unofficial 
establishment of $22-$28 band. 
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special timing; whether it is mounted with built-in dynamics that allows for 
flexibility when market conditions change; whether the views of the 
participants are considered in the process; whether the concept of cost plays 
any important role; whether the revenue stream is incorporated in the 
decisions and many other things. Hoffman (2000) noted that, effectiveness of 
an organisation is dependent upon its ability to adapt to developing changes 
in its environment (external factors). Understanding a clear nature of 
volatility, OPEC structure and the markets in which it operates are necessary 
in any attempt to examine whether OPEC policies are effective in addressing 
the price stability in the target band. It should be noted, however, that the 
primary objective of OPB is to dampen volatility by preventing sharp swings 
in oil prices as against volatility (see Fattouh and Allsopp, 2009). In another 
study, Fattouh and Scaramozzino (2011) highlighted that OPEC’s actions can 
be interpreted to prevent oil prices falling below an unacceptable level as 
perceived by the members. Figure 2.1 presents for the period of the official 
OPB period, relationship between West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot oil 
prices and OPEC oil price band in U.S. dollar per barrel. 
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Figure 2.4: Relationship between Spot Price and OPEC Oil Price Band 
in U.S. Dollar per Barrel 
 
Sources: EIA Spot prices and OPEC OPB Policy 
From figure 2.4, it can be observed that oil prices have been volatile over the 
duration when official OPB was in operation. Sharp swings in oil prices can 
also be observed over the period, but they are less skewed to the former part 
of the period than the latter part. The sharp rise and fall of prices were 
mainly contained in the former period. However, the pungent rise became 
permanent and remained high in the latter part of the period considered. 
Attouh and Allsopp (2009) noted huge tendencies for a sharp inter/intra-day 
volatility to be apparent within a specifically set oil price band. This type of 
volatility should not fall within the framework within which the success of the 
OPB policy should be assessed. 
Despite the challenges faced by OPEC in pursuing OPB policy, some studies 
acknowledge the attempt as positive steps to stabilising oil prices from sharp 
fluctuation (see Tang and Hammoudeh, 2002 ) and was greatly welcomed by 
the Western powers (see Fattouh and Allsopp, 2009); others believed that 
OPEC lacks such an ability (Sodhi, 2008; Alhajji, 2009); while others still 
believed if OPEC had operated competitively in the oil markets, oil price could 
have been lower and even more stable than they were (see Hedenus et al., 
2010). For example, based on their computations, estimated oil prices should 
have been between $7-$15/barrel had the oil market behaved competitively.  
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In line with the above, Alhajji (2009) argued that OPEC should never have 
even thought of introducing the OPB policy because it lacked the power to 
control the variables that infuse/trigger actions when any of the market 
conditions change. The answer to whether or not OPEC can influence oil price  
can be found in the framework of target pricing zone theory in which oil 
prices are allowed to float within a specified band with the expectation that 
both upper and lower limits are defended to ensure stability. The question is, 
is OPEC able to defend the boundaries in order to stabilise oil prices within 
the band, or it is beyond OPEC control (via policies) to actually address the 
instability in the oil market. 
Dreher and Voigt (2008) classified credibility to be an asset which determines 
a country’s investment and growth resulting from 'real interest rate'. They 
investigated the credibility derivable to a nation by joining membership of 
international organizations. According to Bharati et al. (2008) as argued in 
their model, it can be conceived that OPEC credibility = OPEC’s 
overproduction relative to quota + world refining capacity utilization + OPEC 
capacity utilization + policy transparency (price + investment (production) 
transparency) – speculations (reduced speculations). In a competitive market 
with stochastic demand and supply shocks, the expectation is that, price 
clustering will not exist in the “least-significant integer digit," given a trend of 
an observed price range over time (Bharati et al., 2008).  
2.7.1 OPEC Announcement on Oil Price Volatility 
Guidi et al. (2007) examined the efficiency of the oil market in relation to its 
ability to incorporate the U.S. announcements in conflict and non-conflicts 
periods. Dermier and Kutan (2010) believed announcements surrounding the 
U.S. SPR relative to OPEC production decisions are equally important in 
understanding oil price volatility. They covered a 25 year-period (i.e. 1983-
2008) to examine evidence of market reaction around the announcements 
periods for consistency with the “efficient market hypothesis” based on 
event-study’s methodology. The study found no significant evidence of 
market reaction during “production increases announcements” but found 
significant positive returns during “production cut announcements." 
Furthermore, evidence is documented that SPR announcements also have the 
tendency of igniting a “short-run market reaction” for almost a week during 
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the post announcement period. Subsequently, they concluded after testing 
the cumulative abnormal return differences that SPR proves to be an 
ineffective means of achieving market stability. The implications of this 
finding lend support to the earlier claim that OPEC’s action is often 
exaggerated by the media. While reduction is a means of attributing blame to 
OPEC, increased oil production by OPEC attracts little or no support from the 
market or the media.  
Demirer and Kutan’s (2010) finding lent support to the position reached by 
Deaves and Krinsky (1992) which found that announcements surrounding 
OPEC traders is systematically under-reacted by the traders in the markets, 
most particularly where bullish news is conveyed, which implies an abnormal 
return to certain investors. Brunetti et al. (2013) assessed the “fair price” 
pronouncements made by OPEC officials on the crude oil prices using two 
methodologies (event studies and autoregressive distributed lag models) on 
data from 2000 to 2012. The study concluded that the influence of the 
announcements in terms of provision of new news to players in the oil futures 
market is nearly “zero."  
Graefe (2009) noted that despite OPEC’s withholding of oil supply, 
international oil prices had been found to be “exceptionally inelastic" to most 
announcements in respect of the supply decisions. Schmidbauer and Rösch 
(2012) examined associations between OPEC production policies,  particularly 
the informational aspect arising from OPEC conferences and the global oil 
price volatility computed in combination with Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models on data (87 announcement) 
between 1986 and 2009 and extended regression models. The study 
documented evidence of positive effects/ relationship of OPEC 
announcements on expected returns and crude oil prices depending on the 
strength of the intended decision.  
2.8 Review of Attempts to Challenge OPEC’s Actions in the Oil 
Market 
Hedenus et al. (2010) argued that oil prices were charged higher than the 
competitive level due to OPEC’s restriction of production, which implies 
evidence of a transfer of wealth from the oil consuming countries to the oil-
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producing nations. Greene (2010) computed over $500 billion in 2008 as the 
lost/cost to the U.S. created by OPEC due to the market failures created from 
its production restriction. Given the provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
one of the possible legal actions against OPEC, if established to be so, is that 
they could face some legal consequences before the U.S. courts. In this 
regard, in the recent periods, a body of evidence suggesting harsh sanctions 
against OPEC are reviewed below. The petroleum and public relations 
industries were primarily pioneered in the U.S. (Chomsky, 2002; Parra, 
2004), and effort to protect its interest and their interests as well, should be 
well expected in any attempt to design a framework for the operation of the 
energy markets. There has been growing environmental concern over the 
amount of carbon emission associated with the consumption of crude oil, 
peoples’ life-styles, and aggressiveness toward industrialisation and oil spills 
(Kolk and Pinkse, 2007). On this basis, the oil importing nations raised their 
doubt on the continuous dependence on a politically unstable group of 
nations by the name of OPEC for their supplies of energy (Parra, 2004).  
Finally, it should be noted that many committees have been inaugurated and 
charged with different responsibilities aimed at challenging OPEC’s actions 
since inception ranging from the U.S. Senate on Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs in 1975 to more recent reports such as the one on “the U.S. 
trade deficit, the dollar, and the price of oil” by Jackson (2011) as part of the 
U.S. congressional research series. For more on the review of the conclusions 
of most of these committees, see Grossack (1986); Ryngaert (2010); Morris 
and Meiners (2013). In most conclusions, if not all, the reports of the 
committees (as perceived by the above authors) proposed harsh measures to 
be taken against OPEC for its engagement in an illegal trade practice (i.e. 
anti-competitive behaviour). 
2.9 Summary and Conclusion 
OPEC has been identified as a major global oil producer with the highest 
proven conventional oil reserves since its inception in 1960. OPEC had 
emerged through a complex process propelled by members’ desire to 
exercise control over their oil resources which they believed were under 
priced (see Chalabi, 2010). The movement for the establishment of OPEC had 
increased oil prices to the level desired by OPEC (Parra, 2004). However, 
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OPEC became well known globally as an effective cartel following its decisive 
action to restrict crude oil export to the U.S. and Netherland for their support 
to Israel during Arab-Israel war in the early 1970s. This major event had 
portrayed OPEC as a cartel that coordinated its actions with a view to 
promoting sustained high oil prices at the detriment of the Western 
economies (Adelman, 2001).  The majority of the review of literature showed 
that OPEC operated as an effective cartel which deliberately restricted oil 
production and rarely invested in new crude oil capacity for its own ends (see 
Adelman, 2001 and Morris and Meiners, 2013).  On the contrary, quite a few 
other studies (such as Bentzen, 2007; Cairns and Calfucura, 2012; Colgan, 
2014; Kiswani, 2014) disputed the claim that OPEC had operated as an 
effective cartel. 
Although the literature about OPEC’s general and specific roles of OPEC in the 
oil market and its influence on oil prices still remained inconclusive 
(Schmidbauer and Rösch, 2012), the majority of the literature reviewed 
portrayed the actions of OPEC as an effective cartel (see Morris and Meiners, 
2013). The implication of this dichotomy warranted further research to 
investigate why OPEC should introduce a policy (i.e. OPB policy) which 
presumably placed the organisation as an effective cartel that had control 
over oil prices but failed to adhere to such policy as it was accused by the 
Western media and politicians. Another interesting aspect relates to the fact 
that other factors might have hindered its ability to achieve that prime 
objective which only an effective cartel could achieve. Explaining these 
complex dynamics with a view to linking to the debate about whether or not 
OPEC had existed as an effective cartel from the year 2000 onward would be 
of academic interest.  
68 
 
  
CHAPTER THREE: INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
AND THE ROLE OF OTHER MARKET PLAYERS IN 
THE OIL MARKETS 
 
69 
 
Chapter Three Information Disclosure and the Role of 
Other Market Players in the Oil Markets 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the global structure of the oil market, developments in 
new reserves (both conventional and unconventional) across the globe, 
trends in the renewable energy, and the potential impact on oil prices. 
Similarly, it presents a review of the empirical studies on information flow 
across the market, issues regarding transparency and the role of speculation 
on the prices.  
3.2 An Overview of Global Oil Market and Price Volatility 
The complexity of the oil prices is often explained in the context of “oil” being 
a non-renewable and exhaustible resource (see Hotelling, 1931). In economic 
theory, the price of a commodity is usually defined as the marginal cost of 
that commodity for an ordinary competitive market. However, one unique 
nature of the price for exhaustible resources is that it is often higher than its 
marginal cost when compared with other commodities (Hamilton, 2012).  Oil 
market is often described as a very complex institution dominated by politics. 
The increasing oil prices which appear to be affecting or affected by other 
energy prices have been of increasing concern to various stakeholders 
ranging from consumers, analysts, international institutions and governments 
as well as the media (see Marimoutou et al., 2006). This leads to adoption of 
various complex approaches to its study. Modelling the global oil market 
would mean how decisions of various stakeholders or market agents (such as 
OPEC, non-OPEC, oil consumers) are modelled by the modeller (Powell, 
1990).  
Furthermore, the literature on the oil market modelling is divided into two 
broad categories, namely: optimisation and simulation (Powell, 1990; 
Baldwin and Prosser, 1988) although subsequent studies (see Cremer and 
Salehi-Isfahani, 1991; Alhajji and Huettner, 2000a) view the models from 
monopolistic and competitive perspectives (see Al-Qahtani et al., 2008b). 
Each modelling approach is guided by certain assumptions. Proponents of the 
optimisation approach to modelling oil market suggest an ideal situation 
where the intention of the decision-makers is a wealth optimisation over time 
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(Powell, 1990). Although, optimisation or inter-temporal optimisation 
modelling of oil markets (as suggested in Baldwin and Prosser, 1988) 
considers the extreme interest of a market player or set of players, there is 
no consideration of the social aspect of the markets in the most previous 
literature. Therefore, they suffered some degree of criticisms for being 
model-driven studies with many tendencies of arriving at wrong conclusions 
(see Smith, 2005).  
In the same way, simulation models have been widely applied or tested in 
the oil market with a fundamental assumption that players are behaving 
competitively and/or operating towards a particular target price and take 
action to set a price path which is influenced by others depending on market 
developments (see Gately, 1984; Baldwin and Prosser, 1988; Al-Qahtani et 
al., 2008b). In other words, the second approach assumes a partial 
monopolistic set up. However, both approaches do not appear to be 
satisfactorily comprehensive in describing the events in the oil markets and 
the role of OPEC in influencing oil prices (see Slaibi et al., 2010). In this 
regard, Slaibi et al. (2010) proposed a framework considered cooperative as 
it encompassed the role of political and military influences connected with 
economic motives of both oil producers and consumers to keep price 
definition within a target zone. The econometric modelling of oil markets and 
prices based on Slaibi et al. (2010)’s approach has some degree of flexibility 
in the theoretical propositions. On this basis, the dynamic behaviour of the 
market players can best be described. 
Oil price volatility has become a global concern given its effects on the 
macroeconomics of both developed and developing nations across centuries 
(Darby, 1982 and Hamilton, 1996, 2003, 2009 and Carlstrom and Fuerst, 
2005). Oil, being one of the most important resources on the planet, has 
made the industry not only the largest but also the most international among 
other industries (Parra, 2004; Cortese, 2013; Lin, 2011). The opinions on the 
real causes of oil price volatility are divided across researchers and oil market 
analysts as much as opinions on the role of OPEC. The internationalisation of 
the oil companies and their approach to handling events that relate to 
environment, prices and technology transfer  have been widely studied and 
debated from different perspectives and disciplines, which raise important 
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questions such as: Why oil and how does it influence power? Why are the oil 
prices volatile? How does the balance of power change over time? What are 
oil price volatility receiving important concerns to the market participants?  
Historically, shifts in the balance of power in the oil markets have been 
established over time and from one player to another (see Fattouh, 2012; 
Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). Initially, during the early discovery periods of oil 
in the 1870s, the power of pricing was mainly determined by the market 
forces informed by demand and increased desire to produce more oil found in 
large quantities relative to the then-existing demands (see Hamilton, 2011). 
In the later periods when demand for high-related investments increased, the 
power to fix oil prices mostly moved to the hands of the major oil companies 
which provided the capital because the nature of the companies in those days 
did not accord much regards to any other parties apart from concern over the 
shareholders' wealth (see Parra, 2004; Chalabi, 2010). Yang et al. (2002) 
considered the demand side of the oil market to the OPEC supply using error 
correction models and simulation analysis in the light of the shift in demand 
and recession.   
Furthermore, Marimoutou et al. (2006) showed inevitable connection 
between the sensitivity of oil prices and negative volatility and protective 
measures against market risk. In this regard, assuming such actions might 
pose a high risk to market players, their study applied both conditional and 
unconventional Extreme Value Theory (EVT) in assessing the risk-
management strategies within the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) in the oil 
market. Over the last four decades, a growing literature has been well 
documented on the global oil market. More than thirty (30) models on the oil 
market were made publicly known by the Energy Modelling Forum (EMF) in 
the late 1970s alone (Powel, 1990). Jaffee and Soligo (2007) in their review 
of events and the role of the IOCs in the transformation of the international 
market found that oil markets are highly competitive. In all the OPEC nations, 
production of oil is largely carried out by the IOCs in partnership with the 
national oil companies. In the recent Forbes analysis of the top twenty five oil 
companies (i.e. both national and private international) based on their daily 
production capacity, national companies belonging to OPEC are competing 
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hand-in-hand with the national and privately-owned companies in the non-
OPEC nations. Table 3.1 presents a summary of this ranking. 
Table 3:1: Forbes Ranking of the World's Biggest Oil Companies 
  The World's 25 Biggest Oil Companies 
Based on Daily Production Capacity 
 
Ranking  Corporations Million 
barrels per 
day 
1 Saudi Aramco - OPEC (Saudi Arabia) 12.5 
2 Gazprom - Non-OPEC (Russia) 9.7 
3 National Iranian Oil Co. - OPEC (Iran) 6.4 
4 ExxonMobil - OECD (USA) 5.3 
5 PetroChina - Non-OPEC (China) 4.4 
6 British Petroleum (BP) - OECD (United 
Kingdom) 
4.1 
7 Royal Dutch Shell - OECD (Netherlands) 3.9 
8 Pemex - OECD (Mexico) 3.6 
9 Chevron - OECD (USA) 3.5 
10 Kuwait Petroleum Corp. - OPEC (Kuwait) 3.2 
11 Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. - OPEC (UAE) 2.9 
12 Sonatrach - OPEC (Algeria) 2.7 
13 Total - OECD (France) 2.7 
14 Petrobras - Non-OPEC (Brazil) 2.6 
15 Rosneft - Non-OPEC (Russia) 2.6 
16 Iraqi Oil Ministry - OPEC (Iraq) 2.3 
17 Qatar Petroleum - OPEC (Qatar) 2.3 
18 Lukoil - Non-OPEC (Russia) 2.2 
19 Eni - OECD (Italy) 2.2 
20 Statoil - OECD (Norway) 2.1 
21 ConocoPhillips - OECD (US) 2 
22 Petroleos de Venezuela - OPEC (Venezuela) 1.9 
23 Sinopec - Non-OPEC (China) 1.6 
24 Nigerian National Petroleum - OPEC (Nigeria) 1.4 
25 Petronas - Non-OPEC (Malaysia) 1.4 
  Total Contribution per 25 Biggest 
Companies 
89.5 
  Approximate Daily Global Average Oil 
Production  
90 
  Percentage Contribution of the World's 
Biggest 25 to World Oil Production 
99.44% 
Source: Forbes, 2013 
Note: 2012 working interest production volumes calculated by Wood 
Mackenzie reflects oil plus the energy equivalent in natural gas. 
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In this regard, OPEC, non-OPEC and the OECD are summarised in table 3.2.  
Table 3:2: Classification of the World's 25 Biggest Oil Companies 
Based on Country Group 
 Classification of the World's 25 Biggest Oil 
Companies Based on Country Group 
OPEC  Non-
OPEC  
OECD 
 R
a
n
k
in
g
  Corporations (National and International) Million 
barrels 
per day 
Million 
barrels 
per day 
Million 
barrels 
per day 
1 Saudi Aramco - OPEC (Saudi Arabia) 12.5     
2 Gazprom - Non-OPEC (Russia)   9.7   
3 National Iranian Oil Co. - OPEC (Iran) 6.4     
4 ExxonMobil - OECD (USA)     5.3 
5 PetroChina - Non-OPEC (China)   4.4   
6 British Petroleum (BP) - OECD (United 
Kingdom) 
    4.1 
7 Royal Dutch Shell - OECD (Netherlands)     3.9 
8 Pemex - OECD (Mexico)     3.6 
9 Chevron - OECD (USA)     3.5 
10 Kuwait Petroleum Corp. - OPEC (Kuwait) 3.2     
11 Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. - OPEC (UAE) 2.9     
12 Sonatrach - OPEC (Algeria) 2.7     
13 Total - OECD (France) 2.7     
14 Petrobras - Non-OPEC (Brazil)     2.6 
15 Rosneft - Non-OPEC (Russia)   2.6   
16 Iraqi Oil Ministry - OPEC (Iraq) 2.3     
17 Qatar Petroleum - OPEC (Qatar) 2.3     
18 Lukoil - Non-OPEC (Russia)   2.2   
19 Eni - OECD (Italy)     2.2 
20 Statoil - OECD (Norway)     2.1 
21 ConocoPhillips - OECD (US)     2 
22 Petroleos de Venezuela - OPEC 
(Venezuela) 
1.9     
23 Sinopec - Non-OPEC (China)   1.6   
24 Nigerian National Petroleum - OPEC 
(Nigeria) 
1.4     
25 Petronas - Non-OPEC (Malaysia)   1.4   
  Average Daily Production (ADP) in Million 
Barrels per Country Group 
38.3 21.9 29.3 
  Percentage of ADP in Million Barrels per 
Country Group  
42.79% 24.47% 32.74% 
 Number of Corporations in Each Country 
Group 
10 6 9 
Source: Forbes, 2013 
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According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) data, approximately 89 
million barrels of oil and liquid fuels were produced and consumed per day 
globally in 2012. This is equivalent to around 32 billion barrels per annum. 
Non-OPEC production based on table 3.2 is nearly 60% despite the fact that 
they hold almost 1/4th of the global proved oil reserves. This has been 
consistently similar to the practice a decade ago (see Farrell et al., 2001). 
Although, OPEC has recorded a significant increase in its proved reserves 
over the last couple of decades, non-OPEC countries such as Canada, Norway 
and Russia have made huge discoveries in the conventional oil and gas which 
make them become important players in the market (see Farrell et al., 2001; 
Chalabi, 2010; and Russell and Ibrahim, 2013).  Consumptions of the nations 
based on country-groups are presented in table 3.3     
Table 3:3: Comparison of World Production and Consumption per 
Country Group 
    OPEC Non-OPEC 
(Excluding 
OECD) 
OECD 
  Average Daily Production Per 
Country Group 
38.3 21.9 29.3 
  Percentage Production Contribution 
to World Production Per Country 
Group 
42.79
% 
24.47% 32.74
% 
  Average Daily Consumption Per 
Country Group 
8.36 34.92 45.99 
  Percentage Average Daily 
Consumption Per Country Group 
9.37% 39.12% 51.51
% 
 Conventional Oil & Gas Reserves 
Figures in 2012** 
   
 Shale Oil and Gas Reserves Figures 
in 2012** 
   
Source: Forbes, 2013 
** The conventional and shale energy figures above are based on the EIA 
data. 
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From Table 3.3, it can be observed that OPEC members consume less than 
10% of the world oil production. Given the level of the OPEC consumption 
and corruption in the world corruption perception index, it can be argued that 
higher sales of oil beyond the current level by OPEC are likely to promote 
further corruption. It should be noted that non-disclosure of reserve figures 
relating to shale energy might have a potential impact on toil prices. 
Furthermore, recent development in the shale reserves is contributing to 
additional debates about the role of the new source of energy on the oil 
prices. Table 3.4 presents summary of the top ten countries in terms of shale 
oil and gas reserves from EIA data.  
Table 3:4: Ranking of Countries According to Shale Reserves 
 Rankings in shale 
gas 
Rankings in shale 
oil 
Ranks Countries trillion 
cubic 
feet 
Countries Billion 
barrels 
1st China 1,115 Russia 75 
2nd Argentina 802 U.S.  58 
3rd Algeria 707 China 32 
4th U.S. 665 Argentina 27 
5th Canada 573 Libya 26 
6th Mexico 545 Australia 18 
7th Australia 437 Venezuela 13 
8th South 
Africa 
390 Mexico 13 
9th Russia 285 Pakistan 9 
10th Brazil 245 Canada 9 
 World 
Total 
7,299  345 
Source: EIA, 2013 
Table 3.4 presents new discoveries in the shale oil and gas for the top ten 
countries; the only OPEC country in the list is Algeria.  
3.3 Data Transparency in the Oil Market 
This sub-section of the literature reviews studies about general framework for 
energy institutions and the extent to which transparency has been promoted 
with a view to enhancing oil price stability. In view of the fact that 
governance has been theoretically classified as internal governance (IG) or 
external governance (EG) (see Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010), both 
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streams of the literature about OPEC’s internal governance mechanism as 
well as the global mechanism through which its action is being managed and 
controlled externally are critically reviewed at this juncture. Internal 
governance concerns hierarchical governance (Lavanex and Schimmelfennig, 
2009) while external governance concerns relationships with the external 
parties as reflected in the global energy governance (Florini and Sovacool, 
2009). OPEC’s actions therefore must have to be evaluated and judged 
against the effectiveness of both governance mechanisms in place.  
To be effective in the IG, each organisation is expected to harness the 
resources at its disposal effectively by exercising significant control over its 
different units in the best interest of the organisational objectives. This 
section of the literature reviews governance. Therefore, transparency and 
compliance with the laid down rules are crucial in resolving internal 
challenges an organisation might face. This will consequently enhance the 
credibility and reputation of such organisation to be legitimately recognised 
and helps to reduce political pressures of operations within any community.  
Similarly, effective external governance which relates to how the organisation 
deals with external forces and relationship with the community is highly 
crucial in uplifting the credibility of an organisation (Jensen, 2003, Hall, 
2008). In this regard, OPEC was partly criticised by Saxton (2005) for being 
an isolated organisation well distanced from the discharge of duties to the 
Western society, and its governance is not clear to the public. As mentioned 
earlier, OPEC has suffered many allegations regarding both its internal and 
external governance, which has allegedly led to an ineffective and imperfect 
oil market (see Byzalov, 2002; Saxton, 2005; Greene, 2010). OPEC extends 
to its ability to manage effectively the relationship with other stakeholders 
without which the objectives of OPEC will never be achievable.  
Therefore, effective governance and reputation of OPEC are associated with 
leadership of OPEC member nations (Doran, 1980 and Saxton, 2005) and 
effective management of relationship with non-OPEC members and with oil 
consumer nations by promoting policies that would not jeopardise their 
economies. The latter is enshrined in OPEC statute (2008) and made an 
important objective being pursued by OPEC today. The challenges facing 
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energy markets in general and oil32 markets, in particular, are enormous. 
Some of the key challenges linked to OPEC are widely documented in the 
literature. However, non-OPEC producers and oil consumers are rarely 
blamed for their actions that might potentially influence the market 
negatively. This has an implication for the functioning of the oil markets and 
the industry as a whole (see Cortese, 2006; Russell and Ibrahim, 2013).   
Energy security remains a key concern to both oil consumers and producers 
given the scale of its perception and impact on actions of the affected market 
players. A more classical example that can be found in monthly oil reports 
from both organisations (i.e. OPEC and IEA) is the game of a blame shift 
between the two organisations. In most cases, OPEC claims that oil market is 
well supplied with the required volume of oil based on OPEC management’s 
perception and evaluation of the market. Instead, OPEC often attributes the 
less impact of such overproduction to ‘stockpiling’ practice by the name of 
strategic oil reserves kept by most OECD countries. Similarly, if indeed, the 
issue of energy security is about the increase and regular supply of oil, 
investment in new capacity is not only considered as OPEC’s sole 
responsibility but a similar step is expected from the oil consumer nations 
(Lukman, 2000).  
However, a doubt was raised as why such investment has not been on the 
regular increase previously. One of the simple reasons could be the 
investment environment is not conducive (environmental, technical, political, 
economic, social problems) and the risk has become very high. A number of 
studies (Dalton et al., 1998; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996 and 1999; and 
Sanda et al., 2005) found a positive relationship between effective 
governance and increase in shareholding of a firm, which impliedly means an 
increase in performance. Therefore, corporate governance plays a significant 
role in this direction, and this research views it as a key to enhancing global 
energy security for market stability. This view is consistent with that of 
Mazraati and Jazayeri (2004) who documented a need for coming together 
(through good governance) of parties or stakeholders in the oil market in 
order to address oil price volatility. On this basis, stakeholder theory has 
                                                          
32 The importance of oil as ‘life blood’ of the industries and human development is stressed by 
Schumacher and Kirk (1977); and Goldthau and Sovacool (2012). 
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been adopted in this study to explain the governance level that promotes 
understanding.  
The study by Goldthau and Sovacool (2012) highlighted four key areas 
named ‘dimensions of difference’ in relation to governance issues in the oil 
industry for policy makers as compared with other fields. An interesting 
aspect of the study is the framework employed33 to describe the differences.  
Furthermore, another governance-related challenge to the oil markets 
revolves around data and transparency in the oil market; and it has received 
attention of the policy makers over the last decade and a half (see CEU, 
2005; JODI, 2013). As highlighted earlier, JODI was mainly established to 
contain six members under the leadership of International Energy Forum 
(IEF) to voluntarily govern the data issues affecting the oil markets which 
have been linked to the frequent price volatility and speculative activities 
since 2000. Despite the fact that the market needs to be fed with more 
accurate, relevant, timely and handy data to aid users in their various 
decisions, the information dissemination in the oil market is not strictly or 
compulsorily governed with power of enforcement by any international 
regulatory body (Florini and Saleem, 2011). In this connection, incomplete 
data (Koomey et al., 2002), discrepancies in the data supply by reputable 
organisations such as IEA and EIA (Sornette et al., 2009), and climate-
change challenges are important issues that remain unaddressed currently 
despite various initiatives such as the JODI and the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) which were put in place to improve governance of information and 
enhancement of transparency. For any meaningful stability to be actualised, 
cooperation is necessary for the major global oil market players who begin to 
identify common goals as far as the challenges are concerned (Bressand, 
2009). 
 
3.4 A Review of Factors Responsible for Oil Price Volatility 
There is a wide claim that oil prices have been volatile since the 
establishment of OPEC; a statement confirmed by empirical evidence. 
                                                          
33 The framework uses three key concepts namely: energy security, justice and transition to 
low carbon energy.  
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However, it remains a puzzle whether OPEC has been the main cause of this 
high volatility as this allegation contradicts its objectives enshrined in the 
OPEC statute (2008). With the increasing shift of blame between consumer 
and producer nations, establishing the real cause of high volatility in oil prices 
will be important. The oil market is indeed regarded a complex institution 
where price formation is not limited to the action of a single player but a 
consortium of many forces (see Martina et al., 2011). Events that unfolded in 
the decades after OPEC was established showed that numerous factors 
ranging from economic incentives, geo-political events, quest for market 
leadership and control in the industry to be interpreted as possible factors 
responsible for volatile oil prices. The oil market is predominantly influenced 
by political factors, which often promote speculation about information 
regarding oil fundamentals. Over the last decade, there has been evidence of 
portfolio shift and increased activities of financial firms in the oil futures 
market which has made some observers conclude that the surge in oil prices 
observed during such decade was caused by financial speculation (Alquist and 
Gervais, 2011). For example, Richardson (2000) called for a combined 
responsibility among the oil stakeholders to enhance market data 
transparency with a view to achieving global oil price stability. 
The failure of oil market fundamentals to explain the volatility in oil prices, 
which was observed in the last decade since early 2000s raised a question of 
whether speculation has played a key role in driving oil prices (Alquist and 
Gervais, 2011; Kaufmann, 2011). Beikalizadeh (2008) noted that most OPEC 
countries were dependent on the revenue from the exported crude oil for 
their economic growth and developments; and volatility in oil prices affects 
the economies of both oil consuming and producing nations. Many factors 
have been linked to oil price volatility and complexity of the oil markets from 
both consumer and producer perspectives and also market events that might 
be invisible in terms of the responsibility. Fattouh (2010) identified two views 
in relation to the key drivers of oil price volatility (during the first decade of 
the millennium) as follows: i “structural formation” in the oil market forces 
(demands and supplies) and changes in such fundamentals; and ii 
speculative activities. For instance, the speculation in oil prices and how they 
work in the oil market has been widely debated but with a mixed conclusion. 
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Gholtz and Press (2007) insisted that OPEC’s role as a cartel remains largely 
a key factor influencing the market forces and thereby resulting in market 
imperfection and subsequent price increase due to supply fall. However, the 
study also acknowledges the crack in OPEC due to disagreement in the quota 
that often leads to cheating. 
3.4.1 Relationship between Oil Price Volatility and Other Commodity 
Markets 
Filis et al. (2011) examined the dynamics between oil prices and stock 
market prices for both oil-consuming and oil-producing nations using DCC-
GARCH-GJR 34  methodology. However, the nations considered in the 
producing category were Canada, Mexico, and Brazil while the consumer 
nations were the U.S., Germany, and Netherlands. The study concluded 
based on the time-varying correlation coefficients that no difference exists 
between the two groups; the correlation responds (positively/negatively) to 
precautionary demand oil price shocks; which are the results of “global 
business cycle’s fluctuations or world turmoil (i.e. wars)” (Filis et al. 2011: 
152). However, it was found that the relationship between the two markets 
was not affected by oil price shock from the supply-side, but the lagged 
correlation values indicated that oil prices lead to a negative effect in the 
stock markets irrespective the shock’s origin except for the 2008 global 
financial crisis. 
3.5 Information Disclosure and Extent of Transparency in the Oil 
Market  
The relevance of information to the oil market cannot be overemphasised. 
This can be well appreciated based on the framework and the primary motive 
for setting up the JODI. Although, compliance with JODI is on a voluntary 
basis, its ability to extend the concept of disclosure to the country by country 
level is of tremendous importance. It is always an established fact that more 
information is much preferable than less information to the investors 
(Wagenhofer, 2005) except if a particular group of investors have access to 
privileged information from the management, and that would result in an 
                                                          
34  DCC-GARCH-GJR stands for dynamic conditional correlation GARCH based on a model 
estimation technique developed by Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle's (1993). 
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imperfect market (allegedly OPEC, see Saxton, 2005; Greene, 2010). More 
specifically, OPEC has been alleged by the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee of concealing “…important industry information and is not 
forthright in sharing its output plans and price objectives”. 
3.6 U.S. Stockpiling and Oil Price Volatility 
The debate on the justification for maintaining oil stockpiles by the 
government, and the ideal volume of such oil stockpiles to be kept and/or 
released is still ongoing (Vatter, 2008). Although, most of the literature in 
this regards is in support of government maintaining such oil stockpiles, few 
studies have been conducted exploring the potential effects associated with 
the costs of maintaining such stocks in relation to appropriate level that 
might stabilise35 oil prices.  
The release from oil stockpiles proved effective in stabilising oil prices in the 
short run only during the 1991 Gulf war (Ghouri, 2006; and Vatter, 2008). 
Whether the use of oil stockpiles during this period was meant to generate 
support for the U.S. first intervention in Iraq by reducing the impact on the 
tax payers (both the U.S. and its allies) or a purposive attempt to stabilise oil 
prices, remains a difficult question to answer. If meant for stabilising oil 
prices and not politically motivated, a similar condition that warranted such 
response should be able to receive a similar response in the subsequent 
periods. This, however, was not the case when oil prices hit a high level in 
the beginning of the new millennium when evidence of speculation was 
evident. Ghouri (2006) emphasised that the U.S. SPR is only meant to 
accommodate shocks disruptive to supply in the long run.  The uncertainty 
surrounding the release from SPR is expected to promote this speculative 
moment in the oil market. Figure 3.1 below shows how the U.S. stockpiling 
behaviour continues despite increasing oil prices. 
                                                          
35 See Vatter (2008) for detailed review. 
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Figure 3.1: U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve in Thousand Barrels 
(2000 – 2012) 
 
Source: EIA, 2013 
Similarly, figure 3.2 presents the decline of U.S. consumption of OPEC oil 
from 2000 to 2012. 
Figure 3.2: U.S. Crude Oil Consumption in Thousand Barrels per Day 
(2000 - 2012) 
 
Oil prices have exceptionally grown high since the late 2003 exceeding the 
set target range set by OPEC. One of the key factors responsible for that was 
an increase in demand not only from the emerging economies such as China, 
India, and Brazil, but also due to the remarkable increase since 2003 in the 
U.S. consumption for filling up its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). The 
increase in SPR from 2001, January to 2004, April accounted for more than 
122 million; however, within the eighteen (18) months between 2003 and 
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2004 alone, such inventories grew by 64 million to 663 million barrels from 
the earlier 599 million barrels at the beginning of the year 2003 (Ghouri, 
2006; see also figure 3.2).  During this period, OPEC’s consistent efforts to 
stabilise oil prices within the target band (i.e. $22 - $28) was unsuccessful.  
3.7 Analysis of the U.S. Disclosure Policies about OPEC and 
Implication on Oil Market Volatility 
In an attempt to discuss the implications of OPEC disclosure policies about 
OPEC and its potential implication on the oil markets, we specifically analyse 
how the U.S. discloses not only the activities of OPEC, but also the resources 
in terms of reserves and operations in terms of oil supply to the oil markets. 
In order to achieve this objective, this subsection begins with OPEC’s 
reserves and oil supply disclosure by the U.S. in relation to other credible 
Western databases (e.g. the BP, IEA) with a view to identifying any potential 
motive for the actions of the U.S. to promote speculation or obstruct OPEC’s 
market power. In this connection, figure 3.3 presents graphical analysis of 
OPEC’s reserves as disclosed by the U.S. and other parties. 
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Figure 3.3: OPEC's Oil Reserves (1980 - 2011) Three Databases 
 
Key:  
OPEC (Home): OPEC reserves as disclosed by OPEC database 
OPEC (EIA): OPEC reserves as disclosed by Energy Information 
Administration 
OPEC (BP): OPEC reserves as disclosed by British Petroleum 
 
Figure 3.3 presents data used by the oil market analysts where BP and OPEC 
data seem to be closer to each other but with minor discrepancies, while the 
gap between disclosure from the two sources and that of the U.S. disclosure 
of OPEC reserves is very wide. There are various implications associated with 
the material gap in disclosure depending on the potential interpretation given 
for the motive. One possible interpretation of this behaviour, where the U.S. 
is assumed to deliberately understate OPEC’s oil reserves might be that, the 
U.S. aspires for the leading position in the global energy markets. However, 
with the development in shale (see table 3.5) and renewable energy 
resources (despite their high costs) which could give the country some 
significant degree of energy independence, understating OPEC’s reserves 
might be a possible way to achieve this objective. Therefore, it will be a way 
to portray OPEC as politically irrelevant.  
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TABLE 3:5: Ranking of Countries According to Shale Reserves 
 Rankings in shale 
gas 
Rankings in shale 
oil 
Ranks Countries trillion 
cubic 
feet 
Countries Billion 
barrels 
1st China 1,115 Russia 75 
2nd Argentina 802 U.S.  58 
3rd Algeria 707 China 32 
4th U.S. 665 Argentina 27 
5th Canada 573 Libya 26 
6th Mexico 545 Australia 18 
7th Australia 437 Venezuela 13 
8th South 
Africa 
390 Mexico 13 
9th Russia 285 Pakistan 9 
10th Brazil 245 Canada 9 
 World 
Total 
7,299  345 
Source: EIA, 2013 
A wide discrepancy can be observed from figures 3.4 and 3.5 in the 
disclosures between two important data bases that are considered reliable in 
the oil markets.  
Figure 3.4: Discrepancy between IEA and EIA in Disclosure of OPEC 
Supply to Oil Market 
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From figure 3.4, the left vertical axis shows scale from 3.30 3.65 of logged 
values of OPEC’S oil supply according to IEA and EIA data, the horizontal axis 
presents the periods from January 2000 to December 2012 over which the 
disclosure was made. the initial four years (from 2000 to 2003), which 
coincide with the relatively low oil price regime and official OPB period, 
discrepancy in disclosure of OPEC’S oil supply is observed to be minimal when 
compared with the remaining subsequent periods. In periods 4 to 12, which 
are found to be highly volatile and when implied OPB was in force, there is 
inconsistent variation in the disclosure between the two databases with two 
years from 2006 to 2008 experiencing widest variation. Within the two years, 
IEA data reported higher figures than the EIA data source. 
Furthermore, to highlight closer effect of the discrepancies, data for a 
variable used in this study (i.e. OPEC production cheating) is plotted in figure 
3.5. 
Figure 3.5: Discrepancy between IEA and EIA in Disclosure of OPEC 
Production Cheating 
 
Key 
OPC (EIA): OPEC Production Cheating (Energy Information Administration) 
OPC (IEA): OPEC Production Cheating (International Energy Agency)  
 
Figure 3.5 presents the discrepancy in the same variable employed in this 
study (i.e. OPC). The interpretations are almost similar to figure 3.4. The 
implications of these types of disclosure discrepancies are many, one of which 
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is speculative behaviour in the oil market. This evidence implies that the 
diverse views of the reporting might also misguide the market analysts’ 
decisions, and that absence of a unified and authentic reporting framework 
for the market could be a basis for speculation. This finding lends support to 
Sornette et al. (2009). It could also result in arriving at different conclusions 
depending on the data source employed by a particular study. For example, 
from IEA view-point, OPEC might be concluded to have performed fairly well 
at above logged value of 10 (i.e. in the last quarter of year 7) as shown in 
figure 3.5, while EIA might conclude that OPEC restricted production cheating 
or excess production to logged value less than 8 on the vertical axis. 
Therefore, this might lead to a wrong conclusion that OPEC operated as a 
cartel in a period by a study using EIA data, while opposite conclusion might 
be reached by another study that employed the IEA database. 
The implication of the entire disclosure of OPEC’s reserves and oil supply 
might promote speculation about OPEC and oil prices. By understating OPEC’s 
supply, the U.S. might be attempting to portray OPEC as a cartel responsible 
for the high oil prices. The growing evidence of anti-trust laws might have 
implication for OPEC in the long run. OPEC is accused of being a 
monopoly/cartel engaged in wealth transfer by punishing the Western 
economies. Given the provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act, one of the 
possible legal actions against OPEC will be detrimental to the members’ 
objectives in the event the Act becomes successful. Therefore, there is a high 
risk of portraying OPEC as an effective cartel coordinating high oil prices 
while the reality of the matter remains the opposite. 
3.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, events affecting the operation of the oil market and prices 
were reviewed. The structure of the international oil market in relation to the 
developments in new reserves (both conventional and unconventional) and 
trends in the renewable energy were highlighted. Information disclosure 
literature and its effect on the oil prices in the light of the role played by 
various international organisations were also discussed with a view to 
assessing the degree of the transparency in oil markets. Whilst identifying the 
role of oil market speculation on oil prices, this chapter also reviewed 
empirical studies on speculative trading in oil futures markets and its 
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influence on other markets and prices. In this connection, the need to 
conceptualise energy security and governance was also highlighted.  
Furthermore, major factors influencing oil prices in addition to the role of 
OPEC were also reviewed. Although growing oil demand from the emerging 
economies such as China, India and Brazil has contributed to high oil prices, 
there was sufficient evidence to believe that U.S. led war had impeded 
OPEC’s ability to create adequate spare capacity to the satisfaction of 
increasing oil markets. Based on the review of energy governance issues 
relating to oil markets, many studies (e.g. Winzer, 2012; Goldthau and 
Sovacool, 2012) established strong need to conceptual important factors such 
as energy security, governance framework and many more other issues in 
the global oil market for stability in energy prices including oil and gas. 
Classical examples establishing the potential effects of poor data and 
discrepancies in such data have been documented by JODI and Sornette et 
al. (2009) resepectively. U.S. stockpiling policy has been established to be 
another important area that requires a critical review for effective global 
energy regulatory framework to be achieved. An effective regulatory 
framework in the global energy requires actions from the relevant 
international regulatory authourities such as International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), JODI, United Nations, and WTO.  
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Chapter Four Philosophical Bases and Theoretical 
Framework of the Study 
4.1 Introduction 
Theory in any piece of research plays an important role by shaping 
understanding of the relationships that exist between concepts (i.e. practice) 
and also the reasons why they exist in such directions (Downing, 1996; and 
Blaikie, 2010). The connection between concepts and social theory are well 
embedded in the positivist research paradigm (see Blumer, 1969). In 
highlighting the meaning of a theory, Blaikie (2010) gave a general 
description based on Inkeles’ (1964) and Turner’s (1991) definitions. It is 
perceived as “a heuristic device for organizing what we know, or think we 
know, at a particular time about some more or less explicitly posed question 
or issue” (Inkeles, 1964: 28). Turner (1991) perceived a theory to tell a story 
about the occurrence of events and why they should happen. This suggests 
that there might be some circumstances where a single established theory is 
insufficient to tell the story, therefore combining multiple theories become 
inevitable in such a situation. It is very possible that a theory is supported 
with certain philosophies that might brighten the understanding of how such 
theory works in the practical world. This is very much compatible with the 
research paradigm of positivists, which is mainly guided by deductive 
reasoning36. In the light of the literature reviewed on OPEC, many studies 
including Bernabe et al. (2004) concluded that a single model is found 
insufficient to describe events in the oil markets, particularly the role of 
OPEC. 
The philosophical bases tend to provide a good ground for a comprehensive 
understanding of the moral reasoning issues associated with the actions or 
conditions of the players that might influence the outcome of results in a way 
not possibly anticipated. North (1991) produced an important argument in 
this regard by highlighting the role of individuals’ motives and interests in 
influencing the market operation as an institution. This same strategy has 
been found useful in many studies while developing a theoretical framework 
                                                          
36 This as aspect is dealt with in the next chapter that specifically focuses on the research 
design, approach and strategies for the conduct of this study. 
91 
 
based on multiple or single theoretical framework to underpin their studies. 
Costese (2006) employed some philosophical concepts adapted from 
institutional theory to integrate two prominent theories, namely: Lukes’ 
conception of power theory and Mitnick’s theory of regulatory capture. 
Hassan (2012) also used two environmental philosophies, namely: 
‘consequentialism’ and ‘deontology’ to support integration three compatible 
theories (environmental Kuznets curve theory, legitimacy theory, and 
voluntary disclosure theory). This can be much appreciated in the 
structuration theory developed by Giddens (1976) and extended in 1984. 
Giddens’ effort to establish a link between social theory tradition and social 
actors’ experience in the light of the various structures (social totalities) 
informed what is captured in today’s Structuration Theory (Blaike, 2010). 
Slaibi et al. (2010) also considered the effect of the military and politics 
towards achieving economic objectives of the key players in an attempt to 
keep oil prices within a target by applying target zone theory. In this regard, 
the chapter specifically deals with the philosophical bases embedded in the 
target (price) zone theory to build the research framework. Figure 4.5 
presents a summary of the strategy to answer the research questions in the 
light of the theory and the philosophies (which are discussed in detail in the 
following sub-sections). 
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As shown in figure 4.1, the main research question is highlighted with two 
objectives formulated to achieve the main aim of the study. In the light of the 
literature reviewed, a theoretical framework is developed. Three philosophies 
are discussed, which form ground for developing the theoretical framework 
based on target (price) zone theory (TPZ or TZT). 
4.2 Philosophical Bases 
Philosophical bases guide a researcher in analysing a theory or bodies of 
theories with a view to learning more about moral reasoning aspects 
associated with actors’ behaviour (see Fox and De Marco, 2001). 
Philosophical assumption provides basis or logical ground to understanding 
why a particular action that happens might likely produce a desirable or 
undesirable impact that impacts on a theory. This will provide an 
Main research 
aim 
 
Objective  1 
Objective 2 
Theoretical 
ground 
Philosophical 
bases 
To critically examine the extent to which OPEC’s stabilisation 
policies are able to keep oil prices within a given target band 
To what extent could OPEC stabilise global oil prices within a 
particular target price band? 
 
To critically examine the effect of the actions of key market 
players in obstructing OPEC’s ability to stabilise oil prices within 
a target band 
Vulnerability & 
exploitability  
Media 
imperialism 
Social justice 
Target (price) zone theory 
 Figure 4.1: Theoretical Framework 
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environment in the deductive reasoning approach which ensures a 
contribution and improvement in a theoretical proposition in social science 
(see Blaikie, 2010). In this study, the theory adopted, as will be discussed 
extensively in the subsequent sections, is target (price) zone theory. It is 
consistent with the theoretical bases of the unrestricted VAR models, the TPZ 
theory can be employed to underpin the dynamics produced by VAR in 
describing the actions of the key players in the oil market as an institution. 
However, since the theoretical framework underpins the entire study, the 
philosophical concepts might well express the degree to which one actor in 
the institution is superior to the other or vulnerability of the other to the 
action of the other. Oil markets are characterised with high politics (Cortese, 
2006; Selivanova, 2007; Slaibi et al., 2010). The concept of vulnerability and 
exploitability (VE) as proposed by Belal et al. (2013), the concept of the 
media imperialism, and the concept of energy (social) justice, are combined 
in the framework to underpin the entire study with a view to lending support 
to inferences in the analysis of the study. 
4.2.1 The Concept of Vulnerability and Exploitability-OPEC Members 
Although the concept of vulnerability is very old, it has generated keen 
interests among scholars with the publication of the World Development 
Reports (2001 and 2010) by the World Bank which emphasised the risk 
exposure of the various resource-rich developing and under developed 
nations in the more complex globalised markets and environments. Since 
then researchers have been exploring implications of various indices for 
vulnerability to economic shocks among others (see Echevin, 2013). 
Furthermore, the economies of some nations that are much stronger than 
others in the same group might be much larger compared with others. The 
difference was highlighted in Belal et al. (2013) in which a few powerful 
economies (e.g. Brazil, China, India, Mexico and Russia) account for 57.3% 
of the GDP contribution of the 150 countries. All OPEC nations fall into the 
world definition of emerging economies.  
Previous studies (such as Morduch, 1994; Blaikie et al., 1994; Glewwe and 
Hall, 1998; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Ligon and Schechter, 2003; 
Suryahadi and Sumarto, 2003; Amin et al., 2003; Calvo and Dercon, 2008; 
Calvo and Dercon, 2013; Gallardo, 2013) have established a long relationship 
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between poverty and vulnerability. Other studies are interested in the 
vulnerability of the emerging economies to risk exposure of environmental 
hazards due to the actions of the multi-national corporations (MNCs). These 
developments extend to the international markets where the risk exposure is 
likely to be much higher. This relationship is evident in a number of measures 
of vulnerability that include “Vulnerability to Expected Poverty” and 
“Vulnerability as Threat of Future Poverty” (Montalbano, 2011) despite the 
effect of globalisation where the local markets of the less-developed nations 
are to compete with the economies of developed nations. This type of 
vulnerability in terms of competition with the multinationals due to weak 
technical know-how to handle the industry in their respective nations is well 
documented in many studies (see Hitt et al., 2000). 
Three main risk management approaches to vulnerability are raised in the 
less-developed countries' literature based on the World Bank’s classification 
of vulnerability, which includes: risk exposure; responsiveness capacity; and 
a lowest relevant event consequence (Montalbano, 2011). Distinguishing 
these approaches from the one defined by the UNDP, Montalbano 
(2011:1492) highlights “Sustainable Livelihood Vulnerability” approach as 
effective given its consideration for the incorporation of negative shocks 
sensitivities of key macroeconomic variables that are good indicators of 
livelihood and resilience. By virtue of the vulnerability exposure to poverty 
and inability of the less-developed countries to provide the appropriate 
‘adaptive capacity’; places some countries at disadvantage and risk of being 
exploited. Subsequently, in designing any global policy framework, such 
vulnerability exposure and country-differences need to be incorporated 
otherwise the less-developed nations could be prone to any exploitation 
(Belal et al., 2013). This is due to the fact that lower risk and higher 
resilience and ‘adaptive capacity’ are attributable to the developed countries 
(Ward and Shively, 2012).  
Most of these less developed or emerging economies, including OPEC nations 
heavily rely on export of natural resources for foreign reserves or national 
income (Aulakh et al., 2000; Yiu et al., 2007; Beikalizadeh, 2008). 
Internationalisation of these economies measured by the foreign direct 
investments (FDI) brings about economic growth where industrialisation 
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process is strengthened with development in the “financial and informational 
infrastructure” (Belal et al., 2013; Gaur et al., 2014). However, the tendency 
for the nations to compete favourably in the modern markets dominated by 
the Western capitalist system is impulsive. Other studies (such as Luo and 
Tung, 2007; Gaur et al., 2014) further noted that those economies that 
perform better than others have in addition to export, FDIs of those 
developed nations significantly improved.  
This may suggest that depending on the Western or U.S. interest, some 
nations might be placed at advantage over others. Resource curse theories 
(see Shaxson, 2005; Baggio and Papyrakis, 2006) are other means to explain 
the effect of poor governance and massive unemployment, and low economic 
growth and development in those nations. In a longitudinal study which 
employs data from 1989-2005, Gaur et al. (2014) examined factors 
responsible for such a strategic shift from export to increased FDI from 
resource- and institution-based perspectives. Conceptualising the idea of the 
vulnerability of these nations due to their heavy dependency on the Western 
markets for the revenues (e.g. oil revenue as argued by Beikalizadeh, 2008), 
assuming that these nations should be engaged in practices that might deter 
the revenue inflow might not be sound. The developed nations have the 
advantage of exploring some alternative sources, though they might be 
expensive, as against the developing nations that are heavily dependents on 
the big economies for their survival.  The tendency for exploitation, therefore, 
from the developed nations to the under-developed or developing economies 
is more to be expected than the other way round.  
4.2.2 The Concept of Energy Social Justice  
Social justice demands for fairness in distribution of resources and disclosure 
of information from the institutional perspective to those who deserve them 
(see Fox and Marco, 2001; Belkaoui, 2007). In reality, some resources are 
unevenly distributed in the nations across the globe. While some have a 
competitive advantage in the light of Adams Smith’s economic arguments, 
trading between nations over the resources in which they have competitive 
advantages will create wealth and make both nations better off. In the 
modern markets, social justice is meaningful when resources are fairly valued 
in the market system irrespective of where they originate from. Energy is 
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considered an important driver of industrialisation for the developed nations 
as earlier stressed. As discussed in Chapter 3, despite the fact that OPEC 
nations own over 75% of the global proved conventional oil, their 
consumption remains less than 10%, which shows evidence of the level of 
industrialisation in those nations. Evidence presented in the vulnerability and 
exploitability concept of the level of poverty also portrays the level of risk 
exposure associated with the injustice in the resource and capital allocation of 
the international markets in terms of value. Yet the countries still suffer from 
the problems of electricity, which affect the industrialisation processes, 
economic growth and corruption. Corruption and poor governance are the 
consequences. 
Goldthau and Sovacool (2012) identified energy justice as an important 
element for addressing the increasing governance problem in the 
international perspective. The study distinguished energy justice from two 
perspectives of demand and supply.  Energy injustice according to the study 
revolves around a global energy system which denies billions of humans 
access to electricity, or, alternatively, they become dependent on the local 
source of energy that heavily pollutes not only the environment alone but 
also leads them to become susceptible to health-related risks. In highlighting 
such types of energy injustice based on the IEA, UNDP, and UNIDO reports in 
2009, Goldthau and Sovacool (2012) stated a figure of 1.4 billion people that 
are without electricity and 85% that are based in rural areas, despite the fact 
that most of the countries are rich in resources. Goldthau and Sovacool 
(2012) also noted the disparity in the access to energy in the OECD nations is 
very wide, which indicates more evidence of energy injustice.  Different 
approaches to social justice exist. For example, Rawls’ theory of justice 
approaches social justice from the principle-based perspective which is 
applicable in developing the basic structure of society derived from social 
contract theory.  The theory poses a huge challenge to the normative 
approach to ethics based on utilitarianism 37 . Other perspectives of social 
justice have emerged based on Nozick’s t and Gerwith’s theory of justice.        
                                                          
37 Utilitarianism within the normative theoretical approach is about the ethics of undertaking 
actions that best maximise the utility.  
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In this direction, multi-national corporations operating in most of these 
resource-rich nations have not helped in transforming the lives of the people 
despite the increasing contribution of the companies to the environmental 
pollution and degradation as documented in many UN and many other 
independent studies.  This problem can be summarised in the social and 
environmental accountability context of the MNCs operating in the resources 
rich nations. For example, Afifi and Jager (2010) wrote extensively about how 
migration of the residents in the resource-rich nations is forced due to 
degrading environment and social vulnerability resulting from the actions of 
the MNCs. However, there is still no clear definition of the dimension of 
justice in the international context as well as its mandatory regulatory 
enforcement (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012). Similar conditions apply to the 
international energy industry and markets where governance is lacking (see 
Costese, 2006; Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012).  
4.2.3 The Concept of Media Imperialism 
It has been observed that the Western media portrays OPEC (and its 
members) in an adverse light Chomski (2002). In this study, this concept is 
employed as a framework against which the Western media engages in 
depicting OPEC as a cartel behind most energy crises in the west. This is 
possible where in an attempt to legitimise a particular energy transition by 
way of expensive policies in the short-run, the media might be engaged in 
disseminating analysis to make people believe in a particular cause. A 
number of studies have been carried out on the role of the media in 
transforming public perceptions about the pictures of events surrounding 
them (see Bennett, 1982; Zaller, 1999; Koomey et al., 2002; Bennett, 2004; 
Coyne and Lesson, 2009; Oates, 2008; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011) This 
is due to the concentration of ownership and control of the media in the 
hands of only a few individuals. In this regard, there is high likelihood for 
OPEC’s image to be misrepresented most particularly where such 
misrepresentation could earn some positive results to the Western energy 
policies. Thus, for example, production quota allocations by OPEC may be 
under-publicised or over-publicised depending on the impact such reporting 
would have on the reputation of OPEC (see Colgan, 2014). This could be an 
indication of use of media in manipulating information for oil market players 
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to achieve a political or economic objective. Evidence of this behaviour has 
been mentioned in many studies (e.g.  Kepplinger and Roth, 1979; Chalabi, 
2010; Colgan, 2014). 
As mentioned earlier, oil market imperfection has been attributed to OPEC’s 
actions. Media plays a key important role in this regard by portraying OPEC’s 
imperfection as the basis for the crisis in the oil markets (e.g. Morris and 
Meiners, 2013).  Also, the media is important in portraying the risk the OECD 
nations, particularly the U.S., are exposed to by their reliance on the OPEC 
oil. It can be cogently argued that the way these events are packaged and 
presented by the media might influence the level of the energy transition38 of 
the OECD nations.  
Kalyango and Vultee (2012) highlighted the impact of media in orchestrating 
conflict between nations in developing economies. Thus, Chomsky (2002) 
articulated reasons behind the U.S. led war in Iraq believing that the media 
was employed by politicians to manipulate peoples’ perceptions so that 
economic and political objectives could be achieved via military action. Few 
people would disagree that Iraq is an important member of OPEC, and 
possibly the U.S.-led war could be an attempt to weaken OPEC by promoting 
high oil prices due to the crisis and also in view of the projected energy 
opportunities as witnessed in the U.S. shale energy revolution that sparked 
into life just after the war was formerly ended in 2005 as shown in figure 1.2. 
It is also possible that OPEC statements (i.e. expressed by its leaders in 
many forums) or its position (i.e. expressed in periodic reports such as 
monthly and annual reports) might be accurate, in which case it has been 
making attempt to stabilise oil prices, but the media effect which is outside 
OPEC’s control could make OPEC’s action ineffective. This is true where two 
conflicting parties give evidence, and the weaker one is blamed for the 
consequence regardless of the facts. Some empirical evidence is consistent 
with this view such as Bharati et al. (2013) who found that OPEC’s official 
‘fair price pronouncements’ have no effect on oil prices for data covering 
almost the period considered in this study. 
                                                          
38 Energy transition is a conceptual term used to describe a shift from one form of energy to a 
portfolio of other sources usually due to security, environment. It is also backed up by several 
policies and strategies designed to achieve such purpose. 
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4.3 Theoretical Ground 
The oil market is characterised as a complex institution where it is difficult, if 
not impossible, for a single model to describe events surrounding interaction 
of the players and their influence on international oil prices. The oil market 
works as a system with various institutions seeking seemingly different 
objectives. For example, despite OPEC’s continuous commitment to stability 
of oil prices as reiterated by its leaders, other users/players strongly accuse it 
of being a villain and performing actions contrary to its stated objective (see 
Saxton, 2005). Furthermore, IEA/OECD members also claim a strong 
commitment to oil price stability. In contrast, the actions of the other market 
players might have caused OPEC’s action to be less effective in achieving 
desired objectives (Russell and Ibrahim, 2013). Whichever way, the economic 
value and benefit derivable or enjoyed over time might be a good yardstick to 
evaluate critically an incentive of any institution (whether OPEC, non-OPEC 
and IEA/OECD).  
Many theories, as highlighted in Chapter 2, have been advanced in previous 
studies attempting to underpin the influence of OPEC in the oil market vis-à-
vis the actions of the market players. However, the major weaknesses of the 
theories are; 1. They view OPEC in isolation of the role simultaneously played 
by other players in the market who could influence OPEC decisions. 2. In view 
of the fact that so many studies rely on a single theory to underpin 
understanding of OPEC, the benefits of connecting the theory with any moral 
philosophy is lost. In this context, target (price) zone theory is used in 
building the framework for this study. Fox and Marco (2001:351) noted that 
“much political action is aimed at amending the existing laws by introducing 
new legislation." In this regard, there is a view that strongly believe that 
OPEC’s establishment in 1960 was politically motivated to address issues 
surrounding the pricing of oil which the founding members believed was not 
competitively sold to IOCs (Parra, 2004; Chalabi, 2010). As argued earlier, 
there is high an incentive for OPEC to maintain stable oil prices within a 
target band in the light of the three philosophical concepts identified in the 
previous sections of this chapter. Below the lower band, investments will be 
discouraged, while above the upper band, it will encourage investments in 
the alternative energy sources. A natural question at this point is: What will 
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happen in the event where investment in alternative energy has been 
committed by the Western politicians initially due to high oil prices instigated 
by OPEC? Should the Western world sustain such high oil prices for the 
viability of their investments or choose to incur loss on the committed 
investments? If the answer to the above question is yes, therefore, the IEA or 
the U.S. might engage in preserving a target price other than that of OPEC in 
an effort to safeguard the return for the committed investments and 
systematically charge it to OPEC.  
In providing answer to the question above, Colgan (2014) noted that it is 
possible for OPEC to know that the market power it is portrayed or purported 
to have possessed to drive high oil prices are not real, however, given the 
fact that they benefit from the resulting high revenues they tend to be silent. 
This might not be unconnected with the concept of vulnerability and demand 
for high oil revenue to sustain their economies as discussed above. In the last 
decade, OPEC has produced a number of measures (including new reviews 
such as ‘who gets what from imported oil’) 39  aimed at promoting public 
awareness about how oil revenue from the imported OPEC’s oil (presumably 
in the high oil price regime, e.g. 2008-2014) is usually shared between OPEC 
and other key players. This includes additional analysis for tax imposed by 
the Western countries to arrive the pump price in the petrol and gas stations 
(see OPEC, 2014)40. Perhaps, this analogy fits the example of the strategy 
adopted by Japan (which had high energy costs) to enforce innovative 
transition to energy-efficient products that placed the country at a highly 
competitive level internationally in the electronic industry (see Porter, 1980). 
If the Western nations are faced with high energy cost, a potential option 
could be consistent with Porter’s. It remains an interesting side of a story to 
understand that such issues are seldom discussed by the western media in 
analysing the causes of high oil prices. 
4.3.1 Target (Price) Zone Theory 
The target (price) zone theory (TPZ or TZT) is discussed at this stage to 
enable first, the linkage with the philosophies and second, the discussion of 
                                                          
39 The review was initially introduced in 2008 and has been consistent to date 
40 Check the link below for the latest (i.e. 2014) review:  
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/341.htm 
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logical processes of developing the framework that underpins the research. 
The idea of target (price) zone theory is not new in the OPEC and oil market 
literature as it has been applied and found useful in describing the 
movements of oil prices in oil markets (see, for example, Tang and 
Hammoudeh, 2002; Slaibi et al., 2010; Bharati et al., 2012). It was originally 
borrowed from the monetary economic (particularly exchange rate economic) 
literature to experiment OPEC’s ability to stabilise oil prices within a particular 
target band with upper and lower limits (Hammoudeh and Madan, 1995; 
Tang and Hammoudeh, 2002; Flandreau and Komlos, 2006; Al-Qahtani et al., 
2008b; Bharati et al., 2012). Although not explicitly described in the Keynes’ 
(1930) economics, Svensson (1991 and 1992) noted that proclamation 
championing the modern TZT can be attributed to Keynes (1930). The first 
empirical analysis examining structure of the currency bands vis-à-vis the 
behaviour of the exchange rate was made by Krugman (1991) in a seminal 
presentation on “exchange rate target zone” (see Kempa et al. 1999).  
Furthermore, the theory has subsequently been applied and improved by 
modification to capture important behavioural elements in an attempt to 
prove the movement of oil prices within a given target band, following a 
series of studies carried out in this regard. For example, Flandreau and 
Komlos (2006) believed that improvement in the theory is achievable by 
deriving a target zone model based on a combination of nested hypotheses in 
relation to ‘Austro-Hungarian’. In this connection, evidence for policy 
credibility as well as efficiency of the market produces an inference for the 
workability of the theory. Similarly, evidence for price clustering in a volatile 
oil market is believed to produce support for OPEC’s actions and ability to 
stabilise oil prices within a target price band (see Bharati et al. 2012).  
Furthermore, by introducing philosophical reasoning in the structure of the 
interaction between the key market players, effectiveness or otherwise of the 
OPB policy could properly be evaluated. For example, historically, oil market 
players have been at different levels in terms of skills, infrastructure and 
tools while operating at various stages of the market, industry and price 
evolution (see Parra, 2004; Chalabi, 2010) for review of the historical gaps 
between the market players). This is partly one of the possible reasons for 
the failure of game theory models to provide comprehensive underpinning of 
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the nature of OPEC and its influence in the oil markets. Guttman (1996) 
highlighted the weaknesses of early evolutionary economic models 41  by 
highlighting the missing link of ‘rationality’ in the players’ optimisation 
decisions which the models were unable to capture and describe. In this 
regard, the three philosophical concepts supporting the theoretical 
proposition are discussed in the subsequent sections (i.e. sections 4.2.1-
4.2.3). Considering this study’s approach and emphasis on the social action 
theory, applying TZT should greatly improve the social aspect of the market 
interactions associated with the activities of the key market players. 
Examining the interactions between various players and any likely inferences 
given the philosophical foundation built in the study, will provide a better 
framework to understand and improve the existing theory consistent with the 
deductive reasoning approach42 to research. 
However, earlier theoretical attempts for target behaviour models43 on OPEC 
comprise of target capacity utilisation (Griffin, 1984); target revenue (Alhajji 
and Huettner, 2000a and 2000b); and target price zone (Slaibi et al., 2010). 
Although, these theoretical concepts were earlier reviewed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, an attempt is made to highlight the relevant aspect of the review 
to the theory adopted for the conduct of this study. It has been mentioned 
earlier that it is never an overstatement to conclude that, given the structure 
of the OPEC nations (in terms of reserves ownership, production/ratio, low oil 
consumption, vulnerability), all OPEC nations mainly depend on oil revenue 
for the sustenance and development of their economies. In this regard, 
volatility in oil price and other related issues of energy security is of 
tremendous concern to them as much as it is to the OECD and non-OPEC 
nations (see Lukman, 2000). In this regard, high oil prices may results in 
damage to OPEC in two ways: first in the volatility of budgets and other 
macroeconomic activities of OPEC members (Farzanegan and Markwardt, 
2009); and second in promoting investment in alternative sources of energy 
                                                          
41 Some of the evolutionary economic models (such as Axelrod, 1981 and 1984; Hirshleifer, 
1982) were widely criticised in Guttman (1996) for neglecting rationality and maximisation in 
behaviour. 
42 This approach is discussed in Chapter 5 of this study. However, it should be noted that it is a 
research approach where conceptual and theoretical framework is designed with the intention 
of testing for empirical evidence to be generated and general inferences to be deduced in the 
light such established structure/framework (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
43 An attempt was made by Al-Qatani et al. (2008) who reviewed the large literature on target 
behaviour by OPEC.  
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by non-OPEC countries (Bazalov, 2002). This will obviously translate into the 
long-run decline or loss in the stability and revenue streams of OPEC nations.  
Similarly, low oil prices are likely to discourage not only investment in the 
new reserves of OPEC oil by the both OPEC national companies and the IOCs. 
They will also translate into low national revenue, foreign reserves earnings 
to the OPEC nations who mainly depend on oil for their incomes (Noguera 
and Pecchecnino, 2007). Consequently, it will be difficult for them to service 
their debts and other costs of governance, which might potentially lead to a 
failed state. Logically, IOCs are likely to lose their revenues as well in view of 
the fact that most exploration activities in the OPEC nations are being carried 
out by the well-established IOCs. Stabilising oil prices in line with the OPEC’s 
stated objectives is the key to a win-win strategy for OPEC and IOCs. 
However, what might seem to matter in this regard revolves around the 
control of the prices in the light of the market forces (including potential roles 
of key players with different objectives in the market institution). One of the 
possible propositions of the TZT, as highlighted by Slaibi et al. (2010), is that 
the market players might struggle to apply different strategies to keep oil 
prices at a different target zone considered more suitable for achieving their 
energy policies and national interests. In this connection, Slaibi et al. (2010) 
stressed the role of interaction between the political, military and economic 
forces for both oil producers and consumers in defining a cooperative 
framework towards a target price zone. 
This suggests that empirical review of various economic, political and military 
measures, gains and strategies could be useful in obtaining evidence and 
deducing inference about how a target price zone is achieved by players in 
the oil market. Therefore, exploring economic incentives behind key factors 
that drive high oil prices such as speculation (Davidson, 2008), discoveries in 
shale and other unconventional forms of energy (Russell and Ibrahim, 2013), 
development in renewables energy, as discussed above, are some the 
important arrears where such evidence could be generated. These 
developments, coupled with the energy diversification of the OECD nations 
which resulted in consistent decline of OPEC’s oil consumption in the OECD 
nations (see Russell and Ibrahim, 2013), oil stockpiling behaviour and role of 
information dissemination to oil market players, might raise further 
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challenges to OPEC in its attempt to stabilise oil prices within a desired target 
band and TZT might be informative in underpinning the various interactions 
in this regard. More of the relevant aspect of the theory is discussed in the 
light of the literature reviewed in both Chapters 2 and 3. 
4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, four main sections were used from introduction to conclusion 
with a view to discussing the philophical assumption employed for this study. 
The first section introduced the chapter. The second section discussed the 
relevant philosophical bases. Three philosophical concepts were used, which 
included vulnerability and exploitability, social justice and media imperialism. 
Section three presented the theoretical underpinning of the study and finally 
section four summarised and concluded the chapter. A target (price) zone 
(TPZ) theory was used to form the theoretical ground and in the light of the 
philosophical bases to underpin this study. This strategy was adopted 
following the North (1991) argument about understanding market as an 
institution. In an attempt to understand political economy of institutional 
decisions and changes, North (1991) argued that oil market should better be 
understood as an institution based on a comprehensive framework. Many 
other studies such as Giddens (1976); Cortese (2006); Hassan (2012) 
employed a similar strategy to aid the understanding of the main theories 
discussed in their theoretical frameworks. Designing an effective framework 
is crucial in understanding events in the oil market most particularly in 
relation to the OPEC’s actions (policies) in the oil markets and the political 
economy of the OECD/IEA energy transition which was grossly understudied 
(see Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012). 
Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning for this study was used to 
understand the extent to which OPEC’s actions targeted to control oil prices 
within a particular band set by OPEC. Besides, the theory would form the 
basis for understanding why OPEC could not control oil prices within the band 
it set given the assumption it had such a capability similar to an effective 
cartel. In view of the criticisms and allegations made against OPEC, this 
theory would help in interpreting some important events in the international 
oil markets and how regulators should better be informed of complex 
dynamics in the markets based on available empirical evidence. TPZ theory 
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has has been widely used in many economics studies that aimed at 
understanding effectiveness of government interventions/policies in 
controlling interest rates within a particular range withi both lower and upper 
boundaries (see Kaugman, 1991). Recently in the last decade, the theory has 
been widely advocated in relation to OPEC (see Tang and Hammoudeh, 2002 
and Slaibi et al., 2010).  
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Chapter Five Research Methodology and Methods 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical framework that underpins this 
study. This chapter discusses the research method, methodology and 
assumptions that guide the philosophical and statistical framework employed 
in this study. It has been widely argued that a researcher’s philosophical 
framework, which includes assumptions about the nature of reality and how it 
should be approached, largely influence the choice of the research methods 
which are inevitably influenced by the research design (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Blaikie, 1993; 2007; and 2010; Symon and Cassell, 2012; and 
Saunders et al., 2012). A rigorous and successful harmonisation of such a 
philosophical stand and appropriate statistical tools are likely to enhance the 
methodological fit44 (Edmondson and McManus, 2007) which impacts on the 
quality of the research results. For this reason, this chapter is technically 
regarded as the steering wheel of the entire research as it identifies and 
discusses the research paradigms and presents justification for the choice of 
the research methodology and methods.  
Consistent with the above view, each research project must ensure that 
proper “internal consistency”—for various elements within the research 
project—is achieved for a meaningful theoretical and practical impact to be 
made. Edmondson and McManus (2007) identified the following important 
elements: research question; prior literature on the subject area; proper 
research design; and the “theoretical contribution." In line with the above 
argument, this chapter connects the various research elements in an effort to 
ensure appropriate methodological fit. Besides, the success of the entire 
strategy of the research depends upon how the research philosophical and 
methodological underpinnings (such as ontology, epistemology, axiology, 
methodology, and methods) are identified and designed to provide convincing 
answers to the research questions (see Grix, 2002; Blaikie, 2007; Collis and 
Hussey, 2009; and Saunders et al., 2012).  
                                                          
44  Methodological fit is defined by Edmondson and McManus (2007: 1155) as the 
“internal consistency among elements of a research project.” This definition is 
consistent with the definition given by Saunders et al. (2012: 158) on methodological 
coherence covered in the term they refer to as “research onion”. 
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5.2 Philosophical Assumptions in Accounting Research 
To ensure proper understanding of a social reality within the parlance of 
social sciences, appropriate research paradigm must be stipulated. ‘Paradigm’ 
refers to the philosophical framework identified by the researcher to guide 
the conduct of the research in line with conventional wisdom relating to the 
application of philosophies as well as the assumptions and ideas regarding 
the nature of knowledge and the entire universe (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
This section presents the literature on the philosophical issues in research 
and how they are identified for the purpose of the study. Historically, a 
paradigm is developed when it is discovered that the older or existing one 
could not provide a comprehensive explanation about a phenomenon as 
people’s perceptions of reality progress (Kuhn, 1962; Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Chambers, 1994; Pretty et al., 1995; Ryan et al., 2002; Blaikie, 2007; 
Collis and Hussey, 2009). For example, the drawbacks observed in using 
questionnaire-based surveys (e.g. time-consuming, costly, and inability to 
provide in-depth understanding of the social reality) prompted the use of 
qualitative surveys in the 1980s (Chambers, 1983 and 1994; Pretty et al., 
1995).  
It is pertinent to highlight the characteristics of the assumptions that 
underpin the research paradigm and how they are linked to this study. Blaikie 
(2007) identified ontological and epistemological assumptions as the core 
assumptions. In order to discuss and relate the various assumptions to 
different research paradigms, it is important to note that all the research 
paradigms highlight different approaches of establishing connections between 
three important elements about the nature of reality in social sciences (i.e. 
“ideas, social experience, and social reality”45 as explained in Blaikie, 2007). 
Crotty (1998) argued that discovery of a “meaning” was not made but rather 
established via interaction between the world and our consciousness. Three 
prominently established research paradigms (positivist; interpretivist and 
pragmatist) are worthy of introduction at this juncture with a view to 
justifying the most appropriate one for this study. 
                                                          
45 For detailed explanation about the three concepts refer to footnote 3 above. 
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To relate the above elements to, and enhance the understanding of the 
assumptions of this research work, the following specific questions are raised: 
1. What are the appropriate philosophical assumptions relating to the nature 
of reality that enable analysis to be undertaken on the effect of OPEC policies 
on oil price volatility?  
2. What constitutes valid ‘knowledge’ with respect to the relationship between 
OPEC policies and oil price volatility?  
3. How can the relationship between OPEC policies and oil price volatility be 
explored? 
4. What specific strategies, methods and techniques can be put in place to 
derive knowledge about the various relationships between OPEC policies and 
oil price volatility?  
Generally, the research philosophy chosen and its associated paradigm helps 
locate the contribution of the research in the social science discipline (see 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Falconer and Mackay, 1999; Ryan et al., 2002; 
Ryan, 2006; Morgan, 2007; Denscombe, 2008; Modell, 2009; Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, 2011). In this connection, Grix (2002) highlighted five 
chronological processes (often referred to as a research building block46 as 
described below), to enhance the understanding of the methodological 
framework for this study: 
i. Ontology: This is concerned with the assumption made about the 
nature of reality; this assumption sets the framework for the research. 
ii. Epistemology: This is the assumption about what constitutes valid 
knowledge.  
iii. Methodology: How can we go about acquiring the knowledge to 
address the research question being investigated?  
iv. Source: This element defines the type of data to be collected for such 
knowledge to be known?  
v. Methods: This stage involves procedures, models, tools and techniques 
designed to acquire such knowledge.  
                                                          
46 See also Hassan (2012a) 
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Furthermore, Schratz and Walker (1995) and Ryan (2006) argued that 
research techniques are often miserable procedures in the absence of 
knowledge of philosophy or context in a research process. This is because 
philosophy enhances such meaning of a phenomenon with guiding principles 
that cannot be offered by “procedural advice” in a particular technique. 
Therefore, a structured methodology will not only enhance the understanding 
of the phenomenon, but will likely take a step further in facilitating 
replication, which is a critical issue about reliability in research (Gill and 
Johnson, 2010).  
However, Blaikie (2007) observed that the major philosophical challenge 
posed to a researcher is the ability to establish a connection between “ideas, 
social experience and social reality." Therefore, for a proper understanding of 
the research strategies and the philosophies, Grix’s (2002) building blocks 
are discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter in a more relevant 
context to this study starting with the philosophical assumptions; data 
sources, population definition and sampling selection procedures; variables 
definition and measurement strategies; and data analyses - tools and 
methods.  Consistent with the above philosophical design, Saunders et al. 
(2012) noted that researcher’s methodological choice, strategy employed, 
and the time scope of the research (collectively referred to as “three layers of 
research onion”) are influenced by the selection of research philosophy and 
approach given the primary role they play in the research design process47. 
In the subsequent sections and subsections, attempt is made to discuss the 
various theories behind such four elements and how this research will 
specifically fit into the parlance of the social sciences and preceded by the 
methods. 
5.2.1 Ontological Assumptions  
Ontology deals with the question of “what” is the nature of the existing social 
reality which needs to be known (Burrell and Morgan, 1979 and 2002; Guba, 
1990; Grix, 2002; Ryan et al., 2002; Sale et al., 2002; Crossan, 2003; 
                                                          
47  According to Sunders et al. (2012), the research design process enhances the 
transformation of the researcher’s research question in to a research project. Research design 
has to be integrated into other elements to achieve methodological fit (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007; Saunders et al., 2012). Edmondson and McManus (2007) highlight the 
components of methodological fit to include each of the four elements, namely: “research 
questions, prior work or state of current theory, research design and theoretical contribution”.   
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Blaikie, 2007 and 2010; Collis and Hussey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2012). It is 
a concept concerned with the study of being about knowledge otherwise 
known as “what is” (Crotty, 1998; Sunders et al., 2011; Scotland, 2012). 
Existing literature often summarises ontological theories into two most 
prominent (but “opposed and mutually exclusives”) groups, namely: 
“idealism” and “realism” (Blaikie, 2007). The divisions exist due to the 
different positions of the researchers informed by different perceptions of 
how things are and work. Idealism is the ontological position of interpretivism 
which believes that what we need to know appears there and is inseparable 
from our thoughts, experiences, conscious, and senses (see Blaikie, 2007; 
Scotland, 2012).  
In contrast, realist theory views objects as having existence independent of 
the researcher investigating them (Blaikie, 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; and 
Collis and Hussey, 2009). The realist approaches a social world with 
assumptions similar to that of the natural sciences about what knowledge 
exists and how it can be explored (Cohen et al., 2007; Scotland, 2012). 
Realism believes that knowledge about an object exists independent of the 
researcher (Pring, 2000; Blaikie, 2007; Collis and Hussey, 2009). The clear 
distinction between the theories is that, while realists strongly believe in the 
singularity of the nature of reality, its independence with the researcher and 
the objectivity in approach, idealists’ on the contrary believe in the 
multiplicity and “relativism”48 in approaching such object (Collis and Hussey, 
2009). 
In the same direction, the dichotomy between the philosophies in idealist 
(interpretivist) and realist (positivist) theories (paradigms) has a long 
established standing history in the literature (Blaikie, 2007). In an effort to 
enhance the distinction between the two theories, various studies present a 
                                                          
48 Relativism attaches a subjective view to reality and believes this view differs across 
the individual researchers studying it (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Blaikie, 2007; 
Scotland, 2012). This contrast between the relativism and idealism recently emerges 
from the literature in an attempt to understand the underlying basis of different 
paradigms (Blaikie, 2007). 
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number of useful sets of categories, which are able to define where the 
researcher falls in his quest to discover “knowledge." It should be noted that 
these categories are non-exhaustive and non-universal in the research 
literature. This is the main reason why Burrell and Morgan (1979)’s attempt 
to standardise paradigms model receives criticisms relative to “paradigm 
incommensurability” (see Hassard, 1991; Parker and McHugh, 1991; 
Willmott, 1993; Weaver and Gioia, 1994; DeCock and Rickards, 1995; Deetz, 
1996; Blaikie, 2007). 
Supporting the distinction between the two prominent paradigms within the 
ontological context, Bryan and Bell (2007) highlighted the questions of 
whether research objects under study are social entities whose nature of 
reality is such that can or cannot be influenced by the perceptions and 
actions of the social actors. The answers to the questions pose a position of 
objectivism and the subjectivism (or constructionism/rationalism). 
Objectivism in the social sciences has long been established in the literature 
due to its connection with the natural science process of enquiry. However, 
the constructionists are out to challenge the scientific process application to 
discover social phenomenon or reality (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Hassan, 
2012).  
5.2.2 Epistemological Assumptions 
Epistemological assumptions deal with what is considered and accepted as 
valid knowledge to social scientist (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Epistemology is 
a “theory of knowledge” or simply a science of how knowledge is validly 
acquired about the social reality in a social entity (Blaikie, 2007). It is a 
philosophical assumption which provides a framework for judging how 
knowledge is validly established within a social entity.  Therefore, it deals 
with the philosophical basis for selecting what can be known. While the 
interpretivist’s assumption is that reality is usually mediated by human 
senses, conscience and/or experiences. Positivists believe entirely in the 
opposite stance because according to their school, independence and 
objectivity of the researcher in getting to know about the social reality are 
fundamentally necessary as against the experience which might be highly 
biased (Pring, 2000; Balikie, 2007; Scotland, 2012). 
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Positivism was mainly popularised by Comte (1798-1857) in his attempt to 
apply scientific procedures for finding reality in the social world (see Crotty, 
1998; Scotland, 2012). In his effort to give an example of the independence 
of the knowledge and the social being, Scotland (2012) extended the 
example given by Crotty (1998)49 and noted that a meaning of a social object 
remains firmly as it is and is not influenced by the researcher’s conscience 
but rather his strategy to acquire such meaning50. Positivists also believe in 
descriptive and factual statements, which are founded by sound data (House, 
1991; Scotland, 2012).  
Furthermore, epistemology is concerned with the philosophical assumption 
that having believed that a particular knowledge exists, how does a social 
scientist obtain such knowledge about social reality?  Ryan et al. (2002) 
added that, it entails dealing with challenges when deciding on how 
knowledge should be acquired. It has two important groups, namely: 
‘positivism’ and ‘interpretivism’.  In view of the above and the empirical 
nature of the study, positivism which advocates objectivity and views objects 
(being researched) as independent of the researcher and his/her research 
activities is adopted as the research philosophy supporting the study. 
Basically, the strategy in this study is based on positivist’s research paradigm 
and employs a deductive reasoning approach where a relevant theoretical 
framework is developed and relevant data are subjected to robust statistical 
testing that are expected to produce empirical evidence either or not 
consistent with such framework (see Hassan, 2012).  
The emergence of post-positivists from the positivism in the 20th century was 
another scientific paradigm mainly motivated by the belief that knowledge is 
created within the various social movements and the relationships aimed at 
aspiring a global change and contribution to “social justice” (Ryan, 2006). He 
further summarises the features of the post-positivists as i it is broad in 
scope as against the positivists which remains specialised; ii theory and 
practice are two inseparable yardsticks that provide a context for acquiring 
                                                          
49 In his precise words, Crotty (1998: 8) notes that “a tree in the forest is a tree, regardless of 
whether anyone is aware of its existence or not. As an object of that kind, it carries the 
intrinsic meaning of treeness. When human beings recognize it as a tree, they are simply 
discovering a meaning that has been lying in wait for them all along.” 
50 See also (Schratz and Walker, 1995) which lends a similar support. 
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knowledge; and iii enterprise is directly dependent upon the researcher’s 
motivations and his commitment to the conduct of research. 
To understand the post-positivism very well, a summary of the school’s 
characteristics is highlighted below in contrast with positivists: 
1. In the post-positivists school, research seems broad (due to various 
relationships that exist in the social phenomenon) rather than specialism 
thought in positivism (Ryan, 2006);  
2. There is strong connection between theoretical and the practical nature of 
phenomena  in post-positivism as against the positivists which might rely 
on ‘just the facts’ (see Ryan, 2006); and 
3. Post-positivism implores the idea of richness of data collection and 
categorisation techniques (due to the broad nature of research) above the 
positivists’ school for a meaningful, objective and certain outcome to be 
observed and make the research processes more rigorous (see Scotland, 
2012).  
The epistemological assumption for interpretivists is based upon subjectivism 
in approaching a social reality (Blaikie, 2010). Therefore, this establishes a 
demarcation between what we know (which is often subjective) and what is 
out there to be known (Grix, 2004 and Blaikie, 2010). The experience of the 
researcher is very crucial in generating new knowledge as consciousness of 
the researcher interacts with particular social reality (Heron and Reason, 
1997; Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 2009; and Scotland, 2012). This is the main 
reason in interpretive school why disparities could exist in perception of a 
social phenomenon given such human differences in constructing meaning 
(Cohen et al., 2007). The methodology of the interpretivists might involve the 
use of “case studies” (which involves in-depth examination of a social reality 
over a long span of period); “phenomenology” (which involves personal and 
direct experience of the researcher while avoiding any personal prejudice); 
“hermeneutics” (which involves meaning derivation from a language); and 
“ethnography” (which involves longitudinal study of cultural groups) (see 
Scotland, 2012). 
Interprevist’s epistemological assumption stongly believes in individual 
constructs which Guba and Lincon (1994) noted are best stimulated by a 
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researcher based on his interaction with the research participants, whose 
reponses should be credible enough (Creswell, 2009). Scotland (2012) noted 
the challenges with interpretation of events surrounding such constructs 
which open up new horizon of understanding as more efforts are made to 
describe phenomena. Grint (2000) argued in relation to the concept of 
‘leadership’ (e.g. Richard Branson) that the meaning is subjective depending 
on how the followers perceive their leader (i.e. the constructs). This explains 
the reason ‘fun’ superceded ‘reward’ for respondents to recognise a good 
leader. Alternative approach as Grint (2000) argued would have been difficult 
to describe and find answers to the phenomena.  
Interpretive methods yield insight and understandings of behaviour, explain 
actions from the participant’s perspective, and do not dominate the 
participants. Examples include: open-ended interviews, focus groups, open-
ended questionnaires, open-ended observations, think aloud protocol and 
role-playing. These methods usually generate qualitative data. Analyses are 
the researchers’ interpretations; consequently, researchers need to make 
their agenda and value- system explicit from the outset. Internal and 
external validity in research complement the ability to replicate (i.e. 
replicability of) a project and make it be accepted as good research within the 
academic community. Any knowledge must have a well-defined filtering 
process to qualify as knowledge capable of producing meaningful contribution 
(see Richie and Lewis, 2003; Cohen et al, 2007).  
5.2.3 Methodological Assumptions 
Methodology is referred to as the actual approach taken in the process of 
research, which entails the body of different methods (Burns, 2000; Collis 
and Hussey, 2009).  This subsection on methodology deals with the specific 
procedures taken for the conduct of the entire research. More specifically, 
methodology in this context simply involves all the theoretical explanations 
and analysis adopted in relation to the methods and principles for the conduct 
of a research in a particular discipline (Burns, 2000; Saunders et al., 2012). 
It encompasses laid-down procedures, tools, approaches, methods, and 
system, which guide how a particular problem will be solved in research (Irny 
and Rose, 2005; Collis and Hussey, 2009). Methodological assumptions and 
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philosophical assumptions are concepts often used by many scholars 
interchangeably (see Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
In this regards, research methodology covers multiple methods, which could 
be linked together sequentially, combined or rather divided in to sub-
processes (Katsicas, 2009). Therefore, as the name implies, it involves clear 
definition and identification of the entire and specific procedure(s) in relation 
to research population, sample, data categorisation, variable measurement, 
and design as well as strategies for analysis. Although each of the above 
processes is independent, cohesion and proper justification must be achieved 
within and between them for the enhancement of methodological rigour51 
(Paley, 1997; Giorgi, 2000a, 2000b; Collis and Hussey, 2009). For a study 
successfully to address or generate its research questions, it must be firmly 
grounded within a methodological approach (Allen et al. 1986).  
Furthermore, studies find a methodological misuse 52  in much academic 
research which failed to portray a clear linkage between the major research 
concepts highlighted above (Giorgi, 2000a; Edmundson and MacManus, 
2007). For instance, (Giorgi, 2000a, 2000b) established among others 
absence of relationship between research questions and methodological 
choice, as well as the impact of such choice on the selected sample size, and 
tools of analysis employed.  Maggs-Rapport (2001) observed that, the 
consequence of the absence of the rigour has the tendency of yielding 
increased criticism and dismissal of research findings. Blaikie (2007) further 
highlighted that identifying proper methodological assumptions are crucial in 
the choice of a methodology which makes the entire research task easier. 
Maggs-Rapport (2001) concluded that ‘best research practice’ remains 
unachievable unless researchers are able properly comprehend the existing 
methodological precepts as well as the relationship between research method 
and research methodology. 
The methodological assumption under positivists entails examination of 
relationships and factors that might influence the outcomes of such 
                                                          
51 Collis and Hussey (2009:337) defined the methodological rigour as “the appropriateness and 
intellectual soundness of the research design and the systematic application of the research 
methods”. 
52   See Cohen et al. (1998); SmithBattle and Leonard (1998); Edmondson and McManus 
(2007); and Saunders et al. (2012). 
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relationship (Creswell, 2009). Similarly, in order to closely examine the 
various complex relationships existing between variables within the social 
reality, techniques (such as correlation and experimentation) are employed 
by positivists. Therefore, for knowledge to be acquired, the ultimate outcome 
must be supported with empirical pieces of evidence, though not restricted to 
quantitative (Pring, 2000; Saunders et al., 2012). Knowledge generated 
about the social reality is considered ‘value neutral’ due to the nature of 
methodological assumption of ‘value neutralility’ in the positivists’ school of 
thought (Scotland, 2012). The same pattern of correlation and 
experimentation exists in post-positivism but with some improvements based 
on the sophistication they believed to exist in examining what should be 
knowledge (see Creswell, 2009; and Scotland, 2012). Furthermore, Creswell 
(2009) noted that participant’s perception is often added to the empirical 
data to enhance the research rigour.  
5.3 Linking Research Paradigm with Research Methodology and 
Methods 
Considering the chosen paradigm (i.e. positivist), figure 5.1 below presents a 
structural summary of the research paradigms in order to justify the main 
basis for not adapting the alternative strategies. 
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Source: Adapted from research authors (Creswell, 1994 and 1998; Collis and 
Husseys, 2009 and Blaikie, 2007 and 2010). 
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Figure 5.1: Summary of Paradigm Choice in Research 
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5.4 Research Strategy: Approaches and Methods 
The success of the entire strategy of the research depends upon how the 
research philosophical and methodological underpinnings (such as ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, methodology, and methods) are identified, designed 
and linked together (Schratz and Walker, 1995; Ryan, 2006; Blaikie, 2007; 
and Scotland, 2012). It is well established in the field of research that the 
degree to which a researcher becomes clear about a theory prior to 
conducting a particular study has an important bearing in the choice of a 
research design53 or approach to a specific study (Saunders et al., 2012).  
Therefore, two prominent approaches in the literature are deductive and 
inductive reasoning. The approaches are detailed in the following paragraphs 
with a view to highlighting the approach as well as the justification for the 
purpose of this study. Similarly, the research philosophies and their 
associated paradigms provide proper guidance on how this research will fit in 
the parlance of the social sciences as a discipline.   
Furthermore, methods are considered as the techniques for collecting and 
analysing data in a particular research and the nature of the data (i.e. 
whether qualitative or quantitative) generally dictates the choice of the data 
analysis techniques or methods in every research; and this is informed by the 
philosophical stance of a researcher (see Collis and Hussey, 2009). In order 
to properly define the position of this study in relation to the approach and 
strategies applied on various research elements, this section highlights the 
population identification and definition processes; sample and sampling 
selection procedures; variable measurement strategies, data collection and 
analysis techniques. 
5.4.1  Research Approach 
In line with the introduction of the research approaches in the previous 
paragraph, the following approaches are identified from the literature: 
inductive, deductive, retroductive, and abductive.  
 
                                                          
53 Research design is defined as a technical and detailed plan, including the private working 
papers often prepared by the researcher or his team prior to commencement of a research 
project (Sunders et al., 2012). It is “an integrated statement of and justification for the 
technical decisions involved in planning a research project” (Blaikie, 2010). 
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5.4.1.1 Inductive Reasoning Approach 
Inductive reasoning occurs where a researcher develops a new theory in a 
research effort to bridge an existing gap between ‘conclusion’54 and ‘observed 
premises’55 with a view to providing answers to the research questions. In 
this research approach, the purpose of the research emanates from the quest 
of the researcher to gain a feel for the happenings about a particular 
phenomenon with a view to understanding its nature and patterns to enable 
development of a theory. Therefore, it is “a study in which theory is 
developed from the observation of empirical reality; thus general inferences 
are induced from particular instances” (Collis and Hussey, 2009: 8).  
Consistent with Collis and Hussey (2009), Blaikie (2010) and Saunders et al. 
(2012) noted that studies carried out using an inductive approach usually 
involve collecting data to explore an existing phenomenon, understand its 
nature and pattern by operationalising concepts (i.e. conceptual framework) 
with a view to developing a theory. Although the conclusions drawn via 
inductive reasoning are not tested, the established framework could be tested 
to later become a theory upon subsequent confirmation by follow-up studies. 
5.4.1.2 Deductive Reasoning Approach 
The deductive approach involves the use of established theoretical 
propositions to proffer explanation, understanding, and sometimes prediction 
of a particular research phenomenon (Collis and Hussey, 2009). With a 
theory in place as a guide to the conduct of the research, deductive reasoning 
is inclined to what can be referred to as much of scientific research 
(Saunders, 2012). Therefore, the basis of explanations and prediction is the 
theory which must have been earlier developed in the previous studies and 
adopted in the theoretical framework to underpin the current study.  
More specifically, deductive research involves “a study in which a conceptual 
and theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical 
observation; thus, particular instances are deduced from general inferences” 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009:8). Data are collected to enable the researcher to 
                                                          
54  Conclusion here refers to the finding of other studies in relation to a similar research 
problem upon which the researcher sets to provide more convincing explanations. 
55  Observed premises are those established ideas/relationships/questions/hypothetical 
statements made by the researcher based on experiences/ review of literature or observation 
of the social phenomenon. 
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evaluate some research questions or hypotheses formulated within the 
context of a particular theory. In this regard, the outcome of the study might 
agree with the theory or disagree with it. In any case, the approach enhances 
the understanding of the nature of the reality by relating the phenomenon 
against a particular theory.  
Blaikie (2010) identified six important steps for conducting deductive 
research, which were also summarised in Saunders et al. (2012) as follows: 
Set in place a tentative and testable proposition, idea, premise, or hypothesis 
(which highlights a relationship between two or more variables) or set of 
hypotheses that form theoretical proposition(s). 
Deduce from the existing literature a conceptual position, testable proposition 
or more by identifying and defining different conditions under which 
assumptions of a particular chosen theory are likely to hold. 
Carry out evaluation of the premises as well as the argument behind the logic 
and compare such argument against existing theories in order to judge the 
extent to which explanation is produced until the best understanding is 
achieved. 
Obtain the relevant and appropriate data in order to measure, test, and 
analyse the variables or such concepts or relationships; 
A failure of the outcome of the analysis to agree with the premises results in 
a "tests fail!” which indicates theory falsification. In that regard, it will lead to 
rejection, modification or even restarting the entire process. 
Consistency of the researcher’s conclusions with the premises indicates that a 
theory is therefore corroborated. 
5.4.1.3 Retroductive Reasoning Approach 
Consistent with the previous approaches, this approach sets to begin with “an 
observed regularity” and attempts to generate various successions of 
explanations (evidence) by identifying those “structure(s)” and the 
"mechanism(s)” causing such regularity (Blaikie, 2007). By this attempt, 
retroductive strategy provides strong reasons for a hypothesis to be pursued 
but unable to convincingly produce reasons for the hypothesis to be believed. 
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The probability of the explanations becoming true is never “1” but could 
rather be split 50/50, which means a 50% chance of being true. However, in 
each case, further augmentation is developed empirically to provide a 
rationale behind believing in a particular hypothesis (Ward and Gimbel, 
2010).  
Alongside the above development, retroduction strategy has gained 
momentum and application in the social science literature56. For example, 
Downward and Mearman (2007) evaluated the logic of retroduction within the 
context of economic research in which a mixed methods strategy is adopted. 
Using this approach it was found useful and logically consistent within the 
social science discipline in general and economics in particular. Its ability to 
unite various economic and social thoughts in providing useful insights into a 
phenomenon is an important finding of their study. Consistent with Lawson’s 
(2003) study, Downward and Mearman (2007) noted that effectiveness of 
combining different methods and strategies in addressing specific economic 
and social phenomena using triangulation, retroduction appears the most 
appropriate logical basis of defining the conduct of such type of study. 
Furthermore, abduction and retroduction approaches are identified to have a 
synergy effect when combined in social science studies (Danermark et al., 
2002). Retroduction on its own might not be without certain limitations. 
Although, retroduction attempts to provide explanations to an observed 
regularity, the inference does not lead to a movement by the researcher from 
a hypothesis to drawing conclusion (Danemark et al., 2002). Therefore, 
combining this approach with another in social science has some advantages. 
5.4.1.4 Abductive Reasoning Approach 
The abductive reasoning approach originated from the early work of Aristotle, 
but later developed into an established approach and theory of inference by 
an American philosopher called Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) (Svennevig 
2001). In this approach to research or reasoning, a researcher formulates 
explanatory hypotheses or ideas and evaluates such based on meanings and 
accounts from the social actors’ everyday activities (see Blaikie, 2010). The 
                                                          
56 See for example, Ayim (1974);White (1997); Tsang and Kwan (1999); Mir and Watson 
(2001); Danermark et al. (2002); Ward (2006); Downward and Mearman (2007); Meyer and 
Lunnay 2013 for empirical studies involving retroduction strategy. 
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approach has its roots from combination of the renowned deductive and 
inductive approaches (Suddaby, 2006). Its strategy or logic is based on 
establishing premises with a view to arriving at logical conclusions. In so 
doing, relevant data are collected to explore a particular phenomenon by 
constructing themes which form a conceptual framework of the study. The 
framework is subjected to further test by obtaining new data until theory is 
generated or modified (Saunder et al., 2012). Meyer and Lunnay (2013) 
found that, many studies in social sciences often employed abductive or 
retroductive inference without them knowing or realising doing so. An 
important distinction between abductive and retroductive inferences is that 
while the latter demands conceptualisation of circumstances without which no 
concept can exist, the former simply examines data which is even outside the 
initial premise, chosen theory or developed theoretical framework. 
In view of the above discussions about the various research approaches, 
deductive reasoning approach is applied by this study to achieve 
methodological fit as highlighted by Edmundson and MacManus (2007). All 
the research ideas, questions and the relationships amongst variables are 
formulated in the light of the chosen theoretical framework. Based on this 
methodology, quantitative or quantifiable data were collected and analysed 
based on unrestricted VAR models (more about VAR is detailed in section 
5.5.3) which allowed the results about the various dynamics to be obtained 
and helped in answering the research questions within a context of the 
theoretical framework (see Blaikie, 2010: i.e. six steps in deductive 
approach).  
This approach is consistent with the research paradigm chosen for this study. 
Considering the fact that various relationships between variables are 
highlighted, the deductive approach is suited to providing explanations and 
predicting social phenomenon on the basis of a given theory or bodies of 
theories (Creswell, 2009 and Saunders et al., 2012). Saunders et al. (2012) 
further noted that in testing the propositions using a deductive approach, a 
researcher collects quantitative data but that does not rule out the use of 
qualitative data. Consistent with the above view, Blaikie (2010) earlier 
highlighted that deductive reasoning is in conformity with studies that are 
scientifically inclined (natural or social sciences). 
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Table 5:1: Reasoning/Approach to Research 
 Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive 
Logic Inference is 
induced when 
existing 
premises serve 
as the basis for 
generating 
untested 
conclusions 
Inference is 
deduced when the 
premises hold 
true, the 
conclusions must 
equally be true. 
Inference is 
retroduced when 
an observed 
regularity serves 
as a basis for 
generating 
testable pieces of 
evidence (critical 
realism). 
Inference is abduced  
when known 
premises serve as a 
basis for generating 
some testable 
conclusions 
G
e
n
e
r
a
li
s
a
b
il
it
y
 It flows from 
general to 
specific. 
It flows from 
specific to 
general. 
It flows from the 
combination 
between specific 
and general. 
It flows from the 
interactions between 
specific and general. 
Data 
usage 
It collects data 
to explore a 
phenomenon by 
identifying and 
constructing 
themes with a 
view to creating 
a conceptual 
framework 
within which the 
research is 
explained. 
It collects data to 
enable 
hypotheses tests 
against an 
existing theory or 
body of theories 
(theoretical 
framework). 
It collects data 
with a view to 
exploring a 
phenomenon by 
devising various 
strategies to 
generate 
evidence-based 
explanations 
regarding an 
observed 
regularity.  
It collects data with a 
view to exploring a 
phenomenon by 
identifying and 
constructing themes 
to enable 
identification of 
conceptual 
framework and 
thereafter test the 
established theory by 
another data 
collection procedure. 
Use of 
Models 
It is formed by 
“abstract 
descriptions” 
and via 
conceptual 
frameworks. 
It is formed by 
“theoretical 
models” and via 
diagrammatic and 
mathematical 
representations. 
It is formed by 
“abstract 
description” and 
entails use of 
analogies. 
It is formed by 
“abstract description” 
and discovering 
everyday meanings 
and motives.  
Theory It generates a 
theory. 
It enables test 
against a theory 
with a view to 
falsifying or 
verifying. 
It generates and 
modifies a theory 
by investigating 
data often outside 
the initial 
theoretical 
framework. 
It generates and 
possibly modifies a 
theory 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie (2010) and Saunders et al. (2012) 
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5.5 Research Methodology 
Methods are considered as the techniques for collecting and analysing data in 
a particular research (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The nature of the data to be 
collected (i.e. whether qualitative or quantitative) generally dictates the 
choice of the data analysis techniques or methods in every research; and this 
is informed by the philosophical stance of a researcher (see Blaikie, 2007; 
and 2010; Collis and Hussey, 2009; Scotland, 2012). This section discusses 
the methods used in collecting data for this study and the empirical 
methodology for analysing the data. 
Table 5:2: Sample Period Selection for the Study 
Classification for OPEC 
[Fattouh’s (2012) 
approach] 
Phase I era 
(1960-1985) 
(Trade union and 
Price setter) 
Phase II era (1986-
2006) 
(Residual Producer 
and spare capacity 
holder) 
Phase II era (2007 to 
2010) 
(Inventory Manager and 
Signaller) 
1960-2012 (52 years) 1960-1985  
(25 years) 
1986-2006  
(21 years) 
2007-2012 (6 years) 
Population 100% 100% 100% 
Sample - 2000 to 
2012 (13 years) 
NA (Based on 
Brémond et al., 
2012) 
29% (06/21*100) 
equivalent to 
01/01/2000 -
31/12/2006. 
100 % 
equivalent to 01/01/2007 -
31/12/2012 
Source: Developed by the researcher from the literature. 
Based on table 5.2, it can be observed that OPEC’s behaviour changed over 
time from the inception in 1960 to 2012 (Fattouh, 2012). The period in which 
OPEC acted more like a trade union and price setter (phase 1) has not been 
considered in this research, although reference was made to such literature 
to gain an insight that will enable understanding of reasons for the current 
dynamics in OPEC behaviour or in that of other key oil market players. This is 
consistent with the view of Brémond et al. (2012) who argued that reference 
to phase 1 is an important guide to understanding OPEC’s subsequent 
actions. In phase II, 40% of the period formed part of the sample used in this 
research in consideration of data limitation, while the entire period (i.e. 
100%) of phase III when OPEC acted as signaller and inventory manager was 
also considered.  
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5.5.1 Methods of Data Collection 
Considering the focus of this study is to empirically assess OPEC’s oil price 
band/stabilisation policies vis-à-vis its ability to control oil prices within a 
target price band, the appropriate research method employed to achieve the 
stated research objectives is quantitative methods based on analysis of 
secondary data. Secondary data are employed for two important reasons. 
Firstly, since the 1973 oil price shock, there has been an exchange of political 
statements and shift of blame between OPEC (as a cartel) and IEA or the U.S. 
on who has been responsible for the sustained high oil prices.   Besides the 
challenge of identifying respondents that represent the interests of 
players/organisations in the oil markets, another potential challenge is that 
the views to be generated from any primary data collection instrument might 
end up reflecting the diverse views of such organisations. Therefore, in the 
light of positivists’ paradigm which assumes singularity and objectivity of a 
social reality, knowledge could still be established in a process not influenced 
“by the act of investigating it” (Collis and Hussey, 2009: 56). Given the 
developments in the internet reporting, the responses of both organisations 
always remain that all necessary information reflecting their energy position 
and policies could be found on their websites and various periodic reports.  
Consequently, secondary data are used to explore the complex relationships 
and dynamics between various oil market players’ actions to provide answers 
to the research questions raised in this study. In view of the fact that this 
study solely relies on the secondary sources of data, it becomes crucial to 
highlight detailed structure of the data for the modelling purposes. Huisman 
(2009) highlighted the crucial importance of understanding data before 
applying any modelling technique. Data were obtained for a period of 13 
years (equivalent to 156 monthly data points) from 2000 and 2012 from the 
energy archival sources of OPEC, EIA, BP, and IEA. Other variables included 
in the model were expressed as dummies for war in Iraq; economic events 
(i.e. global economic recession); and OPEC official and implied oil price band 
policies. 
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5.5.2 Definition of Variables and Measurement Strategies 
This section defines the variables used in this study. Variables representing 
OPEC stabilisation policies were included in the models to examine how the 
policies influenced oil prices and how they are influenced by changes in other 
variables. Consistent with VAR model’s classification of variables, data 
collected were split into endogenous and exogenous variables. In this 
connection, data in relation to OPEC’s actions were collected for i) OPEC 
production quota policy; ii) OPEC oil price band policy; iii) OPEC spare 
capacity policy; and iv) OPEC production cheating. To critically investigate the 
effect of the actions of other key market players, data were collected for 
three variables namely: OECD/IEA crude oil consumption, OECD/IEA crude oil 
stockpiling, and non-OPEC production. The three variables are considered 
important due to the following reasons. First, OECD/IEA members’ crude oil 
consumption and stockpiling are two prominent ways of implementing IEA’s 
policies. Managing the two variables by the member nations, IEA is able to 
respond to disruption in the oil market57. Furthermore, stockpiling behaviour 
has been established as an important factor that explain the variation in oil 
prices, therefore it has been used in many studies (see Pyndick, 2001; 
Considine and Larson, 2001; Ye et al., 2002; Dées et al., 2003; Kaufmann et 
al., 2004; Zamany, 2004; Ghouri, 2006; Kings et al., 2012). OECD/IEA 
stocks level at a particular period is likely to be influenced by the crude oil 
consumed. In order for the OECD/IEA members to comply with the IEA 
policy, there is a tendency to increase consumption by OECD/IEA members to 
meet up with the minimum stock level even when oil prices keep rising.  
Secondly, non-OPEC producers are considered important because they are 
the only competitors in the oil market to OPEC. There is a general belief in 
the oil market literature that non-OPEC group behaves competitively (Allsopp 
and Fattouh, 2011), therefore, their actions are largely described or assumed 
to be like that of a fringe (Horn, 2001; Sankey et al. 2010). In this 
connection, their relative contribution towards high oil prices is rarely 
investigated. A sizeable review of literature on oil market could not provide 
sufficient empirical support that non-OPEC played not significantly in 
                                                          
57 See more on how IEA responds to major disruptions in oil prices via the weblink below: 
https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/respondingtomajorsupplydisruptions/ 
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promoting high oil prices. Including this variable is believed to yield some 
findings that might be in support or against this conclusion. 
Oil Price (OPR): West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures contract crude oil 
prices are most commonly used in this type of study (see Hammad, 2011). 
The crude oil contracts which are usually traded on the New York Market 
Exchange (NYMEX) were found to be the world’s most liquid futures contract 
(Büyüksahin et al., 2009), most widely traded for futures contracts 
(Sadorsky, 2006 and 2008; Brunetti et al., 2013). WTI has been used by 
many other studies because it quickly reflects the information about 
projected value of oil in the current contract prices (see for example 
Hammoudeh et al., 2003; Ye et al., 2005; Ye et al., 2006; Villar and Joutz, 
2006). WTI spot prices are commonly used as the reference prices that guide 
futures contracts (see Horn, 2001) and as a benchmark against which the 
OPEC reference basket is compared in the oil markets. To further justify our 
choice for WTI spot prices, a number of robustness checks were carried out 
on futures oil prices against other forms of prices including spot oil prices and 
the OPEC basket prices. No significant differences were found between 
futures and spot oil prices which are consistent with the findings from other 
studies (see Silvério and Szklo, 2012, and the covariance and correlation 
analysis result reported in Appendix XXV). The monthly oil prices data were 
obtained from U.S. Energy Information Administration database for the 
sample period (i.e. from year 2000 to 2012), which produces 156 periods or 
observations.   
 
OPEC Production Quota (OPQ): OPEC production figures have been 
employed by previous studies58 (e.g. Kaufmann, et al., 2008; Barros et al., 
2011) to examine OPEC behaviour/strategy in influencing oil prices in the 
global markets. OPQ is defined in this context as the raw production levels 
OPEC often set periodically as part of its strategy to protect members’ 
interests with a view to attaining “fair prices 59”. Quota might be initially 
                                                          
58 For more and extensive review about these studies refer to Chapter 2 of this study on OPEC 
structure in the global oil market. 
59 “Fair price” has no any universally accepted general definition. However, for the purpose of 
this study, fair prices are considered just and acceptable prices to OPEC which will not set the 
members at disadvantage. It is such a price the OPEC would be happy to witness it prevailing 
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allocated to a member, but due to factors60 beyond the members’ control, 
another member with the excess capacity (usually Saudi Arabia) is often 
invited to make up the initial allocation made to that country. This variable is 
included because; it is established to be the most effective tool for OPEC to 
influence oil prices (see Mazraati and Jazayeri, 2004; Kaufmann et al., 2004).  
In this regard, monthly OPEC production quota from January 2000 to 
December 2012 (equivalent to 13 year period and 156 observations) were 
taken from OPEC database.  
 
OPEC Production Cheating (OPC): This variable is a proxy for cheating by 
members of OPEC (see Chapters 2 and 4 for detailed literature on OPEC 
cheating behaviour). It is derived from two major variables. First is the actual 
OPEC production obtained from the EIA database and second, OPEC 
production quota described above. This proxy is used due to the fact that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain accurate and reliable data about how 
much crude oil and gas products that sold in the market outside OPEC official 
allocation. The variables are monthly variables obtained as difference 
between OPEC actual production supply to the market and officially allocated 
quota. This variable was defined in a similar way in the previous OPEC 
literature (see Kaufmann et al., 2004: 67) who defined it as “the degree to 
which OPEC exceeds” their allocated “production quota”. There is no 
unanimous agreement as to the effect of this behaviour in the oil market. 
Therefore, while a view exists arguing that increased OPEC cheating is a sign 
of inefficiency on the part of OPEC which increases uncertainty, another 
strand believes that the action helps the market by pumping in more oil and 
helps keeps demand-supply balance (see Abraham, 2000, Kaufmann et al. 
2004). The monthly cheating were obtained based on both U.S.-EIA and 
OPEC datasets for the sample period (i.e. from year January, 2000 to 
December, 2012), which produced 156 periods or observations. 
 
OPEC Spare Production Capacity (OSC): Monthly data were generated 
from the U.S.-EIA database for OPEC spare capacity. Spare capacity is the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the oil market. For more about various aspects of “fair prices” see Markham (2005); Brewer 
(2007); and Brunetti et al. (2013). 
60  Some of the factors are natural disaster (King et al., 2012), or social and political 
insecurities in the member state (King et al., 2012), and incentive for a member to cheat 
(Dibooglu and AlGudhea, 2007; Chalabi, 2010). 
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excess crude oil provision made to cushion the oil market in the event of any 
disruption or any unanticipated contingencies. Due to the effect of the war in 
Iraq, accurate data on this variable for the entire OPEC was not obtainable. 
Therefore in most periods, OPEC-10 data were relied upon for the entire 
OPEC’s capacity. This variable is important because it is often a basis for the 
U.S. and OECD/IEA’s projection of oil prices (see Siemenski, 2013). High 
spare capacity in OPEC members indicates low oil price projection, while low 
spare capacity in OPEC members means projection of high oil prices. It will be 
of interest to examine the specific role of this variable on oil prices. 
Furthermore, understanding factors responsible for high or low spare capacity 
will show the importance of this variable in the model. Kaufmann et al. 
(2004) employed almost similar variable (i.e. capacity utilisation as against 
the available capacity) based on quarterly data to assess the claim that 
OPEC’s power had diminished.   
 
Oil Market Competition (OMC): This is non-OPEC monthly crude oil 
production which stands as a proxy for competition in the global oil market. 
The variable was obtained from the U.S.-EIA database. The essence of using 
this variable is to observe dynamics (similarities or differences) between 
OPEC reaction to that of its competitors in an effort to evaluate whether the 
actions of OPEC resemble a cartel as often claimed by the Western politicians 
and media. In the same way, understanding non-OPEC producers (who are 
responsible for nearly 60% of the market share) will be useful to 
understanding the shift in the balance of power in the light of developments 
in other energy sources, such as shale energy (see Russell and Ibrahim, 
2013). 
 
OECD/IEA Crude Oil Consumption (OOC): IEA has set up a policy 
regarding strategic reduction in the consumption of OPEC’s oil while pursuing 
an energy policy that is considered efficient, affordable and sustainable within 
the framework of energy security. As presented in panel 6 of figures 6.1 and 
6.2, during the implied OPB period, this variable has been declining 
consistently in response of the policy. In this regard, this study attempts to 
examine the effect of this policy not only on the oil prices, but also in 
obstructing OPEC’s attempt to achieve stable and reasonable oil prices in 
131 
 
accordance with its stated objectives. More on the reason for including this 
variable was discussed at the beginning of this subsection.  
 
OECD/IEA Crude Oil Stockpiling (OOS): Crude oil stockpiling is yet 
another OECD/IEA policy where each of the 28 members is expected to 
maintain stocks at least not less than 90 days of its prior year’s net imports 
(IEA, 2013). However, any of the member nations is not restricted to 
stockpile more than the minimum level. This explains why the U.S. and Japan 
can set up strategic reserves holding hundreds of thousands of crude oil. The 
essence of the policy is to provide a cushion if future crude oil disruption 
arises; it was introduced as part of the IEA policy response to the OPEC oil 
embargo in the 1970s.  
 
OPEC Oil Price Band (OPB) policy: OPEC OPB policy was aimed at 
achieving crude oil price stability as part of the specific OPEC intervention 
policies introduced in the early 2000s to respond to rising oil prices that 
started in the latter part of the 1990s (see Farrell et al., 2001). The policy 
was also considered a commitment from OPEC to actualise one of its primary 
objectives of oil price stability (see Fattouh and Allsopp, 2009). OPB is usually 
seen as the consensus price range which OPEC was happy to witness 
prevailing in the oil market. It was widely welcome by non-OPEC producers 
as well61. This definition is similar to the “fair price” concept except that OPB 
operates two boundaries (upper and lower bounds) that are crucial to both oil 
consumers as well as producers (e.g. $22 and $28). Kobayashi (2010) 
believed that a fair price regime would not only guarantee a balanced oil 
supply and demand regime, but must equally promote a balanced regime in 
the flow of information. For the purpose of this study, OPB policy was 
included as an exogenous variable to test for its effect on the oil price 
stability and also impact on the model 62 . On this basis, OPB policy was 
                                                          
61 When oil prices fell during 2008, a delegation from India at the Jeddah Meeting of OPEC in 
July 2008, presented a new proposal for reviving its OPB policy. The new proposal was 
welcomed by most IEA countries’ political leaders (for example, the US president George Bush, 
the French president Nicolas Sarkozy and the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown)61.  The support 
also extended to the other non-OPEC producer countries such as Russia and Norway. Hence, 
the OPB policy idea was earlier supported by the IEA members in their general struggle to 
stabilise the oil prices. 
62 Having carried out tests relating to the OPB policy, it was established that although it does 
have an effect on oil prices, it does not produce any significant difference between the model 
with and without OPB policy as an exogenous variable. 
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classified into two broad categories, namely: (a) an official OPB policy (which 
lasted between 2000 and 2005) announced by OPEC as an entity, and (b) an 
implied OPB policy based on unofficial announcements often made by senior 
government officials. Suitable coding was introduced to the model to evaluate 
the effect of the official policy introduction and withdrawal.  
 
Global Economic Recession (GER): Economic events are found to be 
important factors influencing oil prices. Those economic events in this context 
do not include those economic events that might be politically motivated. The 
recent 2008 recession which originated from the banking crisis in U.S. 
affected the globe including both oil consuming and producing nations. This 
trend in the economic cycle usually results in low oil prices and low 
consumption. This variable was considered to control for this effect. King et 
al. (2012: 25) employed a dummy variable to control for the effect of 
economic events in examining factors responsible for volatility in daily oil 
prices between 2007 and 2008. In their approach, economic events included 
monetary policy actions, news about financial trading relating to oil market 
and events leading to economic instability (European crisis, global economic 
recession and Asian crisis). On the basis of this assessment, dummy variables 
were employed to represent the duration when the impact of the recession 
was felt globally as defined in Eaton et al. (2011)63. The sharp structural 
break during the sample period led to this variable being considered as a 
major explanation for such sharp change. Therefore, the period of the 
recession is represented with a dummy variable where “1” denotes presence 
of economic recession while the other period with no recession is represented 
with “0”. 
 
War in Iraq (WAR): A number of geopolitical events that affected the oil 
market have been observed since 2000 onward (see Parra, 2004; Radetzki, 
2012). One of the most important events which affected OPEC during the last 
decade was the war in Iraq.  Recognising conflict periods in oil market related 
studies enhances the analysis as noted by Rigobon and Sack (2005). 
However, it is often very difficult to establish pre, during and post event 
                                                          
63 The study considers the actual impact period for the recession to commence from the 1st 
quarter of 2008 to the end of the 1st quarter of 2009. 
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effects with a high degree of certainty. And this decision about the span of 
the period or the variable measurement to be considered has important 
impact on the modelling process (see Stock and Watson, 2001; Brooks, 
2008; Wit et al., 2012). To remove any ambiguity in the measurement 
process of this important event, the EIA definition of this event period was 
adopted with a view to enhancing the validity of the results. This covered a 
period from March 2003 to December 2005. The same definition was 
employed by Guidi et al. (2007) when examining the oil market efficiency to 
incorporate U.S. policies during both conflict and non-conflict periods. The 
period when the war was formally taking place was represented by “1” while 
its absence was represented by “0”. This variable was considered as the 
major event to be included as an exogenous variable for the following 
reasons. First, it was the major political event that took place during the 
period when official OPEC OPB was in operation (see Chalabi, 2010). Second, 
its use was well established in the previous studies (see for example King et 
al., 2012). Third, no other event was established in the literature whose 
effect could be reliably ascertained during the sample period. Furthermore, 
the Iraq war was identified as the only political war that many commentators 
and columnists and even politicians could have termed as an oil war (Mabro, 
2003; Kramer and Michalowski, 2005).  
5.5.3 Methods of Data Analysis  
This section highlights the various techniques employed for analysing the 
entire data collected to answer the research questions. Considering the 
choice for the research paradigm in this study, a number of techniques will be 
employed in the analysis of data in order to achieve the above stated 
objectives. Therefore, it starts with the preliminary analysis as well as further 
or more complex analysis with a view to understanding the nature of 
relationships existing between the existing premises.  
5.5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics are usually applied to enable the researcher to deduce 
appropriate and “accurate profile of events, persons or situations” within the 
context of descriptive and exploratory research (see Saunders et al., 2012). 
They enable description of data using diagrams for measurements on central 
tendencies and dispersions. Descriptive statistics are compatible with both 
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qualitative and quantitative methods, therefore the analysis will pave way for 
understanding and describing the nature of the data, but are not able to test 
or examine relationships, differences and other behavioural pattern of the 
data. In this regard, the summary statistics of the dataset are presented and 
discussed. Furthermore, diagrammatical representation in graphs and charts 
are employed to view the pattern of the distribution. Other forms of normality 
tests (which include formal tests) are used to explore the nature of the 
distribution for further statistical analysis.  
5.5.3.2 Econometric Analysis 
To empirically examine the impact of OPEC stabilisation policies and OPEC’s 
ability to control oil prices within a target oil price band, three Vector 
Autoregressive models are utilised. The first model enables a critical 
examination to be undertaken of the effectiveness of OPEC stabilisation and 
OPB policies assuming no intervention of any other endogenous factors. The 
second model considers the scenario where other market forces such as 
competition in the oil markets and OECD/IEA consumption and stockpiling 
policies influence OPEC’s ability to achieve their price stabilisation goals. The 
third model considers the impact on oil prices, while controlling for the effect 
of its consumption from OPEC nations, of U.S. stockpiling behaviour via its 
establishment of strategic petroleum reserves.   
Econometric analysis enjoys widespread application in the field of applied 
economics, finance, politics and accounting  in the sense that it can 
effectively be used in forecasting economic, social, or political behaviours of 
individuals or entities (Wooldridge, 2009; Hansen, 2013). In the light of the 
time series variables defined in subsection 5.5.2, the philosophical basis for 
this study, and the theoretical framework discussed earlier, this subsection 
discusses the empirical methodology adopted to examine various 
dynamics/relationships between variables with a view to achieving the stated 
research objectives. The presence of the quantitative data (e.g. time series 
variables) suggests the appropriateness of utilising econometrics64 for this 
research. Therefore, in an effort to investigate the response of OPEC policies 
                                                          
64  Econometrics involves application of statistical methods to enable estimation of various 
economic relationships between variables, or testing economic theories (Wooldridge, 2009). 
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to oil price volatility, this study employs the use of an unrestricted65 VAR as 
opposed to simply using ordinary simple regression for analysis.  
The use of VAR in time series analysis to study complex dynamics enjoys 
wide application (Brooks, 2008; Zuniga, 2005; Park and Ratti, 2008; King et 
al., 2012). Developments in time series econometrics have enabled a 
framework to be established for modelling both short and long-term 
dynamics in the economic and financial series with a view to highlighting 
various relationships (Zuniga, 2005; and Brooks, 2008). In view of this 
development, this section presents various time-series property tests and 
specifies how the VAR model works in evaluation of relationships and in 
predicting dynamics in variables.  It is important to bear in mind when 
dealing with time series data that future occurrences of events are assumed 
to solely depend on the past series data but not vice-versa (Wooldridge, 
2009). In this case, properties of time-series might not allow application of 
classical ordinary least square (OLS) regression procedures66 
5.5.3.3 Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Models  
VAR is considered a systems regression model which is more reliable where 
there is more than one dependent variable of interest to the researcher (for 
example oil price volatility and OPEC disclosure).  A multivariate time series 
(like VAR) is a modelling technique which is a hybrid between the univariate 
time series and simultaneous equations models67, and can effectively capture 
complex dynamics due to the following reasons:  
i. In a VAR model, information can be extracted from a variable by 
capturing and examining dynamics from itself or its own lag in both 
univariate and multivariate time series (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
ii. It gives flexibility where a variable can be influenced by the time lag of 
another variable. In VAR, the dynamics in variables can be 
                                                          
65 Brooks (2008) noted that for any VAR to be unrestricted, it must preserve the same level or 
number of lags for the entire variables used in the VAR equation.  
66 Given the nature of the time series data in this study, it is believed that a simple regression 
model cannot fit the methodology for this study. This is because, time series data have unique 
properties; and when classical regression models are applied, that will end up producing 
spurious results, e.g. high R2. Also, one might be tempted to concluded that relationship exists 
between variables, while in the real sense, the variables are not related to each other (see 
Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
67 For such details, see Brooks (2008). 
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comprehensively understood by exploring how lags of other variables 
can influence another variable and vice versa. This is because VAR 
model work as a system with room to accommodate various equations 
within a single system.  In this connection, it can measure changes in 
one variable in relation to its own lags and also in relation to the other 
variables as well as their own lags (Asteriou and Hall, 2007; Brooks, 
2008; Farzanegan and Markawardt, 2009; Farzanegan, 2011; Hansen, 
2013). 
iii. In VAR analysis, one does not need to specify the independent and 
dependent variables as all the variables are endogenously selected for 
the examination of relationships (see Brooks, 2008). 
iv. One of the important issues in time series regressions is the test on 
data for stationarity which is performed to deal with a problem of 
spurious regression due to non-stationarity. VAR enables these 
processes to be examined in order for the estimates to be free from 
bias and to enable consistency of the coefficients.  
v. Because VAR considers variables as vectors, it enables the 
relationships between variables to be considered simultaneously and in 
multivariate form. Therefore, considering oil market as an institution 
where different market players participate with presumably different 
objectives, VAR can model the dynamics in terms of the interaction of 
the various policies in the system. 
Before specifying the VAR model, a series of tests, known as time-series 
properties are required. In this regard, the tests are carried out in the next 
chapter (i.e. Chapter 6) alongside all the descriptive statistics. More 
specifically, the stationarity tests for unit roots and cointegration tests68 are 
carried out. 
5.5.3.4 Unit Root Tests 
Due to the stochastic nature of time series variables (i.e. the tendencies of 
the mean of the series to oscillate in a seemingly unpredictable “random 
                                                          
68  The cointegration test adopted for the purpose of this study is Johansen (1988) 
cointegration test. 
137 
 
walk” over time (Dougherty, 1992), the use of a unit root test becomes 
inevitable within the context of the theory of unit-root econometrics (Asteriou 
and Hall, 2007). As a condition for a univariate analysis, a series must be 
stationary69 for unique dynamics to be properly explored. Unit root test is 
carried out on each of the included variables in VAR for any joint significance 
tests to be observed on the lags of such variables (Brooks, 2008). In the 
event a non-stationary series (i.e. with the presence of unit roots) exists, the 
outcome from ordinary classical regression analysis will remain invalid, 
therefore resulting in “spurious regressions” 70  (Asteriou and Hall, 2007; 
Brooks, 2008). As part of the tests on the properties of time series, a unit 
root test is carried out in order to establish stationarity or non-stationarity in 
the series (Brooks, 2008; Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Therefore, the null 
hypothesis test is carried out to establish whether each series is integrated of 
order one (i.e. Yt= I(1)) which simply implies that there is a presence of a 
unit root in each of the series.  
Furthermore, Brooks (2008) noted two major important reasons why the 
stationarity checks should be carried out on a series: First, there is a clear 
distinction on the effect of ‘shocks’ between stationary and non-stationary 
data. Whereas in stationary series, ‘shocks’ during time t will continue to 
have a reduced effect as time changes from one period to another (t to t + 1, 
and from t + 1 to t + 2, and so on); but the persistence of the shocks in non-
stationary series moves towards infinity, which interprets that the ‘shocks’ in 
period t will not have a lower effect in t + 1, and subsequent t + 2 and so on. 
Second, relates much to the fear of spurious regressions as a result of 
applying classical regressions to non-stationary data, which might produce a 
very high R2 and significant coefficient estimates, therefore producing invalid 
results. 
Therefore, depending on “the order of integration of a series”71, various tests 
are applicable in the course of examining stability in the series in relation to 
                                                          
69 Stationary series is such series “...with a constant mean, constant variance and constant 
autocovariances for each given lag.” (see, Brooks, 2008). 
70  Spurious regression is such which employs classical regression analysis on series that 
appears to be non-stationary, therefore producing invalid results (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
71 According to Asteriou and Hall (2007), “the order of integration of a series” is assumed as a 
general rule to be the size a series is differenced for it to become a stationary one. In this 
regard, it is similar to the number of unit roots. 
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constant mean and variance (popularly known as ‘stationary series’). A series 
Yt integrated of order d is denoted by Yt = I(d). Therefore, a series with unit-
root problem, which is integrated of order 1 [i.e. denoted I(1)], can be 
filtered at a first-difference (i.e. (∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1 ) to generate a stationary 
series with a constant mean and variance. This is one of the crucial property 
test for time series model such as VAR to be estimated. The various 
approaches to investigating stationarity properties (i.e. performing the unit-
root tests) include Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF); Dickey-Fuller GLS (ERS); 
Phillips-Perron (PP); Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS); Elliot-
Rthenberg-Stock Point-Optimal (ERSO); and Ng-Perron (NP) test. However, 
the most famous among them are usually two (i.e. the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF), the Phillips-Perron) which have enjoyed widespread application72 
in the fields of Economics, Accounting and Finance.  
Similarly, in line with the previous studies’ practices, this study employs 
Augmented Dickey and Fuller and Phillips and Perron for unit roots tests in an 
effort to ensure consistency and allow for comparison with the previous 
studies. Furthermore, it allows for comparison between parametric and non-
parametric tools in time series analysis and other various unit – root tests73.  
5.5.3.5 Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration,74 being a statistical tool through which co-movement of non-
stationary economic variables or series can be described, has been employed 
in the previous literature to test long term relationships between variables in 
Accounting, Finance and Economics disciplines most particularly where oil 
prices are involved. For example, cointegration was used to test long run 
relationship between oil prices and global economic activity (Lardic and 
Mignon, 2008; He et al., 2010), other commodity prices such as gold (Zhang 
and Wei, 2010), evidence of collusion and cartel behaviour (Gülen, 1996). 
Two or more non-stationary time series data are considered to be 
cointegrated “if a linear combination of the terms results in a stationary time 
                                                          
72 Some of the studies that employ or propagate the popularity of the two tests include but not 
limited to the followings: Zuniga (2005); Asteriou and Hall (2007); Farzanegan (2011); Brooks 
(2008);  
73 For further references about the tests, refer to Gülen (1996), Zuniga (2005). 
74  This is a process through which long-run comovement of non-stationary variables are 
evaluated and described. It has been used in many OPEC studies (see Gülen, 1996; Kaufmann 
et al., 2004). 
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series” (Zuniga, 2005). It is important to note that for cointegration to take 
effect, all the included variables in VAR models must be of the same order of 
integration. Evidence of cointegration between variables has been interpreted 
as presence of long run relationship which enables the estimation of VECM 
(see Gülen, 1996).   
A number of approaches are available in the economic literature which 
includes: Engle-Granger (Engle and Granger, 1987) two-step test, the 
Johansen cointegration test and Phillips-Ouliaris cointegration test. However, 
despite the shortcomings of each of the approaches, the most popular one in 
social sciences 75  is the one developed by Johansen (1988). Johansen’s 
system cointegration method introduces two tests statistics, namely the 
Trace and Lambda Max tests. The null hypothesis usually states there is no 
cointegrating equation in the system. Under both trace and Max statistics, the 
null hypothesis can be rejected or fail to reject on two bases, namely: excess 
of the trace or Max statistics over the critical values or simply the significance 
level. In view of the fact that evidence of cointegration might suggest 
application of the vector error correction models (VECM), the long run 
dynamics existing within the variables might be observed subject to any 
restriction in the model. 
5.5.3.6 Lag Length Identification and Selection  
The choice of the appropriate lag order in VAR models is the most critical 
aspect considering the fact that the success of the inferences drawn are 
directly dependent upon the correct specification of the model (Gutierrez et 
al., 2009; Zuniga, 2005; Hatemi, 2003; Hacker and Hatemi, 2008; King et al. 
2012).  Due to tendencies of human bias if individuals’ subjective reasoning 
is allowed to dictate the orders of the lags, a wide difference must be 
expected in results given the sensitivity of lag order to the R2 values in the 
regressions. In this regard, the order is statistically arrived. Zuniga (2005) 
                                                          
75 Among the empirical studies that apply the Johansen (1988) in the field of Accounting and 
Finance and Economics discliplines include but not limited to the followings: Zuniga (2005); Li 
(2007). 
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noted the various elements upon which a need exists to achieve trade-offs; 
which include best fitness76, less residuals, and loss of degrees of freedom77.  
The approaches to the selection78 of lag structure which are famous in the 
previous literature included but were not limited to the following: Likelihood 
ratio test (LRT), Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC), Bayer information criterion (BIC) 
and Hannan-Quin information criterion (HQIC). Hatemi (2003) after 
experimenting with Monte Carlo simulation, found that the optimal selection 
of lag order is achieved when the two criteria (namely: Schwarz (1978) and 
Hannan and Quinn (1979)) are combined.  
A number of studies highlighted the danger of wrong selection of lag in VAR 
model (for example see Gutierrez et al., 2009; Hatemi, 2003; Hacker and 
Hatemi, 2008; Brooks, 2008; Asteriou and Hall, 2008; Lütkepohl, 1993). It is 
unanimously agreed that “overfitting”79 or “underfitting” might result in an 
increased “mean-square forecast errors” and “autocorrelated errors” 
respectively. AIC, BIC and LRT are evaluated in most studies that apply VAR 
models because it is standard practice to include them (see Zuniga, 2005). 
Five criteria were evaluated for the purpose of selecting the appropriate lag 
for estimating the VAR. To ensure the appropriateness of the selection, 
further tests to justify the stability of the VAR at the selected lag level were 
carried out using both roots of characteristic polynomial and inverse roots of 
AR characteristic polynomial. 
5.5.4 VAR Models Specifications 
To examine the complex dynamics between, OPEC stabilisation/OPB policies, 
other market players’ policies and the international oil prices, unrestricted 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models were estimated and the resulting impulse 
response (IR) and variance decomposition (VD) analysed. Impulse responses 
traces out over time the responsiveness of current and future values of each 
                                                          
76 The best fit model is the ability of a particular criterion to minimise the information criterion 
function (otherwise known as the overall sum of squared residuals) or maximizes the LR (see 
Zuniga, 2005). 
77 This is the loss arising as a result of a size of estimated parameters (see Zuniga, 2005) 
78 The approaches can be classified as traditional information criterion (AIC, SIC and HQIC) 
and modern or alternative information criterion (IC(p, s)). 
79 Overfitting exists where a “higher order lag length” is selected against what should be the 
“true lag length” 
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of the variables to a shock in one of the VAR equations. While, variance 
decompositions measured the proportion of the movements in the dependent 
variables that are due to their own shocks, and also the shocks of the other 
variables (see Brooks, 2008).  
Two models were estimated, the first model assumes that OPEC has control 
over the oil market and attempt is made to examine its influence holding 
other factors constant in order to observe the degree to which oil prices will 
be stabilised within a target range.   
5.5.3.1 First VAR Model Specification 
Consider a VAR of order P: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑌𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑍𝑡 + ℯ𝑡                                   5.1 
 
Where Yt is a (n x 1) vector of endogenous variables, A1 is a (n x n) vector of 
deterministic variables, and Ai and B are coefficients matrices, C is the (n × 
1) intercept vector of the VAR, Zt stands for the vector of exogenous 
variables, and et  is the (n×1) generalisation of a white noise process. 
 
Brooks (2008:290) identified “compactness” as one of the important features 
of VAR. In other words, equation 5.1 can be rewritten or expanded to include 
the number of variables in the models (i.e. all the four series ( Yt ) of 
endogenous variables (for example y1t, y2t,……,ynt).  
 
Therefore, Yt = [LOPRt, LOPQt, LOPCt, LOSCt]                                          5.2   
 
Note that: LOPR stands for logged values of oil prices; LOPQ stands for 
logged values of OPEC production quota; LOPC stands for Logged values of 
OPEC production cheating; and LOSC stands for logged values of OPEC spare 
capacity. 
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The remaining three exogenous80 variables standing for OPEC oil price band 
policy (OPB), war in Iraq (WAR), and global economic recession (GER) are 
presented in equation 5.3 where Zt  is considered a vector of exogenous 
variables: 
 
Zt = [OPBt WARt GERt]                                        5.3 
By implication, equation 5.1 above can be further broken down into the 
following block of equations (5.4) to make it much clearer (assuming p=1): 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0,1 + 𝛽1,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ1𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡 =  𝛼0,2 + 𝛽2,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1
+ +𝛽2,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ2,𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,3 + 𝛽3,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ3,𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,4 + 𝛽4,1𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ4,𝑡 
As mentioned earlier, VAR is a systems regression model (which signifies 
there could be more than one dependent variable at different times). 
Interestingly, the equations (5.4) could be rewritten where the Ai’s are 4 x 4 
coefficient matrix to produce the following vector (5.5): 
[
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡
] = [
𝛼0,1
𝛼0,2
𝛼0,3
𝛼0,4
] +
[
 
 
 
𝛽11,1 𝛽12,1 𝛽13,1 𝛽14,1
𝛽21,1 𝛽22,1 𝛽23,1 𝛽24,1
𝛽31,1 𝛽32,1 𝛽33,1 𝛽34,1
𝛽41,1 𝛽42,1 𝛽43,1 𝛽44,1]
 
 
 
[
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1
] + ⋯
+
[
 
 
 
 
𝛽11,𝑝 𝛽12,𝑝 𝛽13,𝑝 𝛽14,𝑝
𝛽21,𝑝 𝛽22,𝑝 𝛽23,𝑝 𝛽24,𝑝
𝛽31,𝑝 𝛽32,𝑝 𝛽33,𝑝 𝛽34,𝑝
𝛽41,𝑝 𝛽42,𝑝 𝛽43,𝑝 𝛽44,𝑝]
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−𝑝 ]
 
 
 
 
+ [
ℯ1,𝑡
ℯ2,𝑡
ℯ3,𝑡
ℯ4,𝑡
] 
 
 
                                                          
80 Exogeneity for a variable x is defined by Leamer (1985) in relation to y, “if the conditional 
distribution of y given x does not change with modifications of the process generating x.” (see 
Brooks, 2008:273). In this regard, a major distinction was between “predetermined” and 
“strictly exogenous” variables (Brooks, 2008). While the former relates to a variable which is 
independent of the current and future errors in an equation, the latter describes variable 
independent of the past, contemporary, and future errors in an equation.   
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5.5.3.2 Second VAR Model Specification 
The second model however assumes that OPEC is no longer solely responsible 
for setting oil prices, and that other market players are introduced with 
different policies based on objectives different from OPEC. Therefore, in the 
initial VAR model based on equation 5.1, the Yt has been modified to reflect 
the new players’ policies as follows: 
 Yt = [LOPRt, LOPQt, LOPCt, LOSCt, LOMCt, LOOCt, LOOSt]                5.6                                                               
Note that: LOPRt stands for logged values of oil prices; LOPQt stands for 
logged values of OPEC production quota; LOPCt stands for logged values of 
OPEC production cheating; LOSCt stands for logged values of OPEC spare 
capacity; LOMCt stands for logged values of oil market competition; LOOCt 
stands for logged values of OECD/IEA crude oil consumption; and LOOSt 
stands for logged values of OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling. 
 
However, the exogenous variables remain as in equation 5.6. In this regard, 
the following block of equations (5.10) is developed based on equation 5.4. 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0,1 + 𝛽1,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,5𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1,7𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ1𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡 =  𝛼0,2 + 𝛽2,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,5𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2,7𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + +𝛽2,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ2,𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,3 + 𝛽3,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,5𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3,7𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ3,𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,4 + 𝛽4,1𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,5𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4,7𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ4,𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,5 + 𝛽5,1𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5,7𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ5,𝑡 
       𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,6 + 𝛽6,1𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6,6𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,7𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ6,𝑡 
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡 =  𝛼0,7 + 𝛽7,1𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,6𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7,7𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ7,𝑡 
In the second model the VAR specification in equation 5.1 which has been 
broken down to produce the block of equations in 5.7, is further transformed 
144 
 
into a 7X7 matrix. In this regard, equation 5.11, in matrix form, produces the 
following: 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛼0,1
𝛼0,2
𝛼0,3
𝛼0,4
𝛼0,5
𝛼0,6
𝛼0,7]
 
 
 
 
 
 
+
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛽
11,1
𝛽
12,1
𝛽
13,1
𝛽
14,1
𝛽
15,1
𝛽
16,1
𝛽
17,1
𝛽
21,1
𝛽
22,1
𝛽
23,1
𝛽
24,1
𝛽
25,1
𝛽
26,1
𝛽
27,1
𝛽
31,1
𝛽
32,1
𝛽
33,1
𝛽
34,1
𝛽
35,1
𝛽
36,1
𝛽
37,1
𝛽
41,1
𝛽
42,1
𝛽
43,1
𝛽
44,1
𝛽
45,1
𝛽
46,1
𝛽
47,1
𝛽
51,1
𝛽
52,1
𝛽
53,1
𝛽
54,1
𝛽
55,1
𝛽
56,1
𝛽
57,1
𝛽
61,1
𝛽
62,1
𝛽
63,1
𝛽
64,1
𝛽
65,1
𝛽
66,1
𝛽
67,1
𝛽
71,1
𝛽
72,1
𝛽
73,1
𝛽
74,1
𝛽
75,1
𝛽
76,1
𝛽
77,1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ ⋯
+
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛽
11,𝑝
𝛽
12,𝑝
𝛽
13,𝑝
𝛽
14,𝑝
𝛽
15,𝑝
𝛽
16,𝑝
𝛽
17,𝑝
𝛽
21,𝑝
𝛽
22,𝑝
𝛽
23,𝑝
𝛽
24,𝑝
𝛽
25,𝑝
𝛽
26,𝑝
𝛽
27,𝑝
𝛽
31,𝑝
𝛽
32,𝑝
𝛽
33,𝑝
𝛽
34,𝑝
𝛽
35,𝑝
𝛽
36,𝑝
𝛽
37,𝑝
𝛽
41,𝑝
𝛽
42,𝑝
𝛽
43,𝑝
𝛽
44,𝑝
𝛽
45,𝑝
𝛽
46,𝑝
𝛽
47,𝑝
𝛽
51,𝑝
𝛽
52,𝑝
𝛽
53,𝑝
𝛽
54,𝑝
𝛽
55,𝑝
𝛽
56,𝑝
𝛽
57,𝑝
𝛽
61,𝑝
𝛽
62,𝑝
𝛽
63,𝑝
𝛽
64,𝑝
𝛽
65,𝑝
𝛽
66,𝑝
𝛽
67,𝑝
𝛽
71,𝑝
𝛽
72,𝑝
𝛽
73,𝑝
𝛽
74,𝑝
𝛽
75,𝑝
𝛽
76,𝑝
𝛽
77,𝑝]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−𝑝
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−𝑝 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
ℯ1,𝑡
ℯ2,𝑡
ℯ3,𝑡
ℯ4,𝑡
ℯ5,𝑡
ℯ6,𝑡
ℯ7,𝑡]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main essence of VAR is to analyse the impulse response and variance 
decomposition of variables.  The model specification in VAR is very important 
in the sense that validity of the diagnostic tests solely depend on the 
successful accurate specification of the model (Dougherty, 2011).  
5.5.5 Granger Causality 
Granger causality technique was originally developed and improved by 
Granger (1969) and Sims (1972 and 1980) respectively. A unidirectional 
Ganger causality exists for a variable when its lagged values influence other 
variable, in which case the reverse does not hold true (Dougherty, 2011). In 
a stationary bivariate data (Xt,Yt), Diks and Panchenko (2006: 1648) 
intuitively defined Granger causality that “{Xt} is a Granger cause of {Yt} if 
past and current values of X contain additional information on future values 
of Y that is not contained in past and current Y-values alone”. It has enjoyed 
widespread application by many researchers in empirical economics, finance 
and accounting. It should be noted however that Granger causality, as the 
name implies, does not in real sense mean a literal, physical, structural 
causal relationship that binds the variables in question (Brooks, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2009; Dougherty, 2011; King et al., 2012). It is called Granger 
causality because it is a “chronological ordering of movements in the series” 
which measures, statistically if dynamics (movements) in a variable correlate 
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(appear to lead) with the dynamics (movements) in the other variables and 
does not translate that movement of variable causes movements in the other 
variables (Brooks, 2008: 312).  
In this study, maximum likelihood estimate approach which has enjoyed large 
support in related studies 81  is employed. Due to the inability of the 
parametric Granger causality to detect and measure nonlinear causal 
relationships among various variables, it is recommended to carry out 
nonparametric Granger causality tests alongside the parametric ones (King, 
et al., 2012). Non-parametric tests are extensively advocated in the literature 
because of the difficulty for normality assumption to hold on most time series 
data. In this regard, different approaches are well documented depending on 
the nature of the sample (see Robinson, 1989; Bierens and Ploberger, 1997; 
Chen and Fan, 1999; Hidalgo, 2000; Diks and Panchenko, 2006; Nishiyama 
et al., 2011; King et al., 2012).  
5.5.6 Diagnostic Tests 
One of the few challenges often encountered when using OLS in VAR is the 
appropriateness of the model specification. To minimise or avoid the effect of 
model misspecification, diagnostic tests were carried out (see Chapter 7 for 
the results and discussion). These diagnostic tests are considered at different 
stages of analysis in this study. Various tests (which include unit root test, 
cointegration and lag length test) were initially carried out prior to building 
the final VAR models. Diagnostic reports under each VAR estimates were also 
considered for analysis. Consistent with the previous studies (Zanuga, 2005; 
Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009; Kumar et al., 2012), this research 
employed the most commonly used tests after VAR models have been 
estimated. These include: Autocorrelation LM tests, Jarque-Bera tests and 
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests.  
 
 
                                                          
81 Some of the studies that consider MLE include but not limited to the followings: Toda and 
Phillips, (1993); Dolado and Lutkepohl, (1996); Zapata and Rambaldi, (1997); Giles and Mirza, 
(1999); King et al., (2012). 
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5.6 Justification of the Use of VAR Models in Answering Research 
Questions 
Prior to the 1970s’ crises (including both first and second oil price shocks), a 
macro-economic framework based on various techniques 82  was used by 
macro-economists to describe and forecast data, obtain structural inferences 
and make suggestion for policy-making. This framework was deemed 
inappropriate in the post 1970s’ chaos (Stock and Watson, 2001). However, 
Sims (1980) provided a new framework based on VAR models that work as a 
system and promise to provide a more rigourous, coherent and credible 
methodology to describe and forecast data as well as provide structural 
inferences and policy analysis (see Stock and Watson, 2001). In view of the 
fact that this study aimed at describing actions and events to establish 
whether or not OPEC had operated as an effective cartel to control oil prices 
from year 2000 to 2012, VAR models were deemed to be an appropriate 
method of describing and forecasting the future as they have been 
established as “powerful and reliable tools” in everyday use (see Stock and 
Watson, 2001; Brooks, 2008). Stock and Watson (2001) further highlighted 
some difficulties with the application of VAR models in addressing structural 
inferences and policy analysis due to “identification problem83”. They noted 
that additional procedures involving “economic theory or institutional 
knowledge” were useful in overcoming issues associated with such purely 
statistical tools such as VAR. 
VAR models in the context of this study were used for description and 
forecasting purposes. Various dynamics observed were used to describe the 
behaviour of institutions and predict future behaviour based on the available 
data with a view to providing answers to the research questions rather than 
just testing a particular hypothesis.  
 
 
 
                                                          
82 These techniques according to Stock and Watson (2001) ranged from large models involving 
many equations to the use of a single equation exploring interactions between variables, and 
to univariate time series analysis which involved modelling a single variable. 
83 Identification problem relates to the difficulties when differentiating between correlation and 
causation. 
147 
 
5.7 Limitation of Statistical Models 
This section discusses the general and specific limitations of statistical 
models, particularly the VAR models employed for this study. Over recent 
decades, efforts were made, theoretically and empirically, towards validating 
various models including VAR models with a view to investigating the nature 
of the dynamics existing in a multi-variate framework. A major strength of 
VAR models over univariate and bivariate models relates to the fact that VAR 
models integrate current and lagged values of multivariate time series to 
show the complex dynamics that take place between variables. In this 
regard, the co-movements between the time series can be captured and each 
variable in the model can become a dependent variable at some point. A 
sizeable literature (for example: Bierens, 2004; Zanuga, 2005; Brooks, 2008; 
Genton, 2009; Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009; Kumar et al., 2012) 
highlighted that VARmakes a useful contribution in describing the complex 
dynamics between variables of interest. However, despite the wide use of this 
innovative approach to analysing data, it suffers from limitations just like 
other statistical models (Stock and Watson, 2001). An important limitation 
relates to the framework used for making statistical inference For example, 
there is a tendency for highly persistent time-series to produce misleading 
results based on the methods for statistical inference (Stock and Watson, 
2001). Also without modification, standard VARs may fail to detect 
nonlinearities, conditional heteroskedasticity, and drifts or breaks in 
parameters. Another limitation is that it is often very difficult to interpret the 
parameters estimated in VAR based on OLS methods (Brooks, 2008). 
Consequently, interpretation and comparability of parameters become very 
challenging when VAR models are employed against ordinary regression 
results. 
  
Furthermore, the concept of model uncertainty is paramount to 
understanding foundational issues, the general framework and weaknesses of 
statistical models84 (see Wit et al., 2012). Different models may depend on 
                                                          
84 A statistical model is defined as “a collection of probability measures on some outcome 
space” (Wit et al., 2012:218). 
148 
 
different assumptions in trying to achieve fitness 85 . Sometimes, model 
building might require certain strong assumptions to be made on particular 
types of data (such as having strictly exogenous predictors, homoscedastic 
model errors, seriel uncorrelation and normal distribution - see Clark and 
McCracken, 2012).  
Although unrestricted VAR models are effective in data description and 
forecasting, they have another limitation relating to structural inference and 
policy analysis (Stock and Watson, 2001). This specific limitation relates to 
differentiating correlation from causality even in simpler and straight forward 
models. They concluded that despite such limitations of VAR models, wise use 
based on a well constructed economic reasoning and proper institutional 
familiarity would make the models fit the data and provide additional 
meaning about the estimates and causal relationships. 
5.8 Summary and Conclusion  
Having introduced the various research paradigms in social sciences in 
general and Accounting in particular, this chapter identified positivist research 
paradigm to best fit the study because it relied on quantitative methods 
approach to analysing the data. Similarly, a number of other strategies (such 
as variable definition and measurement, research approach) have been 
highlighted with a view to enhancing the internal validity and methodological 
fit as pointed out by Edmondson and McManus (2007) and Collis and Hussey 
(2009). In addition to the above, various methodologies in line with the 
chosen research paradigms have been described as part of the strategy to 
achieve the research objectives and provide more convincing answers to the 
research questions.  
Therefore, the chapter identified and discussed general methodological 
approaches and specifically linked it to this study. Different tools for 
determining the empirical relationships about the nature of OPEC stabilisation 
policies and oil price volatility were highlighted with a view to situating the 
study in the general body of research about OPEC behaviour in the oil 
market. On the basis of such general discussion, it has been established 
                                                          
85 Fitness of a model relates to the degree of closeness/goodness of the regression line to the 
actual set of data/observations. 
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above that objectivism is the study’s ontological stance. In view of the 
experience generated from the literature, positivism has been identified as 
the epistemological paradigm and the most appropriate strategy for this 
research. In line with the assumptions under positivists’ school of thought, 
deductive research approach was adopted.  
Specifically in relation to the time series analysis, EViews 7 was used because 
it is considered as a powerful econometric tool used by many studies for 
analysing time series data (Brooks, 2008). To test the stochastic properties of 
the time series variables, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Philips-
Perron test are applied. Where the test finds evidence of cointegration, it will 
be concluded that there is a long term relationship between variables; 
therefore vector error correction models (VECM) could be estimated to 
explore long-term dynamics between variables. Unrestricted Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) models can still be estimated where there is no 
cointegration found. Therefore, unrestricted VAR models were specified with 
variables for the purpose of achieving two research objectives and 
consequently providing answers to the research questions as highlighted in 
Chapter 1 of this study. 
Consistent with the theoretical framework developed for this study; which 
considers energy social justice, media imperialism and vulnerability and 
exploitability dimensions, OPEC’s ability to control oil prices within a target oil 
price band was examined within the context of a policy introduced by the 
organisation in year 2000. VAR models are employed to reveal how various 
dynamics based on how OPEC and non-OPEC countries autoed their actions in 
responding to changes in oil prices and vice versa. The period covered in the 
study represent both periods when OPEC belived it was an effective cartel 
that could control oil prices and those period when the organisation finally 
conceded that stability of oil prices was beyond its control. Although specific 
hypotheses were not generated this methodology is set to explore various 
complex dynamics with a view to describing the extent to which OPEC had 
attempted to control oil prices within the target price zone and also 
understanding factors that impeded such ability. Consequently, considering 
the size of the numerous dynamics within the variables considered in this 
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study, developing a hypothesis for each complex dynamic relationship might 
be pre-emptive and complex.    
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Chapter Six Descriptive and Time Series Properties 
Analysis (Summary) 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is aimed providing detailed descriptive analysis and other 
preliminary analysis deemed necessary for the modelling analysis carried out 
in Chapter 7. Please note that the detailed underlying analysis relating to this 
chapter is moved to appendix for ease of understanding. However, this 
chapter summary is intended to provide summary of the findings, relevance 
of the chapter findings to Chapter 7 and justification for analysis in the thesis. 
The main reason for introducing this summary is to ease reading of the 
thesis. Therefore, numbering in this three-page summary chapter are ignored 
because the main Chapter 6 (see appendix 1) has numbering system 
appearing as if it were inserted in place of this summary. 
6.2 Summary of the Chapter Findings 
The main chapter (see appendix 1) presented and described 156 observations 
for each of the seven variables used in this study namely: oil price in U.S. 
dollar (denoted by OPR); OPEC production quota in million barrels per day 
(denoted by OPQ); OPEC production cheating in million barrels per day 
(denoted by OPC); OPEC spare capacity in million barrels per day (denoted 
by OSC); oil market competition (OMC); OECD/IEA crude oil consumption 
(OOC); and OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling (OOS). The chapter started by 
analysing descriptive statistics (particularly central tendencies and normality 
distribution of the datasets). In addition to providing proper understanding of 
the pattern of each variable used in the model (see Chapter 7), descriptive 
analysis would help in detecting some missing and inconsistent observations 
or outliers. The descriptive results showed no missing data. While some 
variables were found to be normally distributed, others exhibited leptokurtic 
distribution.  
Furthermore, in an attempt to carry out the modelling, the chapter examined 
unit root tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) under parametric 
assumption and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests under non-parametric assumption. 
Having satisfied this condition, cointegration tests based on Johansen tests 
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were carried out to examine the long-run relationship. This was explored to 
assess the need to extend this study to capture the long-run dynamics 
between the key oil market players. Two cointegrating equations were found 
by both Trace and Max-Eigen statistics. In addition, analysis relating to the 
number of lags to be included in the models (see Chapter 7) was carried out 
at this juncture where 1 lag proved to be most recommended based on five 
criteria considered. 
These initial tests are necessary to building the models in Chapter 7 in 
addition to the useful information relating to different patterns of the 
variables that could provide support to some findings from the models and 
other diagnostic tests as explained in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter Seven Analysis of OPEC’s Stabilisation Policies 
and Oil Prices Using VAR 
7.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, various analyses were conducted to understand the 
properties of the data which was achieved by combining descriptive statistics, 
normality tests, and other time series tests (e.g. unit root test, cointegration 
test, and lag length test). This chapter analyses the effect of OPEC’s 
stabilisation policies on oil price stability within a target band. Drawing upon 
the rationale that OPEC, as the major reserve holder (i.e. 80%) with almost 
40% of the market share, its policies (namely: production quota, OPEC 
cheating, spare capacity, and OPB policies) should be able to stabilise oil 
prices within its desired target price band if it acted as effective cartel. 
Therefore, the 1st model is set to achieve the first objective of the study with 
a view to answering the first research question. The 2nd model is also 
estimated by introducing additional factors that could not only influence oil 
prices, but could also exert some degree of influence on OPEC’s ability to 
stabilise oil prices within its desired target. This analysis is carried out with a 
view to achieving objective 2, thereby leading to answers for the second 
research question.  In this regard, the next subsection presents the analysis 
for OPEC’s stabilisation policies and oil prices. 
7.2 Analysis of the Impact of OPEC’s Stabilisation Policies on Oil Price 
Stability within a Target Price Band 
In an attempt to critically examine the impact of OPEC stabilisation policies 
on the oil prices within a target price band, the complex dynamics between 
OPEC policies and oil prices using unrestricted VAR are explored as described 
in equation 7.1 below. 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑌𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑍𝑡 + ℯ𝑡                                   7.1 
 
Where Yt is a (n x 1) vector of endogenous variables, A1 is a (n x n) vector of 
deterministic variables, and Ai and B are coefficients matrices, C is the (n × 
1) intercept vector of the VAR, Zt stands for the vector of exogenous 
variables, and et  is the (n×1) generalisation of a white noise process. 
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The series (Yt) of four endogenous and three exogenous variables, mainly has 
three policies of OPEC considered within its immediate control, while the last 
variable stands for oil price.   
 
Therefore, Yt = [OPRt, OPQt, OPCt, OSCt]                                                7.2  
The remaining three exogenous variables standing for OPEC oil price band 
policy (OPB), war in Iraq (WAR), and global economic recession (GER): 
Zt = [OPBt WARt GERt]                                    7.3 
7.2.1 Granger Causality Analysis 
Having carried out various preliminary tests (in Chapter 6) for VAR model 
estimation, Granger causality tests for the four series are considered at this 
stage. In its simplest definition, Granger causality test seeks to provide 
answer to the question whether changes in one variable Granger cause 
changes in other variable or set of variables. Besides, Granger causality test 
also guides on whether the endogenously selected variables in the VAR model 
could be exogenously treated in the model based on the joint significance. 
The null hypothesis for each pair of variables assumes that, one independent 
variable (appearing in column) does not Granger-cause the dependent 
variable indicated on the row. This hypothesis can be rejected in the 
strongest form, moderate form, and weakest form at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Block exogeneity test using chi-square (Wald) statistics for the 
joint significance of the lagged variables are used for Granger causality test. 
The reported estimates are asymptotic Wald statistics and the values in 
parentheses are the p-values. 
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Table 7:1: Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Tests 
 
Dependent LOPC    LOPQ    LOPR   LOSC Joint 
LOPC   0.5542 0.1878 8.3393 12.1878 
     [0.4566]       [0.6647]  [0.0039]*  [0.0068]* 
LOPQ   0.1632   9.9755 15.7332 32.7001 
  [.0.6863]    [0.0016]* [0.0001]*     [0.0000]* 
LOPR 0.9764 0.3782         0.6476 6.6338 
  [0.3231]  [0.5386]                    [0.4210] [0.0845]*** 
LOSC 4.6578 8.033 12.3885   13.9916 
  [0.0309]**   [0.0046]*   [0.0004]*   [0.0029]* 
Notes: *, **and *** represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Significance implies that the column variable Granger causes the 
row variable except for the joint column. 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
From table 7.1, a unidirectional causation running from oil prices (LOPR) to 
OPEC production quotas (LOPQ) can be observed, implying that changes in 
the values of oil price cause changes in the values of OPEC production quota, 
but that changes in the value of OPEC production quota does not necessarily 
cause changes in oil prices as often alleged against OPEC. This suggests that 
although OPEC restricts output, such restriction does not Granger-cause 
changes in oil prices (see Gülen, 1996 and Bina and Vo, 2007 for support to 
this empirical finding). Similarly, a unidirectional causality is running from 
LOPR to LOSC which suggests that, changes in OPEC spare capacity do not 
Granger-cause changes in oil price but changes in oil prices could cause 
changes in the level of the capacity. Based on the nature of OPEC members 
(high population and urgent demand for infrastructure e.g. Nigeria, Angola, 
Iran) the above result is expected in the sense that pressure might be 
exerted on the spare capacity by increasing “cheating” behaviour by OPEC 
members to benefit from high oil prices. International oil companies (IOCs) 
are strongly accused of this type of practice when oil prices are high (see 
Wood, 2002). Furthermore, bidirectional causality running between OPEC 
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spare capacity to cheating behaviour and OPEC quota lend support to the 
position established above. This confirms that changes in either OPEC 
production quota or cheating Granger-cause changes in OPEC spare capacity, 
and also vice versa.   
However, based on the results, causality between cheating in OPEC and its 
quota could not be established; and likewise between cheating and oil prices 
as might be expected logically. This could be due to: 1. Under-reporting of 
OPEC’s actual oil supply by the EIA in relation to other databases (Sornette et 
al., 2009); and also 2. The fact that most data on “cheating” practices cannot 
be accurately ascertained although various evidence proved that they exist. 
Furthermore, causation between OPB (as dependent variable) and spare 
capacity and oil prices (as independent variables) could not be established, a 
unidirectional causality running from OPB to OPEC quota and cheating 
behaviour is revealed in Granger-causality results. Finally, evidence of joint 
significance of causality of lagged sets of variables to each of the dependent 
variables was found. 
Consistent with the Granger causality tests, the results of the first VAR model 
are presented in table 7.2 to explore further dynamics from the impulse 
response and variance decomposition. 
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Table 7:2: Vector Autoregressive Estimates of the Series 
     
      LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
     
     LOPR(-1)  0.946827  0.036805  0.008769 -0.312450 
  (0.03820)  (0.01221)  (0.04737)  (0.07509) 
 [ 24.7848] [ 3.01368] [ 0.18510] [-4.16085] 
     
LOPQ(-1) -0.163027  0.718711  0.272896  1.253746 
  (0.22799)  (0.07289)  (0.28271)  (0.44816) 
 [-0.71505] [ 9.86077] [ 0.96527] [ 2.79752] 
     
LOPC(-1)  0.033256 -0.010685  0.789870  0.349774 
  (0.06592)  (0.02107)  (0.08174)  (0.12957) 
 [ 0.50451] [-0.50703] [ 9.66333] [ 2.69942] 
     
LOSC(-1) -0.008606 -0.032766  0.131352  0.915099 
  (0.02366)  (0.00756)  (0.02934)  (0.04652) 
 [-0.36369] [-4.33127] [ 4.47638] [ 19.6730] 
     
C  0.715199  0.817855 -0.615708 -3.416179 
  (0.78297)  (0.25030)  (0.97089)  (1.53906) 
 [ 0.91345] [ 3.26747] [-0.63417] [-2.21965] 
     
OPB -0.068190  0.009943 -0.045165 -0.052959 
  (0.03110)  (0.00994)  (0.03856)  (0.06113) 
 [-2.19283] [ 1.00015] [-1.17128] [-0.86639] 
     
WAR  0.013431 -0.015601  0.110938 -0.143823 
  (0.02573)  (0.00823)  (0.03190)  (0.05058) 
 [ 0.52200] [-1.89666] [ 3.47715] [-2.84371] 
     
GER -0.033630 -0.011289  0.004650  0.033735 
  (0.02713)  (0.00867)  (0.03364)  (0.05333) 
 [-1.23951] [-1.30160] [ 0.13821] [ 0.63254] 
     
      R-squared  0.972481  0.917363  0.762502  0.918587 
 Adj. R-squared  0.971171  0.913428  0.751192  0.914711 
 Sum sq. residuals  1.082554  0.110635  1.664562  4.182884 
 S.E. equation  0.085816  0.027434  0.106412  0.168686 
 F-statistic  742.1113  233.1245  67.42163  236.9451 
 Log likelihood  164.7825  341.5478  131.4389  60.02740 
 Akaike AIC -2.022999 -4.303843 -1.592760 -0.671321 
 Schwarz SC -1.865919 -4.146763 -1.435680 -0.514241 
 Mean dependent  3.977490  3.248703  2.000818  0.815652 
 S.D. dependent  0.505416  0.093239  0.213334  0.577606 
     
      Determinant residual covariance (dof 
adj.)  4.68E-10   
 Determinant residual covariance  3.79E-10   
 Log likelihood  801.5813   
 Akaike information criterion -9.930082   
 Schwarz criterion -9.301762   
     
     Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC Production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
OPB: Oil price band policy 
WAR: War in Iraq 
GER: Global Economic Recession 
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On the basis of the VAR estimates obtained and presented in table 7.2, the 
following discussions are relevant to understanding the dynamics although 
VAR estimates are very difficult to interpret (Zuniga, 2005; Brooks, 2008). 
VAR estimates could reveal the nature of the influence of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable. In this connection, an attempt was made 
to infer some meaning from the estimates to enable interpretation of the VAR 
impulse responses and variance decompositions.   
7.2.2 Analysis of OPEC’s Stabilisation Policies and Oil Prices Stability 
within a Target Band 
This section begins by examining the nature of oil price and how it is 
influenced by both endogenous and exogenous variables as shown in 
equation 7.2. Evidence generated from the Granger Causality analysis in 
table 7.1, VAR coefficients in table 7.2, and complementary analysis of 
impulse responses and variance decompositions based on the VAR estimates. 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0,1 + 𝛽1,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽1,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 +
𝛽1,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ1𝑡                                                                     7.4 
Based on the Granger causality results in table 4.3, it can be observed that 
none of the three policies of OPEC (namely: OPEC production quota, OPEC 
cheating, and OPEC spare capacity) individually Granger caused oil prices 
over the sample periods. However, there is weak evidence at 10% significant 
level (i.e. 0.0845) that the collective policies Granger caused oil prices as 
shown by the joint chi-square values of 6.6338 (which is significant at 10% 
level). On this basis, the Granger causality result revealed first evidence 
about OPEC’s coordinated action to stabilise oil prices within a target band 
which might be weak considering the fact that each policy individually was 
not significant in Granger causing oil prices. The results partly lend support to 
Gately (1996) who relied on Granger causality and cointegration to examine 
claims whether OPEC acted as a cartel during the sample considered in the 
study. In this regard, the complex dynamics of the variables are investigated 
for the purpose of generating further evidence from the VAR equation 7.2. 
From the VAR results in table 7.2, it can be observed that in addition to the 
positive influence by its lagged value, oil price is negatively influenced by the 
lagged values of OPEC quota, positively influenced by the lagged values of 
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OPEC cheating, and negatively influenced by the lagged values of OPEC spare 
capacity. For the exogenous variables, the results reveal that oil price is 
negatively influenced by OPEC OPB policy, positively influenced by the war in 
Iraq, and negatively influenced by the global economic recession. The above 
results can be interpreted in relation to oil price as follows. The major 
influential variable on the current oil price is the status of the previous period 
oil price (i.e. LOPR (-1) with up to 0.946827). This suggests that the current 
oil price is conditional on the previous period oil prices plus or minus other 
associated relevant events. There is a high tendency for the current oil price 
to increase if there has been a historical increase in the previous period 
except one of the policies indicating a negative relationship with oil prices is 
activated (e.g increased OPEC production quota, reduced crude oil 
consumption and stockpiling by OECD – see the second VAR model in table 
7.9 for a detailed description of this relationship).  However, a unit change 
(increase) in the previous period production quota by OPEC (i.e. LOPQ (-1)) 
lowers the oil price by about 0.163027 (as suggested by the negative 
coefficient -0.163027). This result is confirmed by the impulse response of 
OPEC production quota to oil prices.  
In the same direction, the negative coefficient of oil price (LOPR) to the 
lagged value of the OPEC spare capacity (i.e. LOSC (-1)) implies that a unit 
increase in the OPEC spare capacity reduces oil price by up to 0.0086 (i.e. -
0.008606). Furthermore, a positive relationship between the lagged values of 
OPEC cheating and the current oil prices was found. This implies that a unit 
increase in the previous period OPEC cheating leads to an increase in the 
current oil price by up to 0.033256. The literature on the effect of OPEC 
cheating on oil price is mixed. Therefore, this result does not coming as a 
surprise. Alongside the above results, the absence of accurate and formal 
data on OPEC cheating might contribute to this finding. An alternative 
interpretation might be that the cheating in OPEC is highly motivated by the 
high oil prices as suggested by the positive VAR coefficient of LOPC to LOPR 
(-1).   
Similarly, the results reveal a negative association between OPEC OPB policy 
and oil price (LOPR) with a VAR coefficient of -0.068190. This reveals that 
introduction of the OPEC OPB policy reduces the oil price in the light of OPEC 
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compliance with the OPB policy. Also of interest is the U.S.-led war on Iraq. 
The results show a positive VAR coefficient of 0.013431 (i.e. LOPR to WAR). 
This shows that the war impacts positively on oil prices as shown by the 
coefficient of 0.013431. In the same direction, nature of the influence of the 
global economic recession on the oil prices can be investigated. As indicated 
by the results, a negative coefficient can be observed for LOPR to GER (i.e. -
0.033630). Possible interpretation of this finding is that oil price is affected 
negatively by the presence of economic recession. The 2008 economic 
recession influenced a reduction of oil price of up to 0.033630. 
Generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) are utilised (based on Koop et 
al., 1996 and Pesaran and Shin, 1998) for the purpose of this study as 
against the Choleski decomposition. GIRFs are recommended by Dibooglu 
and AlGudhea (2007) where a variable is affected by another and vice versa. 
As highlighted earlier, an impulse response function (IRF86) is a mechanism 
that measures the effects of one standard deviation shock to an innovation of 
another variable holding other variables constant in a system and this is 
measured over time. Thus, it is often interpreted as “effects of a one-time 
shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the 
endogenous variables” (Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009: 139). Figure 7.1 
presents the IRFs for a unit standard innovation in the oil price. 
                                                          
86 More specifically, by imposing a unit standard deviation shock on a dependent variable, the 
reaction on the residuals of other explanatory variable is observed holding other factors 
constant. 
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Figure 7.1: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in Oil Price (LOPR) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
Figure 7.1 presents four panels of the impulse response functions for one 
standard deviation innovation in oil prices to the shocks on all four 
endogenous variables over 12 periods. The blue line in the middle of the two 
red-dotted lines indicates the response of each of the four endogenous 
variables to the shocks in the dependent variable (i.e. logged values of oil 
prices). The two red-dotted lines indicate standard error bar/band which is 
similar to t-statistic used for reporting coefficients in regression analysis 
(Runkle, 1987). The error band as indicated in the key boxes under each 
panel is measured at ± 2 standard errors. The horizontal axis shows the 
periods in month over which the IRFs are computed. The vertical axis 
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represents the response of each of the explanatory variables to the unit 
change in the standard deviation shock. The values represent innovations (in 
percentages based on logged values) when unit-time standard deviation 
shock87 is imposed on the LOPR. Based on the first panel (i.e. response of 
LOPR to LOPR), response of crude oil price to the initial shock in the oil price 
to be positive and permanent throughout the periods considered can be 
viewed. The shocks in the oil price significantly increase OPEC production 
quota as indicated by the second panel (i.e. response of LOPQ to LOPR), but 
decreases OPEC spare capacity (as shown by panel four (i.e. response of 
LOSC to LOPR). The positive response of OPEC production quota starts in 
period 1 and progressively moves through the remaining periods before 
reaching its peak in period 8 from where it stays constant over the 9th period 
and thereafter begins to decline over the remaining three periods.  
Similarly, OPEC spare capacity responds negatively to the shock in oil price 
and reaches its minimum level in the end of period 7, coincidently when the 
response of OPEC quota to the oil price shock is at its maximum positive 
position. This nature of the relationship is somehow suggested by the VAR 
coefficient of lagged OPEC spare capacity to OPEC production quota (i.e. 
LOSC (-1) to LOPQ -0.032766). This can be interpreted to mean that rapid 
positive response of OPEC production quota exerts much pressure on the 
OPEC spare capacity. The pressure on OPEC spare capacity reduces as 
response of OPEC quota to oil price reduces from period 9 to 12 as shown in 
panel 2 of figure 7.1.  However, OPEC production cheating responds 
positively from period 1 to period 3 before it begins to respond negatively at 
declining state from period 4 to period 9 and remains constant throughout 
the remaining periods (i.e. period 9 to period 12). The impulse response of 
OPEC production quota suggests that, in the short-run, it reacts to a 
                                                          
87  A unit standard deviation shock in this case may be interpreted to be a 1% standard 
deviation on the error term of LOPR since the series was considered based on its logged 
values. Then an impulse response function with one unit shock (for example in the second 
panel titled "Response of LOPQ to LOPR" should be interpreted as: response of LOPQ to 1% 
shock of LOPR. The third panel titled “Response of LOPC to LOPR” therefore shows that a unit 
S.D. shock on the error term of the dependent variable (in this case LOPR) will result in the 
reactions plotted by the blue line over the period considered in the IRFs analysis. This is also 
applicable to the LOSC presented in the fourth panel titled “Response of LOSC to LOPR”. A unit 
S.D. innovation/impulse/shock on the dependent variable (in this case the LOPR) is used in 
order to observe the response of the independent variable (i.e. LOSC). This is repeated over 
the periods considered in the IRFs analysis to plot the blue line in the panel. 
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symmetric shock in oil price by increasing. Although, the increase has 
remained positive throughout the periods, other variables’ reaction to this 
response may exercise some level of influence OPEC production quota. Table 
7.3 presents the results for the variance decomposition of oil prices.  
Table 7:3: Variance Decomposition of Oil Price (LOPR) 
            
  
 Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
            
 1  0.085874  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.118400  99.16398  0.561949  0.245750  0.028323 
 3  0.141637  97.75606  1.551686  0.632470  0.059784 
 4  0.159774  96.14797  2.729032  1.044860  0.078135 
 5  0.174398  94.54507  3.945581  1.427943  0.081406 
 6  0.186327  93.04984  5.114817  1.760261  0.075078 
 7  0.196083  91.70529  6.189368  2.037463  0.067881 
 8  0.204041  90.52164  7.145886  2.263110  0.069367 
 9  0.210503  89.49202  7.975612  2.443836  0.088534 
 10  0.215721  88.60136  8.678661  2.586935  0.133049 
            
  
Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
Table 7.3 presents the variance decomposition of oil price which analyses the 
contribution of OPEC policies towards explaining the variation in oil prices. 
This source of evidence is important in the sense that if OPEC’s stabilisation 
policies were effective, they should be able to collectively account for a 
significant variation in oil prices. From table 7.3, other than the oil price 
which accounts for 99.16%, OPEC production quota, production cheating, and 
spare capacity account for 0.56%, 0.25%, and 0.03% respectively. OPEC 
production quota is the variable that accounts for the largest variation during 
the entire periods with variations of 3.95%, 7.15%, and 8.68% in periods 5, 
8, and 10 respectively. This finding is consistent with previous literature (e.g. 
Mabro, 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2008) that concluded OPEC production quota 
as the most important weapon for OPEC to influence oil prices.  
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The second most important variable accounting for the variation is OPEC 
production cheating which accounts for 1.43%, 2.26%, and 2.59% for period 
5, 8, and 10 respectively. The last but not the least is the OPEC spare 
capacity which accounts for less than 0.5% throughout the periods 
considered. This result might be expected based on the empirical findings. 
However, the literature is supportive that this policy is sensitive to oil price 
changes. For example, consistent with the claim made by the EIA chief Adam 
Sieminski, EIA projected high oil prices in its short term energy outlook 
(STEO) whenever OPEC spare capacity was low (see STEO, 2006 and 2014; 
Sieminski, 2013). This result does not necessarily mean that OPEC production 
quota was not adjusted to appropriately accommodate the demand shocks 
during the period. This finding suggests that OPEC spare capacity does not 
appear to be an important role that would account for oil price shock. 
However, the interpretation of the policy by other key players might be that 
low OPEC capacity indicates a signal from OPEC for high oil prices because 
increase in OPEC production quota and cheating would depend on the 
available excess capacity created by OPEC. This finding lends support to 
Brémond et al. (2012) who found that OPEC acted as signaller during the 
sample period. An important question that might produce a different answer 
at this stage is whether OPEC’s ability to create spare capacity was solely 
dependent on the member’s decision or a product of other factors outside 
members’ control. In other words, valid conclusions cannot be reached at this 
juncture without having further consideration of the determinants for changes 
in the OPEC spare capacity from within and outside the organisation. In the 
subsequent analysis, the real dynamic of this variable emerges as the other 
variables are introduced in the model (see second model). 
In this regard, both impulse response functions in figure 1 and forecast error 
variance decompositions of oil price indicate a very interesting trend. While 
OPEC attempts to consistently increase oil production (i.e. period 1 to 9) due 
to shock in the oil price, continuous decline in the OPEC’s spare capacity 
which could be influenced by a number of reasons seems to persist from 
period 1 to 7 before recovering in the subsequest periods (8 to 12). Linking 
this trend in the impulse response functions to that of the variance 
decomposition, it further confirms that despite such consistent increase 
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production, the production quota appears to be the major contributing 
variable explaining variation in the oil price. Despite the perceived effect of 
declining spare capacity of OPEC as shown by the trend in the 4th panel of 
figure 7.1, variance decomposition shows OPEC spare capacity has no huge 
impact on oil price. Given the fact that non-OPEC producers interpret OPEC’s 
low spare capacity as a signal for high oil prices, it would be important 
understand what actually led to such declining state of spare capacity in 
OPEC. Further evidence of OPEC’s inability to sustain production with a view 
to reducing shock in oil prices is revealed in response of OPEC production 
cheating to shocks in oil prices. This was initiatially positive in the first three 
period but later declined over the remaining 9 periods. Considering this trend 
in relation to the contribution of OPEC production cheating to variation in oil 
price, it is clear that OPEC production cheating accounts for less variation in 
oil prices when there was positive response between LOPC and LOPR in figure 
7.1. Thereafter contribution of OPEC production cheating to variation in oil 
price started to increase because of the low spare capacity and negative 
response of OPEC production cheation to shock in oil price.  
7.2.2.1 Analysis of the OPEC Production Quota  
Furthermore, the nature of the influence of the lagged values of all the 
endogenous and exogenous variables is examined for OPEC production quota 
policy as captured by equation 7.5 below: 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡 =  𝛼0,2 + 𝛽2,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 +
𝛽2,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ2,𝑡                                                                   7.5 
The objective at this stage is to evaluate how the OPEC quota system has 
been affected by other variables. This will clearly spell out how capable OPEC 
might be in influencing future oil prices. From table 7.2 above, OPEC 
production quota policy has been largely and positively influenced by the 
lagged values of its production quota policy, positively influenced by the 
lagged values of oil prices, negatively influenced by the lagged values of 
OPEC cheating practices, and negatively influenced by the lagged values of 
OPEC spare capacity.  
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It can be observed from our results that the war had a negative repercussion 
on OPEC production, considering the proportion of Iraq reserves in OPEC (see 
table 2.0000), as indicated by the VAR coefficient of WAR on LOPQ (i.e. -
0.0113). Consequently, the war has impacted on the market by increasing 
the oil prices as revealed by the VAR coefficient of WAR on LOPR (i.e. 
0.0134). The impact of WAR on oil prices (LOPR) is slightly greater than that 
of OPEC production quota (i.e. by 0.0021), this is likely to increase when the 
effect of the market reaction (usually from both speculators and crude oil 
importing nations) is considered in the model. In the same vein, WAR (i.e. 
the U.S.-led Iraq war) shows a positive relationship with OPEC cheating (i.e. 
0.1109) which could take any two possible interpretations. First, it indicates a 
positive OPEC’s response by increasing its oil production during the war as oil 
prices rose due to lost production from OPEC. Second, OPEC cheating might 
have increased due to the fact that some OPEC members saw the war as an 
opportunity to raise their production to gain from the rising oil prices given 
some of the members’ vulnerability and quest for high revenue to develop 
their infrastructure. 
More specifically, the impulse response functions (IRF) of all the four 
variables to the shocks in OPEC production quota are explored as indicated by 
figure 7.2 below: 
188 
 
Figure 7.2: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in OPEC Production Quota (LOPQ) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
Figure 7.2 presents four panels of the response of all the four endogenous 
variables to the shock in OPEC production quota. The blue line in the middle 
of the two red-dotted lines indicates the response for each of the four 
endogenous variables to the shocks in the dependent variable (i.e. logged 
values of OPEC production quota). Supplementing the findings from the VAR 
estimates discussed under subsection 7.2.3, response of oil price to OPEC 
production quota is initially positive up to the middle of period 2, but later 
becomes negative throughout the periods (periods 2 to 12). This finding 
suggests that oil prices are reduced by increased OPEC production. However, 
magnitude of the impact might not be commensurate with response of OPEC 
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production quota to the shock in the oil prices (i.e. the peak of the response 
of LOPQ to LOPR is much more than the response of LOPR to LOPQ).  OPEC 
production quota response to the shock in OPEC production quota is initially 
positive and continues until the end of period 9 when it becomes negative 
over the remaining periods considered.  
The response of OPEC cheating to the shock in OPEC production quota begins 
as negative from period 1 to period 8 and later turns to be positive for the 
remaining periods. OPEC spare capacity also responds negatively to the shock 
in OPEC production quota at the beginning (specifically from period 1 up to 
period 3). Later the response becomes positive and permanent throughout 
the remaining periods (i.e. periods 4 to 12). This suggests that as OPEC 
production quota increases, OPEC cheating decreases which slightly affects 
the spare capacity of the organisation in the early stages of the periods 
considered in the impulse response analysis. However, the cheating increases 
and becomes positive lately towards the 8th period as the shock in OPEC 
quota to OPEC quota becomes negative (see the second panel of response of 
LOPQ to LOPQ). As the response of OPEC spare capacity increases from 
period 3, it can be observed the response of oil price to OPEC production 
quota already becomes negative and gradually remains so in the remaining 
periods when the spare capacity remains positive and permanent throughout 
the remaining periods. 
In the same manner, the variance decompositions of the OPEC production 
quota are explored as shown in table 7.4 below. 
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Table 7:4: Variance Decomposition of OPEC Production Quota (LOPQ) 
 
 Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
            
 1  0.027655  0.311131  99.68887  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.035473  2.063812  96.87883  0.262771  0.794582 
 3  0.040151  5.156615  91.46556  0.793064  2.584759 
 4  0.043669  9.296580  84.09969  1.473265  5.130464 
 5  0.046783  13.97339  75.80229  2.176967  8.047355 
 6  0.049796  18.65380  67.59070  2.806352  10.94914 
 7  0.052797  22.94024  60.19249  3.309729  13.55755 
 8  0.055773  26.62264  53.96775  3.676333  15.73328 
 9  0.058673  29.64656  48.98462  3.920499  17.44832 
 10  0.061440  32.05290  45.13983  4.066808  18.74046 
            
  
Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
From table 7.4, it can be observed that OPEC production quota accounts for 
the major variation in the second period with up to 96.88%, while oil price, 
OPEC cheating and spare capacity account for only 2.06%, 0.26%, and 
0.79% respectively in the same period. These variations change in the 5th 
period where OPEC production quota accounts for 75.80% while the 
corresponding figures for oil price, OPEC cheating and spare capacity account 
for 13.97%, 2.18%, and 8.05% respectively. For the 8th and 10th periods, 
another remarkable change has taken place. OPEC production quota accounts 
for 53.97% and 45.14% in the 8th and 10th periods respectively. The 
reduction in the variation from OPEC production quota is largely split between 
oil price and OPEC spare capacity where oil price accounts for 26.62% and 
32.05% in period 8 and 10 respectively. For the corresponding periods, OPEC 
spare capacity accounts for 15.73% and 18.74%.  Although, OPEC production 
quota does not account for any tangible variation in the oil prices as shown 
by table 7.2 above, it is established in table 7.4 (consistent with the Granger 
causality results) that OPEC production quota is motivated by the prevailing 
crude oil prices and also the available spare capacity in the member 
countries. As can be observed, OPEC cheating does not account for any much 
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variation presumably because increase in the members’ quota usually offsets 
the amount of cheating that would have been embarked upon.  
7.2.2.2 Analysis of the OPEC Production Cheating  
Similarly, this subsection examines the nature of OPEC cheating practice and 
how it is influenced by its lagged values and the lagged values of other 
variables and the exogenous variables as captured by equation 7.6:  
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,3 + 𝛽3,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 +
𝛽3,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ3,𝑡                                                                   7.6 
Based on the results presented in table 7.2, consistent with equation 7.6, 
OPEC cheating is largely and positively influenced by its lagged values (i.e. 
0.789870). In the same direction, it is positively influenced by the lagged 
values of oil price (LOPR), positively influenced by the lagged values of OPEC 
production quota (LOPQ), positively influenced by the lagged values of OPEC 
spare capacity. It can also be observed from the results that OPEC cheating is 
negatively influenced by OPEC OPB policy, and positively influenced by both 
war in Iraq and the global economic recession. Therefore, the results can be 
interpreted as follows, starting with lagged values of the OPEC cheating 
(LOPCt-1) which produces a VAR coefficient of 0.789870. This suggests that 
increase in the current OPEC cheating is explained (0.789870) by the 
previous period cheating. Also, the positive influence of OPEC cheating to the 
lagged value of the OPEC production quota (LOPQ t-1) reveals an interesting 
positive VAR coefficient (i.e. 0.272896). This can be interpreted as a unit 
increase in the OPEC quota in the previous period results in an increase in the 
cheating in OPEC. As earlier mentioned, the cheating practice could possibly 
be motivated by high oil prices when OPEC quota is increased, or perhaps a 
deliberate effort to cheat because of the grievances of a member feeling 
cheated in the official OPEC allocation quota (see Chalabi, 2010).  
Moreover, OPEC cheating is positively influenced by increase in the lagged 
values of OPEC spare capacity. This suggests that, given the fact that there 
exists a negative VAR coefficient of lagged value of oil price (i.e. LOPR), to 
the OPEC spare capacity (LOSC), increased oil price is accompanied by 
reduction in the capacity largely due to the pressure not only on the 
production but also from the cheating observed in the member nations. 
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Similarly, the effect of the OPB policy on the OPEC cheating can be viewed 
which yields a VAR coefficient of -0.0045165. This implies that introduction of 
the policy was able to reduce cheating in OPEC. Consistently, war in Iraq 
(WAR) and global economic recession (GER) both have positive effect on the 
OPEC cheating (i.e. 0.110938 and 0.004650 respectively). The possible 
interpretation for such positive coefficients could not be unrelated to the 
structure of OPEC as an organisation. The war in Iraq has increased oil prices 
which then served as possibly motivation for some OPEC members to 
increase their production to benefit from the rising oil prices.  
Similarly, global economic recession (GER) reveals a positive coefficient with 
OPEC cheating (LOPC) of 0.004650 which means that despite the decrease in 
oil prices due to global economic recession, OPEC cheating has continued with 
the recession. This could be due to one of the two possible reasons 
mentioned in the last paragraph: that is, some OPEC members exceed their 
allocated quota to boost their economies. It should be noted that cheating is 
usually higher during a war than a recession because a war era is likely to 
lead to speculation about likely increases in oil prices whereas the reverse is 
true during a recession. In fact, usually during recession prices fall and 
consumption is reduced. Consistent with the VAR estimates above, VAR 
impulse responses for a 12 year period were calculated with a view to 
understanding the nature of the policy responses to the shocks in the 
dependent variables (i.e. OPEC production cheating). Figure 7.3 shows the 
impulse responses of all the variables to OPEC cheating using four panels. 
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Figure 7.3: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in OPEC Production Cheating (LOPC) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
Panel one of figure 7.3 (i.e. response of LOPR to LOPC) shows a positive and 
permanent response of oil price to OPEC production cheating. The blue line in 
the middle of the two red-dotted lines indicates the response for each of the 
four endogenous variables to the shocks in the dependent variable (i.e. 
logged values of OPEC production cheating). Consistent with the VAR 
coefficients in tables 7.2, this result lends support to the fact that OPEC 
cheating is motivated by high oil prices. However, the near bumpy IRF in 
panel 1 of figure 7.4 suggests that the response starts as positive from a 
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lower level and reaches its maximum in period 5 before declining towards the 
remaining periods considered. The second panel (i.e. response of LOPQ to 
LOPC) shows a negative response of OPEC production quota to its production 
cheating from period 1 to period 6. Thereafter the response becomes positive 
and lasts for the remaining part of the periods considered. This result 
suggests that initially when oil price responds positively to the shock in OPEC 
cheating up to its maximum level in the periods considered, OPEC quota 
which responds negatively up to such period (i.e. period 6) turns to produce a 
positive response. Panel 3 shows the response of OPEC production cheating 
to the shock in OPEC production cheating which is positive from period 1 to 
period 8 and later turns to be negative from period 9 to the remaining 
periods considered. In this direction, OPEC spare capacity responds 
negatively to the shock in OPEC production cheating. This explains why OPEC 
maintains low spare capacity in the short run in some periods based on the 
sample. Implications of the results on OPEC behaviour are: OPEC behaviour 
changes with time depending on the nature of the shock in any of the 
variables. Shock in OPEC production behaviour receives a negative response 
from OPEC spare capacity due to the pressure created by such shock.  
Furthermore, table 7.5 presents how all the independent endogenous 
variables in the VAR can explain variation in OPEC production cheating as the 
dependent variable in the VAR equation. 
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Table 7:5: Variance Decomposition of OPEC Production Cheating 
(LOPC) 
 Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
            
 1  0.110102  0.689333  58.77903  40.53164  0.000000 
 2  0.137935  0.544360  59.52270  39.49115  0.441783 
 3  0.151758  0.449931  59.56073  38.50351  1.485833 
 4  0.159612  0.454757  58.92834  37.51847  3.098429 
 5  0.164696  0.590693  57.73685  36.50196  5.170500 
 6  0.168522  0.865792  56.14927  35.44206  7.542877 
 7  0.171824  1.265105  54.34522  34.34764  10.04204 
 8  0.174937  1.757585  52.48828  33.24165  12.51248 
 9  0.177986  2.305251  50.70560  32.15267  14.83648 
 10  0.180989  2.871129  49.08130  31.10797  16.93960 
            
  
Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
From table 7.5, variation in OPEC production cheating is accounted by 
58.78% and 0.69% from OPEC production quota and oil price respectively in 
addition to the effect of OPEC production quota itself which accounts for 
40.53% in the first period where OPEC spare capacity accounts for nil. This 
variation in the 5th period is accounted by 0.59%, 57.74%, 36.50%, and 
5.17% from oil price, OPEC production quota, OPEC production cheating, and 
spare capacity respectively.  It can be observed that OPEC spare capacity 
gathering momentum with time as important factor accounting for variation 
in OPEC production cheating after OPEC production quota and cheating. In 
the 8th period, this trend is maintained. Oil price, OPEC production quota, 
OPEC cheating, and OPEC spare capacity account for 1.76%, 52.49%, 
33.24%, and 12.51% respectively. In the final period considered (i.e. period 
10), the results show that oil price, OPEC quota, OPEC cheating, and spare 
capacity account for 2.87%, 49.08%, 31.11%, and 16.94% respectively. The 
results suggest that OPEC production quota is the major variable accounting 
for the variation in OPEC cheating, implying the effect of quota system in the 
behaviour of OPEC members towards oil market and oil price stability. Second 
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major variable accounting for variation is OPEC spare capacity which started 
from 0 to almost 17%. 
7.2.2.3 Analysis of the OPEC Crude Oil Spare Capacity 
Furthermore, the 4th equation in an attempt to understand the nature of the 
dynamics between OPEC spare capacity and its lagged values as well as the 
lagged values of other variables and the exogenous variables as shown by 
equation 7.7 below: 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,4 + 𝛽4,1𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,5𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 +
𝛽4,6𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,7𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ4,𝑡                  7.7 
In this regard, the results reveal that the current OPEC spare capacity is 
largely and positively influenced by the lagged values of the spare capacity 
(i.e. LOSCt-1) by 0.915099, negatively influenced by the lagged values of oil 
prices (i.e. LOPR t-1) by -0.312450, positively influenced by lagged values of 
OPEC production quota (i.e. LOPQt-1) by 1.253746, and positively influenced 
by the lagged values of OPEC cheating (i.e. LOPCt-1) by 0.349774. Also, OPEC 
spare capacity is negatively influenced by the OPEC OPB by -0.052959 and 
the war in Iraq (WAR) by -0.143823, but positively influenced by the global 
economic recession (GER) by 0.033735. 
From the results described above, the following interpretations could be 
useful in understanding OPEC behaviour and how it responds with its spare 
capacity. The positive VAR coefficient of LOSC to LOSC t-1 can be interpreted 
as the current OPEC spare capacity is influenced by the position of the 
previous period capacity level by up to 0.915099. This suggests that a unit 
increase in the previous spare capacity is likely to increase the current period 
spare capacity by the VAR coefficient of 0.915099. This result is highly 
expected. However, OPEC spare capacity is negatively influenced by oil prices 
which suggests that a unit increase in previous period oil price, OPEC 
increases its current production quota (i.e. LOPQ to LOPR t-1 at 0.036805) and 
also current cheating (i.e. LOPC to LOPRt-1 at 0.008769). The resultant 
increase in the above couple of variables will therefore exert more pressure 
on the existing spare capacity therefore leading to a decrease as revealed by 
the negative VAR coefficient of -0.312450. This behaviour is very well 
expected considering the lag between investments and actual crude oil 
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production output for the oil market which might have spill over effect over 
the subsequent periods. This behaviour might not be expected for a cartel 
pursuing sustained high oil prices due to restricted crude oil production. 
In a similar manner, it can be observed that there is a positive influence of 
the lagged values of OPEC quota (LOPQt-1) on the current OPEC spare 
capacity (LOSC). A unit increase in the OPEC production in the previous 
period (i.e. LOPQt-1) usually increases current spare capacity (LOSC) by 
1.253746. This result is expected because it is believed that increase in OPEC 
production quota will improve the amount of spare capacity ceteris paribus. 
Also, the same pattern of relationship is revealed for OPEC spare capacity to 
the lagged values of OPEC cheating (i.e. LOPCt-1). The same analogy is 
applicable in the interpretation of OPEC spare capacity to the lagged values of 
OPEC production quota. Production increase by OPEC from cheating usually 
originates from the existing spare capacity. That means there is high 
motivation for cheating to increase when spare capacity is available (see VAR 
coefficient for LOPC to LOSCt-1). Likewise, when cheating is high in the short 
run, that could be taken as an indication for existence of high spare capacity.  
Consistently, introduction of OPB policy has negative influence on the spare 
capacity presumably due the need for compliance by members with the policy 
any time oil prices increased for consecutive days as stipulated by the policy. 
That means for members to compliance with the provision of the policy, 
pressure is exerted on the capacity which makes it to reduce as events that 
might bring about such policy response usually appeared unanticipated. In 
the same vein, the spare capacity is negatively influenced by the war (i.e. 
WAR with VAR coefficient of -0.143823). The result makes a logical 
interpretation that war has negative effect on the spare capacity. The in Iraq 
might have exerted a high pressure on the existing capacity which changes 
easily in the short run. OPEC production quota usually decreases with the 
presence of global recession (see VAR coefficient of LOPQ to GER in table 7.4: 
i.e. -0.011289) presumably due to decreased oil prices (see VAR coefficient 
of LOPR to GER, i.e. -0.033630). Despite the increased production by the 
OPEC members resulting from cheating during global recession (e.g. see VAR 
coefficients for LOPC to GER, i.e. 0.004650), spare capacity appears to be 
positive. This means that, with the advent of global economic recession, 
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demand is reduced due to lost purchasing power from the oil consumer 
nations. Consequently, the stocks available would have to continue to build 
capacity despite the reduction of member’s quota (i.e. LOPQ to GER VAR 
coefficient of -0.011289).  
Figure 7.4: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in OPEC Spare Capacity (LOSC) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
Figure 7.4 presents four panels of impulse responses of the four endogenous 
variables to the shock in the OPEC spare capacity. The blue line in the middle 
of the two red-dotted lines indicates the response for each of the four 
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
LOSC ± 2 S.E.
Response of LOPR to LOSC
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
LOSC ± 2 S.E.
Response of LOPQ to LOSC
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
LOSC ± 2 S.E.
Response of LOPC to LOSC
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
LOSC ± 2 S.E.
Response of LOSC to LOSC
Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
199 
 
endogenous variables to the shocks in the dependent variable (i.e. logged 
values of OPEC cheating). In the first panel (i.e. response of LOPR to LOSC), 
it can be observed a negative response of oil price to OPEC spare capacity 
from period 1 to the end of 7th period. From the 8th period, the shock 
becomes positive as expected. This interprets that at the beginning when 
there is a shock in OPEC spare capacity, oil prices reduces up to period 7. 
Thereafter a positive response of oil price to the capacity means that price 
increases as the capacity increases. This is due to declining positive response 
of OPEC spare capacity to OPEC spare capacity (as shown by panel four), 
which suggests the nature of the shock decreases with time and that 
pressure from OPEC cheating (see panel three of response of LOPC to LOSC) 
will further force the capacity down. The positive response of OPEC cheating 
to the spare capacity indicates that cheating increases with shock in capacity. 
However, the shock which starts as negative from period 1 up to the middle 
of period 2 becomes positive thereafter and remains permanent throughout 
the remaining periods. The impulse response reaches its peak in the 7th 
period and begins to decline though positive. Panel two shows that OPEC 
production quota has a negative response to the shock in OPEC spare 
capacity. 
In this connection, it can be concluded that most of the above responses are 
consistent with what was earlier reviewed and projected in the literature. In 
the same direction, table 7.6 presents analysis of the variance decomposition 
of OPEC spare capacity with a view to discussing the most important 
variable(s) that account for the variation in the excess capacity.   
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Table 7:6: Variance Decomposition of OPEC Spare Capacity (LOSC) 
 Per
iod 
S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
            
 1  0.173025  2.009340  0.740698  35.40693  61.84303 
 2  0.238871  4.208889  0.397723  30.75406  64.63932 
 3  0.287895  6.670495  0.392395  26.79206  66.14505 
 4  0.328730  9.106040  0.713872  23.49767  66.68242 
 5  0.364338  11.34273  1.305585  20.79813  66.55355 
 6  0.395961  13.29840  2.095358  18.60351  66.00273 
 7  0.424178  14.95040  3.013400  16.82554  65.21066 
 8  0.449297  16.31015  4.000391  15.38621  64.30325 
 9  0.471524  17.40577  5.009575  14.22032  63.36434 
 10  0.491033  18.27167  6.005947  13.27497  62.44741 
            
 
Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil prices 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota 
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
 
From table 7.6, the major contributing variable to the variation is OPEC spare 
capacity, followed by OPEC cheating, oil price and then lastly OPEC 
production quota. On the basis of the results, the proportion of the variation 
contributed by oil price and OPEC production quota grow steadily while that 
of OPEC cheating diminishes. It can be observed that in period 1, other than 
OPEC spare capacity which accounts for 61.84% of the variation in the spare 
capacity, oil price, OPEC production quota, and OPEC production cheating 
account for 2.01%, 0.74%, and 35.41% respectively. In the 5th, 8th, and 10th 
periods, oil price accounts for 11.34%, 16.31%, and 18.27% respectively. 
The variation accounted by the OPEC production quota does not exceed more 
than 6%. It starts from less than 1% from period 1 to 4 and increases in 
multiple of 1 from period 5 to 12. OPEC cheating which contributes the 
highest next to OPEC spare capacity, accounts for 20.80%, 15.39%, and 
13.28% for periods 5th, 8th, and 10th  respectively. 
Having carried out the analysis above, it is important at this point to predict 
how the coordinated OPEC’s action can predict the subsequent year (i.e. 
2013) based on the calculated VAR 1st model coefficients. Table 7.7 such 
results.
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Table 7:7:  Out of Sample Forecast for 2013 Based on VAR – 1st Model 
Period  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Actual Oil 
Price 
 87.86 92.94 92.02 94.51 95.77 104.67 106.57 106.29 100.54 93.86 97.63 94.62 
Forecasted 
Oil Price 
 90.96 92.80 96.55 93.87 85.66 73.96 79.26 85.17 85.51 80.74 77.93 79.19 
              
Prediction 
Error 
 -3.10 0.14 -4.53 0.64 10.11 30.71 27.31 21.12 15.02 13.12 19.70 15.43 
              
LOPR t-1 
 100.27 102.2 106.16 103.32 94.66 82.3 87.9 94.13 94.51 89.49 86.53 87.86 
  0.946827 94.93834 96.76572 100.5152 97.82617 89.62664 77.92386 83.22609 89.12483 89.48462 84.73155 81.92894 83.18822 
LOPQ t-1 
 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
  -0.16303 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 -4.89081 
LOPC t-1 
 6.56 6.93 6.95 7.20 6.81 6.92 6.82 7.04 6.73 6.24 6.05 5.91 
  0.033256 0.218159 0.230464 0.231129 0.239443 0.226473 0.230132 0.226806 0.234122 0.223813 0.207517 0.201199 0.196543 
LOSC t-1 
 2.22 2.01 2.02 2.02 2.22 1.94 1.95 1.90 2.08 2.18 2.40 2.60 
  -0.00861 -0.01911 -0.0173 -0.01738 -0.01738 -0.01911 -0.0167 -0.01678 -0.01635 -0.0179 -0.01876 -0.02065 -0.02238 
C              
  0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 0.715199 
OPB  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 -0.06819             
WAR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  0.013431             
GER  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 -0.03363             
              
Standard 
Error 
 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 1.10029 
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From table 7.7, it can be observed that using equation 7.3 which is restated 
after estimating the appropriate VAR coefficients (see equation 7.8), twelve 
months-period forecast is obtained for the year 2013 on the basis of VAR 
model 1. The forecasted results are therefore compared with actual results. 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡 =  0.715199 + (0.946827)𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + (−0.16303)𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + (0.033256)𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 +
(−0.00861)𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + (−0.06819)𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + (0.013431)𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + (−0.03363)𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +
ℯ1𝑡                                                                                          7.8 
As indicated by the results obtained from the first model, OPEC made an 
attempt to stabilise oil prices within its target band. More specifically, the out 
of the sample forecast showed that OPEC’s coordinated policies were able to 
stabilise oil prices within the range between $87.86 and $106.57 in the 
forecasted year (2013) based on the model. This was clear in the first 5-6 
months of the year as there was no much variation from the original prices. 
However, the attempt to achieve this stability was hindered by factors outside 
OPEC control which have not been considered in this model. Some of these 
factors were described as speculation (Büyüksahin and Robe, 2014), 
geopolitical (Slaibi et al., 2010). For the entire 12 periods (i.e. January, 2013 
to December, 2013), oil prices based on OPEC’s stabilisation policies should 
have maintained the following trends: January-$90.96, February-$92.80, 
March-$96.55, April-$93.87, May-$85.66, June-$73.96, July-$79.26, August-
$85.17, September-$85.51, October-$80.74, November-$77.93 and 
December-$79.19 against the actual data. This result may imply that while 
OPEC does take actions to stabilise oil prices, the market power to stabilise 
oil prices at the level it might have been unrealistically given to OPEC alone. 
This finding is consistent with Khan (2009) who concluded that oil prices in 
2008 should have been within the range of $80-$90 as against $147 which 
was due to the market speculation. 
As can be observed from equation 7.4, and table 7.2, above, a multivariate 
model based on the estimated VAR results in table 7.2, was used. The 
forecasted results were compared with the actual to evaluate the power of 
the VAR model in predicting the future dynamics. Interestingly, it was found 
that our model shows what can be achieved by the combined OPEC policies 
towards oil price stability. The model was able to project movement in oil 
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prices from 1st to the 5th periods. The model shows that other factors 
presumably not included in this model contribute to the discrepancies in the 
subsequent periods. This is due to the fact that the model shows how much 
oil prices should have been achievable had those events not taken place. We 
can therefore note at this juncture that OPEC attempts to act as a cartel by 
unifying its members’ oil production policies in order to stabilise oil prices 
within a target band in accordance with its objective statement. In fact when 
oil prices begin to surge high, OPEC stabilisation policies usually attempt to 
stabilise such prices within the band.  
However, factors that appeared to be beyond OPEC’s control might be 
important in explaining the volatility in oil prices. In this regard, the 2nd 
model is estimated by introducing new variables (see the next section) with a 
view to providing explanation for high oil prices beyond what OPEC might 
have set as target price band. In addition, it will add to understanding of how 
OPEC stabilisation policies are influenced by those additional variables in 
OPEC’s attempt to achieve the target objective of price stability within either 
official band or implied. This study finds evidence that unrestricted VAR 
models reveal good forecast ability in both sample and out-of-sample forecast 
as against the Cabbibo and Fiorenzani (2004) and Chantziara and 
Skiadopoulos (2008) who documented evidence of low forecast power of VAR 
models in their study which compared principal components analysis, 
univariate and VAR models in the futures oil markets, although the approach 
for the out-of-sample tests differ. This could be attributable to the fact that 
the basis of comparison is not similar, for example, no any formal tests for 
predictive ability of the models such as Hensen tests, root mean squared 
prediction error (RMSE), Theil’s inequality coefficient, were used to conclude 
the forecast power of the VAR model employed in this study. 
7.3 Impact of Non-OPEC and OECD Inventory Policies of Oil Price 
Stability 
In the previous sections, attempt was made to understand how OPEC policies 
work to stabilise oil prices within a given target (whether official or implied 
OPB). To examine the effects of non-OPEC and OECD inventory policies, the 
2nd VAR model is estimated. In this regard, the effect of actions of other key 
market players on oil price is analysed in addition to that of OPEC. By 
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introducing the new variables, VAR estimate diagnostic results at the bottom 
of table 7.4 can be compared with the ones obtained in table 7.9 in relation 
to some key elements such as R-squared, F-statistics. 
Having carried out all the tests for unit root and cointegration in Chapter 6 of 
this project, the next subsection analyses the Granger causality results 
presented in table 7.8 below. It should be recalled that “1” lag is chosen as 
optimal lag for estimating the VAR (see subsection 6.4.3 for the lag selection 
tests and criteria). 
7.3.1 Granger Causality Analysis 
Granger causality tests are also carried out for the second model and the 
results are however presented in table 7.8. 
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Table 7:8: Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Tests 
Excluded variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
LOPR    LOPQ    LOPC   LOSC LOMC LOOC LOOS Joint 
LOPR   0.3993 0.369196 0.00574 5.672912 1.411599 1.547812 14.53289 
    [0.5275] [0.5434] [0.9396] [0.0172]** [0.2348] [0.2135] [0.0242]** 
LOPQ   4.424315   0.034556 15.21972 1.78127 1.76737 3.749231 40.92099 
  [0.0354]**   [0.8525] [0.0001]* [0.1820] [0.1837] [0.0528]** [0.0000]* 
LOPC 0.813623 0.924407   18.08085 2.121893 2.208102 2.439717 28.72019 
  [0.3671] [0.3363]   [0.0000]* [0.1452] [0.1373] [0.1183] [0.0001]* 
LOSC 19.55967 2.279366 1.340223   0.05884 2.223217 8.052409 34.00463 
  [0.0000]* [0.1311] [0.2470]   [0.8083] [0.1359] [0.0045]** [0.0000]* 
LOMC 0.432297 1.129172 0.586038 2.415092   0.111576 4.327015 11.04307 
  [0.5109] [0.2880] [0.4440] [0.1202]   [0.7384] [0.0375]** [0.0871]*** 
LOOC 0.766511 2.101742 3.12989 6.925184 1.230237   6.246755 18.34012 
  [0.3813] [0.1471] [0.0769]*** [0.0085]* [0.2674]   [0.0124]* [0.0054]* 
LOOS 0.091991 0.007335 0.357791 0.298972 2.00E-05 3.443649   5.069483 
  [0.7617] [0.9318] [0.5497] [0.5845] [0.9964] [0.0635]***   [0.5349] 
Notes: * ,**and *** represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Significance implies that the 
column variable Granger causes the row variable except for the joint column. 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition  
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Table 7.8 presents the Granger causality results with the variables on the row 
representing dependent variables. A unidirectional causality running from 
different variables to other variables can be observed. For example, causation 
from oil market competition (LOMC) to oil prices (LOPR); oil prices (LOPR), 
OPEC spare capacity (LOSC), and OECD stock policy to OPEC production 
quotas (LOPQ); OPEC spare capacity (LOSC) to OPEC production cheating 
(LOPC); OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and oil prices to OPEC spare capacity 
(LOSC); OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling (LOOS) to oil market competition 
(LOMC); and finally from OPEC production cheating (LOPC) and OPEC spare 
capacity (LOSC) to OECD/IEA crude oil consumption (LOOC) can be observed. 
Besides, a bidirectional causality running between OECD/IEA crude oil 
stockpiling and OECD/IEA crude oil consumption is also found.  
Based on the results from table 7.8, it can be noted that introducing new 
variables into the second VAR models has yielded some interesting findings 
as described below. After introducing three other variables into the earlier 
model, it can be observed that oil prices and OPEC spare capacity remain 
very significant in Granger causing OPEC production quota (at 5% and 1% 
respectively). However, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling becomes another 
significant factor Granger causing OPEC production quota. Also in the earlier 
model, all the three OPEC stabilisation policies were not found significant at 
even 10% in Granger causing oil prices. The results in the second model 
basically remain as in the previous model, however, it can be established that 
oil market competition from non-OPEC is significant in Granger causing oil 
prices at 5% (i.e. 0.0172). In the same vein, OPEC spare capacity also 
remains very significant in Granger causing OPEC production cheating as in 
the previous model. An interesting finding with respect to OPEC spare 
capacity is observed. While oil prices remains an important variable Granger 
causing OPEC spare capacity, OPEC production quota and OPEC production 
cheating become not very significant at 13% and 25% respectively. However, 
OECD/IEA becomes another important significant variable Granger causing 
the OPEC spare capacity (at 1% significant value). 
Furthermore, it can be observed that of the entire variables, only OECD/IEA 
crude oil stockpiling is significant in Granger causing oil market competition. 
However, OPEC production cheating and OPEC spare capacity are found to be 
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significant in Granger causing OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. Bidirectional 
causality between LOOS and LOOC indicates that each one causes the other 
and given existence of a uniform policy in all the member countries, some 
relationships of interest might be found. Finally, evidence of joint significance 
of all joint logged values of variables in Granger causing each of the 
dependent variables except OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling were found. In 
this regard, the VAR estimates (in table 7.9) were explored to understand the 
nature of the relationships between variables prior to computing the impulse 
response functions and the variance decompositions.  
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Table 7:9: Vector Autoregressive Model Estimates 
        
        
 LOPRS LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOC LOOS 
        
        
LOPR(-1)  0.931232  0.028095  0.046815 -0.351216  0.002764 -0.010022 -0.001186 
  (0.04100)  (0.01336)  (0.05190)  (0.07941)  (0.00420)  (0.01145)  (0.00391) 
 [ 22.7129] [ 2.10341] [ 0.90201] [-4.42263] [ 0.65749] [-0.87551] [-0.30330] 
        
LOPQ(-1) -0.149607  0.728328  0.288152  0.692339  0.025792 -0.095835  0.001934 
  (0.23676)  (0.07713)  (0.29970)  (0.45858)  (0.02427)  (0.06610)  (0.02258) 
 [-0.63190] [ 9.44274] [ 0.96146] [ 1.50976] [ 1.06262] [-1.44974] [ 0.08564] 
        
LOPC(-1)  0.042423 -0.004228  0.782754  0.156555  0.005479 -0.034488  0.003983 
  (0.06982)  (0.02275)  (0.08838)  (0.13523)  (0.00716)  (0.01949)  (0.00666) 
 [ 0.60762] [-0.18589] [ 8.85663] [ 1.15768] [ 0.76553] [-1.76915] [ 0.59816] 
        
LOSC(-1) -0.002168 -0.036365  0.154010  0.818587  0.004558 -0.021023 -0.001492 
  (0.02861)  (0.00932)  (0.03622)  (0.05542)  (0.00293)  (0.00799)  (0.00273) 
 [-0.07576] [-3.90125] [ 4.25216] [ 14.7708] [ 1.55406] [-2.63157] [-0.54678] 
        
LOMC(-1)  1.282601  0.234142 -0.992971  0.253007  0.782969 -0.166768 -0.000230 
  (0.53850)  (0.17543)  (0.68167)  (1.04303)  (0.05521)  (0.15036)  (0.05135) 
 [ 2.38179] [ 1.33464] [-1.45667] [ 0.24257] [ 14.1825] [-1.10916] [-0.00447] 
        
LOOC(-1)  0.302247 -0.110178  0.478522 -0.734693  0.008711  0.647196 -0.045020 
  (0.25439)  (0.08288)  (0.32203)  (0.49274)  (0.02608)  (0.07103)  (0.02426) 
 [ 1.18811] [-1.32942] [ 1.48597] [-1.49105] [ 0.33403] [ 9.11170] [-1.85571] 
        
LOOS(-1) -0.533327 -0.270415  0.847599  2.356167  0.091418  0.299152  0.881844 
  (0.42868)  (0.13966)  (0.54265)  (0.83032)  (0.04395)  (0.11969)  (0.04088) 
 [-1.24411] [-1.93629] [ 1.56196] [ 2.83768] [ 2.08015] [ 2.49935] [ 21.5708] 
        
C -4.482425  0.752819 -0.191328 -2.406567  0.534580  2.005833  0.335865 
  (1.90022)  (0.61906)  (2.40541)  (3.68054)  (0.19481)  (0.53056)  (0.18122) 
 [-2.35890] [ 1.21608] [-0.07954] [-0.65386] [ 2.74415] [ 3.78060] [ 1.85341] 
        
OPB -0.077321 -0.003492 -0.001691  0.040159  0.004004  0.003201 -0.006876 
  (0.03681)  (0.01199)  (0.04659)  (0.07130)  (0.00377)  (0.01028)  (0.00351) 
 [-2.10061] [-0.29123] [-0.03630] [ 0.56328] [ 1.06095] [ 0.31147] [-1.95880] 
        
WAR 0.017925 -0.020164  0.135103 -0.196222  0.006910 -0.000611  0.003162 
  (0.03036)  (0.00989)  (0.03843)  (0.05881)  (0.00311)  (0.00848)  (0.00290) 
 [-0.59037] [-2.03852] [ 3.51514] [-3.33659] [ 2.22005] [-0.07204] [ 1.09209] 
        
GER -0.016167 -0.008743 -0.005257  0.025098 -0.001418 -0.009953  0.003078 
  (0.02717)  (0.00885)  (0.03439)  (0.05262)  (0.00279)  (0.00759)  (0.00259) 
 [-0.59509] [-0.98779] [-0.15286] [ 0.47696] [-0.50911] [-1.31210] [ 1.18798] 
        
        
 R-squared  0.974319  0.919912  0.769023  0.926232  0.877056  0.658552  0.961400 
 Adj. R-squared  0.972535  0.914350  0.752983  0.921109  0.868519  0.634840  0.958719 
 Sum sq. residuals  1.010264  0.107223  1.618852  3.790114  0.010618  0.078758  0.009188 
 S.E. equation  0.083760  0.027287  0.106028  0.162235  0.008587  0.023387  0.007988 
 F-statistic  546.3195  165.4021  47.94400  180.8064  102.7269  27.77330  358.6567 
 Log likelihood  170.1386  343.9756  133.5969  67.66928  523.1840  367.8865  534.3946 
 Akaike AIC -2.053401 -4.296460 -1.581895 -0.731217 -6.608826 -4.604987 -6.753479 
 Schwarz SC -1.837416 -4.080475 -1.365910 -0.515232 -6.392841 -4.389002 -6.537494 
 Mean dependent  3.977490  3.248703  2.000818  0.815652  3.726920  3.879248  1.408347 
 S.D. dependent  0.505416  0.093239  0.213334  0.577606  0.023681  0.038701  0.039315 
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 Determinant resid. covariance 
(dof adj.)  5.21E-22      
 Determinant resid. Covariance  3.11E-22      
 Log likelihood  2298.384      
 Akaike information criterion -28.66302      
 Schwarz criterion -27.15113      
        
        
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD/IEA crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
7.3.2 Analysis of the Impact of OECD/IEA Crude Oil Consumption and 
Stockpiling on the Oil Prices and OPEC Stabilisation Policies 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0,1 + 𝛽1,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,5𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 +
𝛽1,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,7𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ1𝑡             7.9 
On the basis of the VAR estimates (in table 7.9) and more specifically in 
relation to the equation 7.9, the nature of relationship between various 
policies of the key oil market players can be described. Based on optimal “1” 
lag selected to estimate the model, a positive relationship between OECD/IEA 
crude oil consumption and oil prices (i.e. 0.302247) is found. This implies 
that the current oil price is influenced positively by OECD crude oil 
consumption. Similarly, the result reveals that the current oil price is 
negatively influenced OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling is negatively related 
with oil prices, suggesting that a unit change (increase) in the previous 
period crude oil stockpiling by OECD/IEA (i.e. LOOS t-1) lowers the oil price by 
about -0.533327.  However, based on the physical and graphical 
representation of the two variables, a mixed nature of relationship was earlier 
observed. In this regard, impulse response functions and variance 
decompositions would be useful in describing the nature of the complex 
dynamics.  
Oil prices are positively influenced by lagged values of oil market competition 
(i.e. 1.282601), which means that oil prices are increased by the increase in 
the lagged values of competition faced by OPEC in the oil market.   
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Figure 7.5: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in Oil Price (LOPR) 
 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
 
Figure 7.5 presents seven panels of impulse responses of all the endogenous 
variables to the shocks in oil price. Starting with the first panel (i.e. response 
of LOPR to LOPR), response of the oil price to the shock in oil price is positive 
and permanent throughout the period. It starts very high and positively in 
the beginning period before it declines with time as it can be observed from 
the panel. The second panel (i.e. response of LOPQ to LOPR) remains positive 
throughout the period as it was found in the first model. The interpretation is 
not different from the one earlier made in the first model. Therefore, this 
suggests that despite the actions of various other market players, OPEC 
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responds positively to the shocks in oil prices by increasing its quota. 
Therefore, given the inverse nature of the relationship as suggested by the 
VAR coefficients in tables 7.2 and 7.9, the response (by way of production 
increase) should be able to bring oil prices back to the band. The positive 
response starts in period 1 and grows consistently up to period 7. It remains 
constant from period 7 until the end of period 9. Thereafter, it begins to 
decline the end of the 12th period approaches, though it remains positive over 
the entire period. The third panel (i.e. response of LOPC to LOPR) shows that 
OPEC production cheating responds to the shock in oil prices positively in 
period 1. This response remains positive and constant up to the middle of the 
2nd period before it begins to decline. As the response of LOPC to LOPR 
descents towards negative from middle of the 2nd period to period 4, we can 
observe from the third panel (i.e. response of LOSC to LOPR) which responds 
negatively; that it is already approaching its minimum in period 6.  
 
In the same way, it can be observed from panel four that oil market 
competition from non-OPEC responds negatively to the shocks in oil prices 
from period 1 to period 4, and thereafter it becomes positive over the 
remaining periods and remains permanent. This suggests that in the first four 
periods after a shock, non-OPEC begins to gather momentum from a reduced 
but growing supply possibly due to their low reserves and time lag between 
the investments and production. Similarly, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling 
(LOOS) responds negatively to oil price shock from period 1 up to 6th period 
and remains positive just above the “0” level over the remaining periods. 
However, OECD/IEA consumption responds negatively to the oil price shock 
from the period 1 and reaches its minimum in the 4th period before moving 
towards positive and crosses the “0” line in period 8. It remains positive from 
the 8th period to the 12th period.  
 
In this regard, the variance decomposition of oil prices is computed and 
presented in table 7.10 to seek further explanation on how the variation in 
the oil price was accounted for. 
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Table 7:10: Variance Decomposition of Oil Prices (LOPR) 
                  Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
1 0.083760 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 0.115528 97.73122 0.270983 0.078669 0.038755 1.114656 0.569858 0.195857 
3 0.138800 94.37667 0.662336 0.147390 0.054860 2.811638 1.361076 0.586025 
4 0.157121 91.09327 1.049074 0.183822 0.049598 4.562046 2.005158 1.057035 
5 0.171663 88.31638 1.390755 0.197305 0.041670 6.156161 2.377718 1.520013 
6 0.183101 86.11737 1.681581 0.199162 0.046278 7.534358 2.497744 1.923504 
7 0.191995 84.41851 1.926290 0.196599 0.073109 8.694716 2.445788 2.244986 
8 0.198857 83.09680 2.131026 0.193251 0.128012 9.653216 2.317287 2.480411 
9 0.204150 82.02930 2.300730 0.190675 0.214392 10.42937 2.199090 2.636448 
10 0.208271 81.11140 2.438949 0.189440 0.333889 11.04225 2.158694 2.725375 
11 0.211550 80.26291 2.548355 0.189733 0.486607 11.51015 2.240502 2.761748 
12 0.214244 79.42837 2.631308 0.191632 0.671197 11.85097 2.466297 2.760226 
                  
Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
         
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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Table 7.10 presents the variance decomposition of oil prices where in period 
2, oil price accounts for 97.73% of the variation in the current oil price 
movement. Despite the response from OPEC and OECD/IEA organisations, 
OPEC quota, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and consumption all account for 
less than 1% (i.e. 0.27%, 0.57%, and 0.20% respectively). However for the 
entire periods, oil market completion from non-OPEC is the second factor that 
accounts for the variation in the oil prices other than oil price itself. The effect 
of the oil price reduces in periods 5, 10 and 12 to 88.32%, 81.11%, and 
79.43 respectively. OPEC production quota accounts for 1.39%, 2.44%, and 
2.6%. This variation resembles the one observed in the OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption. This suggests that the production activities of OPEC as the 
major global oil producer and the consumption of the OECD/IEA as the major 
oil consumer do not vary much in accounting for variation in the oil prices. 
These findings may lend support to the claim by OPEC that it attempts to 
ensure supply-demand balance on monthly basis as disclosed in most OPEC 
monthly oil market reports. OPEC spare capacity and OPEC production 
cheating account for less than 1% throughout the periods considered. This 
suggests that the variables on their own might not strongly account for the 
variation in the oil prices but perhaps the associated speculation could be 
responsible. During the periods considered, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling 
accounts for 0.57%, 2.38%, 2.15%, and 2.47% for the 2nd, 5th, 10th, and the 
12th periods respectively. The variable accounting for the major variation in 
the oil prices next to oil price, is oil market competition from non-OPEC that 
accounts for 1.12%, 6.15%, 11.04%, and 11.85% in periods 2, 5, 10, and 12 
respectively.  
7.3.3 Analysis of the Impact of Non-OPEC Policies on the Oil Prices 
and OPEC Stabilisation Policies 
To understand the effect of oil market competition and the role of OECD/IEA 
crude oil stockpiling and consumption on the activities of OPEC, OPEC 
production quota, OPEC production cheating, and OPEC spare capacity are 
examined after the actions of the new players are introduced.  
In general, relying on the evidence from the Granger causality, VAR impulse 
response functions and the variance decomposition, it is found that OECD/IEA 
and non-OPEC behaviour do have some degree of influence of oil prices and 
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OPEC’ stabilisation policies. Pressure on the organisation often generates 
some reactions that have potential implications on oil prices. The results lend 
empirical support to the conclusion of Amano (1987). 
7.4 Analysis of the Impact of Actions of Other Market Players on 
OPEC Stabilisation Policies 
To understand these dynamics, OPEC’s stabilisation policies are revisited one 
after the other in the following sub-sections while taking into consideration 
the effect of the actions of external players on OPEC’s ability to stabilise the 
oil prices. 
7.4.1 Analysis of OPEC Production Quota and Actions of Other Market 
Players 
 
From table 7.9, and on the basis of equation 7.10 below, it can be observed 
that the current OPEC production quota is positively influenced by the lagged 
valued oil price, lagged values of OPEC production quota, and lagged values 
of oil market completion from non-OPEC. It is also negatively influenced by 
lagged values of OPEC production cheating, lagged values of OPEC spare 
capacity, lagged values of OECD/IEA crude oil consumption and stockpiling.  
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡 =  𝛼0,2 + 𝛽2,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,5𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 +
𝛽2,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,7𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1ℯ2,𝑡             7.10 
OPEC production quota is positively influenced by lagged values of oil price 
(0.028095) and OPEC production quota (0.728328). This implies that 
(change) increase in the previous period oil prices increases the current OPEC 
quota. This action is expected from OPEC but could potentially have two 
different interpretations. First, oil price shock could have been triggered by 
any factor not probably mentioned in this study and to understand OPEC’s 
response we might imply positive relationship of oil prices to OPEC quota to 
mean that; OPEC increases quota, given the increased oil prices in an 
attempt to ensure higher production with a view to forcing oil prices down 
again. The second interpretation might be that OPEC increases production 
quota consistent with its objective, but going by the theory of markets, it 
does that in order to benefit from such increased oil prices. Also, OPEC quota 
is negatively influenced by the lagged values of OPEC production cheating. 
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This is expected in the light of earlier findings and logical argument that 
production cheating is reduced by increased quota allocation to members. In 
the same connection, OPEC production quota is negatively influenced (i.e. -
0.110178) by lagged values of OPEC spare capacity consistent with the 
findings in sub-section 7.2.3. However, oil market competition from non-
OPEC affects OPEC production quota positively (i.e. 0.234142). This result is 
expected because high oil prices are usually followed by increased OPEC 
production quota and also increased oil market competition from non-OPEC. 
Therefore, it is logical to expect positive effects between the two variables.   
OPEC production quota is negatively influenced by the OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption and stockpiling. This implies that the quota is reduced by 
increase in the two variables as expected. In the same direction, we find 
some interesting dynamics from the effects of the exogenous variables as 
expected. For example, we find in the first model (see table 7.4), we find that 
OPEC production quota is increased by the introduction of OPEC oil price band 
policy (0.009943). However, the result in table 7.9 shows a slightly different 
effect as a result of the introduction of new variables in the model. This might 
be expected given the nature of the policy demands increase and decrease at 
some points depending on the need for a situation. However, we find that 
OPEC production quota is negatively affected by war in Iraq, and global 
economic recession. In a simple interpretation, OPEC production quota is 
reduced by the presence or increase in any of the two exogenous events. This 
is expected in the light of economic theory. Recession usually reduces 
purchasing power, exports, demand, and GDP of nations (IMF, 2012 and 
Haughton, 2013). War might also affect economic activities in the nation 
involved in war, which potentially affects the overall OPEC production quota. 
In this regard, the impulse response function of OPEC production quota is 
analysed and results presented in figure 7.6 with a view to understanding 
how other players respond to shock in OPEC production quota.  
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Figure 7.6: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in Opec Production Quota (Lopq) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
 
Figure 7.6 presents seven panels of the VAR impulse responses of all the 
endogenous variables to the shock in OPEC production quota. From the first 
panel (i.e. response of LOPR to LOPQ), oil price responds positively to the 
shock in OPEC production but only in the 1st period. It changes in the 2nd 
period by responding negatively over the remaining periods (2-12). OPEC 
quota responds positively to OPEC quota (in the second panel of response of 
LOPQ to LOPQ) from period 1 until period 11. It begins to respond negatively 
only in the 12th period. The third panel (i.e. response of LOPC to LOPQ) shows 
that OPEC production cheating responds negatively to the shock in OPEC 
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production quota from period 1 up to period 10 before it emerges positive in 
period 11 and remains positive over the end of the 12th period. This implies 
that increased OPEC production quota is usually received by reduced 
cheating. The cheating gains momentum with time over the given periods 
and becomes positive as the response of OPEC quota to the shock in OPEC 
quota becomes negative (see panel 2 of figure 7.7). The fourth panel of 
response of LOSC to LOPQ shows that OPEC spare capacity initially responds 
negatively to the shock in OPEC production quota only from period 1 to 3. It 
turns to be positive from the 3rd period as the response of the LOPQ to LOPQ 
declines towards negative (see panel 2). OPEC spare capacity gradually 
increases and remains positive and permanent throughout the subsequent 
periods. 
 
Similarly, the fifth panel shows that oil market competition from non-OPEC 
responds positively to the shock in OPEC production quota. This remains 
positive throughout the periods considered but at a gradually declining state. 
Usually, OPEC production is often increased when oil prices are high in order 
to calm the prices low and within the target band. This finding shows that 
non-OPEC members also react to that OPEC decision at the beginning but as 
the shock in the OPEC production declines, non-OPEC response also declines 
with time. The decline in non-OPEC response might be due to the low 
reserves compared to OPEC or possibly they appear within this critical 
moment of high prices to grab their market share. In the sixth panel (i.e. 
response of LOOS to LOPQ), we observe OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling 
responds positively in the 1st period, and subsequently turns to be negative 
as the shocks in both oil prices and OPEC quota decline (see 2nd panel, fig. 
7.8, and 7.9). The impulse response continuously declines and reaches its 
minimum in the fifth period. Thereafter, it begins to grow towards the 
positive region as it approaches the end of the period considered. Finally, we 
observe from the last panel (panel 7) in figure 7.9 that OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption responds positively to the shock in OPEC production quota from 
period 1 up to period 4 before changing pattern in period 5 to be negative 
and permanent throughout the remaining periods. This implies that 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption is increased by the increase in the OPEC 
production quota and is reduced accordingly as the shock reduces.  
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However, we compute the variance decomposition of OPEC production quota 
in table 7.11 to examine the contribution of each independent variable 
towards explaining variation in the OPEC production quota. 
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Table 7:11: Variance Decomposition of OPEC Production Quota (LOPQ) 
                  
 Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 1  0.083760  0.183254  99.81675  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.115528  1.315906  95.94923  0.618942  1.566777  0.246805  0.020195  0.282145 
 3  0.138800  3.814212  88.84597  1.489543  4.054348  0.881326  0.505986  0.408614 
 4  0.157121  7.501778  79.58192  2.201175  6.509455  1.849070  1.997056  0.359548 
 5  0.171663  11.71540  69.54452  2.590546  8.384762  2.988413  4.454924  0.321434 
 6  0.183101  15.75856  60.06422  2.686773  9.550281  4.128889  7.382119  0.429153 
 7  0.191995  19.22105  51.93869  2.597824  10.13408  5.163523  10.24231  0.702527 
 8  0.198857  21.99347  45.39586  2.424902  10.33523  6.054587  12.70256  1.093392 
 9  0.204150  24.13867  40.31855  2.233288  10.32112  6.805973  14.64233  1.540060 
 10  0.208271  25.77762  36.45919  2.056100  10.20291  7.437430  16.07336  1.993393 
 11  0.211550  27.03003  33.55964  1.906161  10.04508  7.970581  17.06668  2.421824 
 12  0.214244  27.99374  31.39759  1.785678  9.881502  8.423693  17.70966  2.808138 
          Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
         
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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From table 7.11, it can be observed that the major variation in the OPEC 
production quota is accounted by OPEC production quota itself, followed by oil 
prices, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling, OPEC spare capacity, oil market 
competition from non-OPEC, and OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. In the 2nd, 
5th, 10th, and the 12th periods, variations in OPEC production quota are 
95.95% , 69.54%, 36.56%, and 31.40% accounted by OPEC production 
quota. It can be observed that the variation rapidly moved from nearly 100% 
in period 1 to less than 70% in period 5 and also around 30% in the 12th 
period. Oil price accounts for 1.32%, 11.72%, 25.78%, and 27.99% in the 
2nd, 5th, 10th, and 12th periods. It shows how rapidly important oil price 
accounts for changes in OPEC production decision. This is also important 
evidence that OPEC responds to oil price changes in line with the results 
found from VAR estimates and impulse responses. In the same vein, we find 
evidence that OECD/IEA stockpiling is responsible for variation in OPEC 
production quota in the following order: 0.02%, 4.46%, 16.07%, and 
17.71% for the 2nd, 5th, 10th, and 12th respectively. OPEC production quota 
also depends partly on its spare capacity as it accounts for 1.57%, 8.38%, 
10.20%, and 9.88% in periods 2, 5, 10, and 12 respectively. Oil market 
competition also accounts for 0.24% in the 2nd period, and grows to 2.99% in 
the 5th period. In the 10th and the 12th period, it only accounts for 7.44% and 
8.42% respectively. The other two variables that do not seem to have much 
important information in driving variation in OPEC production are OPEC 
production cheating and OECD/IEA consumption. The cheating accounts for 
less than 1% (i.e. 0.62%) in the 2nd period and remains slightly above 2% 
from the 4th period to the 10th period before coming down to less than 2% in 
the remaining 2 periods. However, OECD/IEA accounts for less than 1% from 
period 1 to 7. It accounts for between 1.09% and 1.99% in the subsequent 3 
periods (i.e. period 8 to 10), and less than 3% in the last 2 periods. 
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7.4.2 Analysis of OPEC Production Cheating and Actions of Other 
Market Players 
To understand the behaviour of OPEC production cheating when effect of 
other variables (i.e. oil market competition from non-OPEC, OECD/IEA crude 
oil consumption and stockpiling) are considered, equation 7.11 is analysed 
below: 
𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,3 + 𝛽3,1𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,5𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 +
𝛽3,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,7𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ3,𝑡     7.11 
 
In this regard, table 7.9 presents the results of equation 7.11 where the var 
estimates are discussed. OPEC production cheating (LOPC) is positively 
influenced by the lagged values of oil price (loprt-1) as shown by the 
coefficient (0.046815). This implies that current increase in OPEC production 
is 0.046815 influenced by a unit increase in the previous period oil price. In 
the same vein, the cheating is positively influenced by the lagged values of 
OPEC production quota (i.e. 0.288152), and its own lagged values 
(0.782754). Similarly, the effect remains positive for the lagged values of the 
remaining exogenous variables except oil market competition (i.e. 0.154010, 
-0.992971, 0.478522, 0.847599 for lagged values of OPEC spare capacity, oil 
market competition, OECD/IEA consumption and stockpiling respectively). It 
can be observed that the exogenous variables show a similar pattern with the 
OPEC production quota except for the effect of the war. Therefore, it can be 
implied that OPEC production cheating is negatively affected by the 
introduction of the OPEC opb policy and effect of global economic recession. 
However, the cheating is positively influenced by the war in Iraq. This means 
that OPEC cheating is increased by the effect of the war. this might be 
interpreted as increase in production by members to either benefit from the 
high oil prices as a result of deficiency created by the affected war country 
(i.e. Iraq) or possibly an attempt by a member (e.g. Saudi Arabia) to 
increase production with a view to bring oil prices down. However, despite 
the effect and effort shown by the results, oil prices continue to surge.   
Attempt is therefore made (see figure 7.7) to describe how other OPEC 
policies alongside other non-OPEC usually respond to the cheating in OPEC.  
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Figure 7.7: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in OPEC Production Cheating (LOPC) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
Figure 7.7 presents seven panels of impulse responses of all the seven 
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panel (i.e. response of LOPR to LOPC), it can be observed that oil price 
responds positively to OPEC cheating. The positive response (in panel two) 
which begins from period 1 grows to its maximum in period 4 before 
beginning to decline but still remains positive over the remaining periods 
considered. OPEC production quota initially responds negatively to the shock 
in the cheating from period 1 up to period 6 before it turns to be positive and 
remains permanent over the remaining periods. OPEC production cheating 
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shown by panel three of figure 7.8 (i.e. response of LOPC to LOPC). However, 
the response which begins from period 1 declines to its minimum in period 10 
and remains constant along the “0” line for the remaining periods. Panel four 
(i.e. response of LOSC to LOPC) shows that OPEC spare capacity responds 
negatively to OPEC cheating. This is expected because increased cheating 
exerts pressure on the existing capacity. 
 
Furthermore, oil market competition responds negatively in period up to 
period 8 and thereafter becomes positive for the remaining periods (periods 
9-12) as shown by panel five (i.e. response of LOMC to LOPC). However, for 
the OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and consumption show positive response 
to OPEC production cheating (i.e. LOPC). From panel six (i.e. response of 
LOOS to LOPC), stockpiling responds positively in period 1 and grows to its 
peak in period 5 and continuous at declining state, though still positive over 
the remaining periods. Panel seven (i.e. response of LOOC to LOPC) shows 
that OECD/IEA crude oil consumption initially responds positively in period 1 
to 2 before temporarily declining and producing negative response in period 3 
and later plunges into positive again. It remains positive over the remaining 
periods considered. The implication of the result is that, OECD/IEA increases 
its member crude stockpiling and consumption as the OPEC production 
cheating increases.  
 
Similarly, the variance decomposition of the OPEC production cheating is 
computed to understand how all the endogenous variables contribute to 
variation in the cheating (see table 7.12). 
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Table 7:12: Variance Decomposition of OPEC Production Cheating (LOPC) 
                  
 Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 1  0.083760  0.724908  58.01878  41.25632  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.115528  0.927331  59.12517  37.23732  2.010780  0.308794  0.001051  0.389554 
 3  0.138800  0.861054  58.11670  33.81928  5.404162  0.923591  0.184951  0.690261 
 4  0.157121  0.776493  55.67720  30.93334  9.072920  1.702981  1.085217  0.751855 
 5  0.171663  0.887361  52.31442  28.36768  12.29114  2.503770  2.944450  0.691180 
 6  0.183101  1.258125  48.52990  26.02392  14.73907  3.221069  5.567532  0.660388 
 7  0.191995  1.831138  44.76985  23.90980  16.40996  3.805323  8.533686  0.740241 
 8  0.198857  2.503745  41.33830  22.06223  17.45871  4.252383  11.44811  0.936528 
 9  0.204150  3.184987  38.38168  20.49953  18.07543  4.582109  14.06030  1.215970 
 10  0.208271  3.815709  35.92986  19.21249  18.42046  4.820934  16.26306  1.537483 
 11  0.211550  4.366330  33.94744  18.17318  18.60740  4.992841  18.04546  1.867351 
 12  0.214244  4.827632  32.37184  17.34585  18.70869  5.116518  19.44655  2.182921 
                  
 Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition  
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Table 7.12 presents the variance decomposition of OPEC production cheating 
in order to have insight on how other endogenous variables usually account 
for variation in the dependent variable (LOPC). It can be observed that, OPEC 
production cheating accounts for less than 50% of the variation in itself (with 
41.26%, and 37.24% in the 1st and 2nd periods respectively). This shows the 
relative importance of OPEC production quota which accounts for 58.02% and 
59.12% in the 1st and 2nd periods respectively, in influencing how and why 
members should cheat in OPEC. This finding is consistent with some insider 
observation that OPEC production quota is the main driver for the 
organisational members to engage in cheating (see Chalabi, 2010). In the 5th, 
10th, and the 12th periods, OPEC production cheating already accounts for 
28.37%, 19.21%, and 17.35% respectively. In the same vein, OPEC 
production quota accounts for 52.31%, 35.93%, and 32.37% in the 5th, 10th, 
and 12th periods respectively. Although OPEC production cheating responds 
positively to the shock in oil price and vice versa, its impact in accounting for 
variation is not as expected.  
In the same vein, oil price accounts for variation in OPEC quota in the 2nd, 5th, 
8th, 10th, and 12th periods at 0.92%, 0.89%, 2.50%, 3.82%, and 4.83% 
respectively. However, another two important factors that account for the 
variation in OPEC cheating behaviour are OPEC spare capacity and the 
OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling which initially account for 2.01% and 0.00% 
in the 2nd periods respectively. For OPEC spare capacity, it grows to account 
for 12.29%, 17.46%, 18.42%, and 18.71% in periods 5, 8, 10, and 12 
respectively. Similarly, crude oil stockpiling by OECD/IEA accounts for 2.94%, 
11.45%, 16.26%, and 19.45% in the 5th, 8th, 10th, and 12th periods 
respectively. OECD/IEA crude oil consumption does not seem to account for 
much variation given that it produces less than 1% from periods 1 to 8, less 
than 2% from periods 9 – 11, and less than 3% in the last period. However, 
oil market competition is slightly higher as it accounts for less than 1% in the 
first 3 periods, less than 4% in the next 4 periods up to period 7, less than 
5% in the subsequent 4 periods, and just 5.12% in the last period. 
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7.4.3 Analysis of OPEC Spare Capacity and Actions of Other Market 
Players  
In this regard, the dynamics in OPEC spare capacity are analysed in the same 
manner as OPEC production cheating in order to understand its peculiarities 
and how it is influenced by other variables. On the basis of VAR estimates in 
table 7.9 from which results of equation 7.12 are extracted and discussed. 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,4 + 𝛽4,1𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,5𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 +
𝛽4,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1+𝛽4,7𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1+𝛽4,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1+𝛽4,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1+𝛽4,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ4,𝑡              7.12 
From table 7.9, OPEC spare capacity is negatively affected by the lagged 
values of oil price (-0.351216), positively affected by the lagged values of 
OPEC production quota (0.692339), positively influenced by the lagged 
values of OPEC production cheating (0.156555), positively influenced by 
spare capacity (0.818587), positively influenced by oil market competition 
from non-opec (0.253007), negatively influenced by OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption (-0.734693) but positively influenced by OECD/IEA crude oil 
stockpiling (2.356167). In the same order, we expect high capacity to be 
maintained when oil prices are presumably low, and similarly when opec 
production quota is maintained, although with time such pressure resulting 
from increased quota might force the opec spare capacity to go low. Positive 
relationship should be expected between OPEC spare capacity and lagged 
values of the spare capacity. The capacity is usually expected to grow as the 
oil competition increases, given evidence of the response of non-opec to the 
shock in oil prices. It can also be observed that a unit increase in the 
OECD/IEA consumption influences the capacity by (-0.734693) whereas the 
spare capacity is positively influenced by a positive change in the lagged 
value of stockpiling.  
However, the capacity is positively influenced by the introduction of OPEC 
OPB policy which indicates a possible compliance by the members to the 
policy. This is further confirmed by the negative relationship of OPB to OPEC 
production cheating implying that the introduction of the policy reduces 
cheating in OPEC among its members. It can be observed that OPEC spare 
capacity is negatively influenced by the war, which implies that the war in 
Iraq reduces OPEC spare capacity. Finally we observe a positive relationship 
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running between OPEC spare capacity and global economic recession. This 
implies that OPEC spare capacity is increased by the presence of global 
economic recession. This result is expected given the fact that economic 
recession reduces demand which in turn reduces OPEC supply. The 
implication is that a large reserve would be held by the members due to 
limited buyers or reduced demand. 
Therefore, the impulse response of all the endogenous variables considered in 
the model to the shock in OPEC spare capacity are analysed as indicated by 
the seven panels of figure 7.8. 
Figure 7.8: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in OPEC Spare Capacity (LOSC) 
 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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From the first panel of figure 7.8 (i.e. response of LOPR to LOSC), it can be 
observed that OPEC spare capacity is negatively influenced by oil price from 
period 1 to period 8. Thereafter, it turns to be positive in the middle of period 
8 and remains so over the remaining periods (i.e. period 8 – 12). This means 
initially when shock occurs in the OPEC spare capacity, oil price is reduced 
and later begins to grow as the shock in OPEC spare capacity reduces (see 
panel 4). In the second panel (i.e. response of LOPQ to LOSC), we can 
observe that throughout the periods considered, OPEC production quota 
responds negatively to the shock in OPEC spare capacity. The response of 
OPEC cheating to spare capacity exhibits a comparably different behaviour. 
Initially, OPEC production cheating responds negatively to its spare capacity 
from period 1 to the middle of the 2nd period before it crosses to the positive 
region over the remaining periods (i.e. periods 2 – 12).  
 
As already highlighted, panel 4 shows that OPEC spare capacity is positively 
influenced by the spare capacity; the response which starts in period 1 
gradually reduces with time up to period 12, though it remains positive 
throughout. In panel 5, we can observe that the oil market competition from 
non-OPEC responds positively to the spare capacity. The response which 
begins in period 1 grows up to period 3 and remains permanent over the 
remaining periods. In this regard, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling responds 
positively to the OPEC spare capacity (see panel 6, i.e. response of LOOS to 
LOSC). It begins as positive from period 1 and slightly goes down and 
remains constant throughout period 2 from where it gathers momentum from 
period 3 to the remaining periods. Finally (in panel 7, response of LOOC to 
LOSC), OECD/IEA crude oil consumption responds negatively to OPEC spare 
capacity. In the same direction we investigate how each of the independent 
endogenous variables account for variation in the OPEC spare capacity from 
the results presented in table 7.13. 
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Table 7:13: Variance Decomposition of OPEC Spare Capacity (LOSC) 
                   Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 1  0.083760  1.031419  1.203839  34.46393  63.30081  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.115528  4.469295  0.841027  29.82482  62.62114  0.005105  1.902808  0.335804 
 3  0.138800  8.557763  0.604328  25.05897  59.41034  0.053622  5.331881  0.983097 
 4  0.157121  12.29216  0.522227  20.90498  55.16084  0.177071  9.170824  1.771892 
 5  0.171663  15.26930  0.564044  17.60280  50.90880  0.373269  12.70629  2.575501 
 6  0.183101  17.47194  0.686017  15.10215  47.15065  0.619504  15.64420  3.325545 
 7  0.191995  19.03404  0.852426  13.25294  44.03512  0.889229  17.94205  3.994187 
 8  0.198857  20.11360  1.039276  11.90023  41.54338  1.160420  19.66793  4.575165 
 9  0.204150  20.84571  1.231828  10.91577  39.59405  1.417619  20.92309  5.071937 
 10  0.208271  21.33327  1.421371  10.20188  38.09254  1.651265  21.80800  5.491674 
 11  0.211550  21.65080  1.602806  9.686465  36.95075  1.856337  22.41027  5.842576 
 12  0.214244  21.85105  1.773117  9.316838  36.09310  2.031061  22.80205  6.132784 
                  
 Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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Table 7.13 above presents the results of the variance decompositions of 
OPEC spare capacity. OPEC spare capacity accounts for 63.30% variation in 
the spare capacity in the beginning period. At the same time, OPEC 
production cheating accounts nearly for 34.46% while both oil price and 
OPEC production quota account for less than 2% each. In the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 
10th, and 12th periods, OPEC spare capacity accounts for 62.62%, 50.91%, 
41.54%, 38.09%, and 36.09% respectively. Also, the second major 
contributor (i.e. OPEC production cheating) exhibits similar pattern. It 
accounts for 29.82%, 17.60%, 11.90%, 10.20%, and 9.32% in periods 2, 5, 
8, 10, and 12. Both variables start from their highest values to the lowest 
(i.e. descending order). For the third most important variable accounting for 
variation in OPEC spare capacity (i.e. OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling), it 
starts from the lowest value (i.e. 1.90% in the 2nd period) and ascend to the 
highest value in the 12th period (i.e. 22.80%). In the 5th, 8th, and the 10th 
periods, OECD/IEA accounts for 12.71%, 19.67%, 21.81% respectively.  
 
A similar pattern is exhibited by the oil price, which accounts for 4.47%, 
15.27%, 20.11%, 21.33%, and 21.85% in the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 10th, and the 12th 
periods. This implies that OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and oil price go in 
the same direction in influencing OPEC spare capacity. Oil market competition 
accounts for less than 1% from period 1 to period 7, accounts for less than 
2% from period 8 to period 11, and slightly above 2% (i.e. 2.03%) in the 12th 
period. OPEC production quota starts from 1.20% and plunges to less than 
1% from the 2nd period to period 7. Thereafter, it increases to less than 2% 
for the entire remaining periods considered. OECD/IEA crude oil consumption 
accounts for less than 1% in the first 3 periods. In the 5th, 8th, 10th, and the 
12th periods, OECD/IEA crude oil accounts for 2.56%, 4.58%, 5.84%, and 
6.13% respectively. 
 
7.4.4 Analysis of OECD/IEA Crude Oil Stockpiling 
To understand how OPEC stabilisation policies and other related factors 
influence OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling, 7.12 is solved in table 7.14 to 
analyse the various dynamics between the variables.  
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𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡 =  𝛼0,5 + 𝛽5,1𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 +
𝛽5,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,7𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,8𝑂𝑃𝐵−1 + 𝛽5,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ5,𝑡          7.13 
 
On the basis of the coefficients estimated from equation 7.13 and presented 
in table 7.14, we can observe that OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling is 
negatively influenced by the lagged values of oil prices (i.e. -0.001186), 
lagged values of OPEC spare capacity (i.e. -0.001492), lagged values of oil 
market competition (-0.000230), lagged values of OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption (i.e. -0.045020). Furthermore, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling is 
positively influenced by OPEC production quota and cheating (i.e. 0.001934 
and 0.003983 respectively), as well as OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling (i.e. 
0.881844). This implies that the stockpiling is reduced increase in the oil 
prices but increased by increased OPEC production quota and cheating. 
Therefore, the just described relationship is very important in the sense that 
the stockpiled oil from accounting perspective are valued on average, first in 
first out, or last in first out. The implication of this type of behaviour has not 
been explored to the bottom in this study.  
OECD/IEA crude stockpiling is negatively influenced by OPEC OPB policy. This 
implies that the stockpiling behaviour is reduced with the existence of OPB 
policy by OPEC. The war in Iraq contributes positively to building stock in the 
OECD/IEA. Global economic recession also influences the stockpiling 
positively. This means that due to reduced economic activities in the 
consumer nations due to recession, a sizeable amount of stocks might be 
expected.     
In the same way, the response of various endogenous variables to the shock 
in the OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling are examined the results are presented 
based on seven panels of figure 7.9. 
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Figure 7.9: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in OECD/IEA Crude Oil Stockpiling (LOOS) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
Panel 1 (i.e. Response of LOPR to LOOS) of figure 7.9 presents the response 
of oil price to the shock in OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling. The response 
initially begins as negative in period 1 and reduces to its lowest level in 
period four and begins a steady movement up towards positive region. It 
turns into positive in the 10th period and remains positive throughout the 
period considered. In the 2nd panel (i.e. Response of LOPQ to LOOS), we can 
observe that opec production quota responds positively to the shock in 
OECD/IEA stockpiling in the 1st period but turns to be negative and 
permanent throughout the remaining periods. However, OPEC production 
cheating exhibits rather opposite pattern with OPEC production cheating. The 
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response of opec cheating starts from period 1 as positive and steadily grows 
to the maximum in period 8 before declining during the remaining periods 
though it has still remained positive.  
Furthermore, panels 4 (i.e. Response of losc to loos) and 5 (i.e. Response of 
LOMC to LOOS) show some similarities. In panel 4, OPEC spare capacity 
responds positively in period 1 and increases up to 6 where it stays constant 
for the subsequent period up to period 7. Thereafter, it begins to decline in 
the remaining periods considered. Panel 5 shows that the response of oil 
market competition to the shock in OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling (i.e. LOMC 
to LOOS), is negative in the 1st period but turns out to be a positive over the 
entire remaining periods. In the 6th panel, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling 
responds positively to the OECD/IEA stockpiling throughout the periods 
considered. In the 7th panel, we can observe a negative response of oecd/iea 
consumption to the shock in the stockpiling. The response initially increases 
toward the positive region but remains constant along the “0” line from 
period 5 to period 7 before falling back to negative region and remains 
permanent over the subsequent periods.       
The contribution of all the endogenous variables in accounting for variation in 
the OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling as presented in table 7.14. 
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Table 7:14: Variance Decomposition OF OECD/IEA Crude Oil Stockpiling (LOOS) 
                   Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 1  0.083760  0.820818  0.044681  0.216801  0.429362  0.377449  98.11089  0.000000 
 2  0.115528  0.766587  0.037584  0.439478  0.401946  0.473296  97.41452  0.466586 
 3  0.138800  0.684370  0.091214  0.644023  0.465610  0.529073  96.54320  1.042505 
 4  0.157121  0.604649  0.167669  0.816454  0.613903  0.556280  95.69035  1.550693 
 5  0.171663  0.539411  0.244801  0.955163  0.847821  0.564725  94.89170  1.956380 
 6  0.183101  0.490509  0.310448  1.063427  1.162835  0.561748  94.14267  2.268359 
 7  0.191995  0.455255  0.359380  1.146320  1.546897  0.552485  93.43354  2.506119 
 8  0.198857  0.429795  0.391063  1.209203  1.982599  0.540304  92.75821  2.688826 
 9  0.204150  0.410781  0.407780  1.256949  2.450427  0.527257  92.11471  2.832095 
 10  0.208271  0.395909  0.413109  1.293624  2.931632  0.514484  91.50363  2.947607 
 11  0.211550  0.383835  0.410844  1.322420  3.410114  0.502548  90.92657  3.043673 
 12  0.214244  0.373857  0.404356  1.345742  3.873299  0.491669  90.38508  3.126000 
                  
 Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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From table 7.14, some evidence that most of the variation in the OECD/IEA 
crude oil stockpiling is guided by a fixed OECD/IEA stockpiling policy can be 
observed. OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling accounts for 97.42%, 94.89%, 
92.76%, 91.50%, and 90.38% in the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 10th, and 12th periods 
respectively. Therefore, it is not possible to project accurately the OECD/IEA 
stockpile. This potentially poses challenge to identifying association with most 
other variables because irrespective of the prevailing oil prices, OECD/IEA 
members are expected to comply with the given policy. In this regard, we 
find that oil price (LOPR), OPEC production quota (LOPQ), and oil market 
competition (LOMC) account for less than 1% of the variation in the 
stockpiling throughout the periods considered. The only two important 
variables are OPEC spare capacity and OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. The 
spare capacity (represented by LOSC) accounts for less than 1% in the 
beginning 5 periods and less than 2% in the next 3 periods (i.e. periods 6 to 
8). However, it accounts for less than 4% in the remaining periods. 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption accounts for 0.47%, 1.96%, 2.69%, 2.95%, 
and 3.13% for the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 10th, and the 12th periods respectively. OPEC 
production cheating (i.e. LOPC) accounts for less than 1% in the first 5 
periods and less than 2% in the remaining periods.  
7.4.5 Analysis of OECD/IEA Crude Oil Consumption 
Similarly the behaviour of the OECD/IEA consumption are analysed by 
looking into dynamics of all endogenous and exogenous variables as captured 
in equation 7.14.   
𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,6 + 𝛽6,1𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 +
𝛽6,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,7𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ6,𝑡              7.14 
Equation 7.14 presents the coefficients of the above variables in relation to 
the dependent variable OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. Consumption is 
negatively influenced by the lagged values of oil price (i.e. -0.010022) as 
expected which indicates that OECD/IEA consumption is reduced by the 
increase in oil price. It can also be observed that there is a negative 
relationship between lagged values of OPEC production quota and OECD/IEA 
crude oil consumption (i.e. -0.095835). This result is not expected partly, 
however if OPEC production quota increase is induced by surge in oil price, 
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OECD/IEA consumption could be reduced by such change in the production. 
The same relationship is observed running between the lagged values of 
OPEC production cheating and OECD/IEA crude oil consumption (-0.03488). 
Also, OPEC spare capacity exhibits similar effect in its relationship with the 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. In fact the entire OPEC stabilisation 
policies, oil market competition, and oil prices are negatively related to the 
OEAD/IEA crude oil consumption. However as expected, OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption is positively influenced by the lagged value of OECD/IEA crude 
oil consumption (i.e. 0.647195) and stockpiling (i.e. 0.299152). This implies 
that the current oil stockpiling by the OECD/IEA is increased with additional 
crude oil consumption in the previous period.  
With regards to the exogenous variables, it can be observed that there is a 
positive relationship between OECD/IEA consumption with OPEC OPB policy. 
For the war in Iraq and general economic recession, it was established that 
both are negatively related to OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. War reduces 
the consumption presumably due to reduced OPEC quota. Recession is very 
likely to discourage demand as mentioned earlier. Therefore, more of the 
dynamics are explored by computing the impulse response functions in seven 
panels of figure 7.10 below. 
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Figure 7.10: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in OECD/IEA Crude Oil Consumption (LOOC) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
Figure 7.10 presents seven panels of the impulse response functions in an 
attempt to describe response of various variables to the shock in the 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. Therefore, we begin with the first panel 
(i.e. response of LOPR to LOOC) where response of oil price to the shock in 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption is found to be positive in period 1 after 
starting up with a negative for a little short while. The response increases 
from period 1 and reaches the maximum between periods 4 and 5 before 
slashing down to period 11 where it becomes negative thereafter. We can 
observe from panel 2 (i.e. response of LOPQ to LOOC) that OPEC production 
quota responds positively to the shock in OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. 
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The response is positive and constant for the first 2 periods. It increases and 
reaches its maximum between periods 5 to 10 and later begins a downward 
movement toward the remaining periods. Panel 3 shows that OPEC 
production cheating begins with positive response from periods 1 – 3 and 
later turns to be negative for the remaining periods. This might imply that 
OPEC members respond positively to the shock in the OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption for a limited period. However, absence of adequate reserve 
might hinder their ability to sustain the supply for a long time. OPEC spare 
capacity responds positively to the shock in OECD/IEA crude oil consumption 
(see panel 4: i.e. response of LOSC to LOOC). The response which starts 
from period 1 reduces to its minimum level in period 6 and subsequently 
gathers momentum and increases over the remaining periods. Oil market 
competition responds positively in the initial periods (i.e. periods 1 – 3) 
before turning to be negative (see panel 5: i.e. response of LOMC to LOOC). 
The same interpretation as that of OPEC cheating can be applied at this point. 
The low reserve and capacity might be constraint which hinders such positive 
response to be achieved from non-OPEC. However, we can observe from 
panel 6 (i.e. response of LOOS to LOOC), that there is a positive response 
between OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and the consumption. This is 
expected given that the amount of consumption greatly determines the 
amount to be stockpiled. The last panel (i.e. panel 7) presents the response 
of OECD/IEA crude oil consumption to the shock in OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption (i.e. response of LOOC to LOOC). The response is positive 
throughout the periods considered.      
 
In the same direction, the variance decomposition of OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption is computed and the results are presented in table 7.15. 
239 
 
Table 7:15: Variance Decomposition of OECD/IEA Crude Oil Consumption (LOOC) 
                  
 Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 1  0.083760  0.034204  0.153349  0.950972  3.827992  2.160496  40.55441  52.31858 
 2  0.115528  0.249221  0.250554  0.908510  6.748190  1.624103  36.40717  53.81225 
 3  0.138800  0.497649  0.280958  0.881118  10.16999  1.526569  33.30628  53.33744 
 4  0.157121  0.675571  0.267991  0.853849  13.57422  1.702537  31.12408  51.80175 
 5  0.171663  0.758611  0.260337  0.824828  16.62394  1.974403  29.55020  50.00768 
 6  0.183101  0.773963  0.291595  0.796004  19.19017  2.231833  28.35647  48.35996 
 7  0.191995  0.758345  0.371104  0.769956  21.26307  2.430063  27.43955  46.96791 
 8  0.198857  0.737329  0.491192  0.749304  22.88357  2.562789  26.76442  45.81140 
 9  0.204150  0.722352  0.636684  0.736317  24.11283  2.640404  26.31144  44.83997 
 10  0.208271  0.715031  0.791777  0.732424  25.01944  2.677849  26.05261  44.01088 
 11  0.211550  0.712472  0.943706  0.737923  25.67170  2.689011  25.94918  43.29601 
 12  0.214244  0.711072  1.083939  0.752044  26.13191  2.684730  25.95822  42.67809 
                  
 Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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Table 7.15 presents the variance decomposition of OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption where OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling is the main driver 
explaining the variation in the consumption other than the consumption itself. 
In the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 10th and 12th periods, OECD/IEA crude oil consumption 
accounts for 53.81%, 50.01%, 45.81%, 44.01%, and 42.68% respectively. 
The next variable that contributes more after the consumption is the 
OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling which accounts for 36.41%, 29.55%, 26.76%, 
26.05%, and 25.96% in periods 2, 5, 8, 10, and 12 respectively. It is also 
found that OPEC spare capacity is another influential factor that account for 
variation in the OECD/IEA crude oil consumption. It accounts for 6.75%, 
16.62%, 22.88%, 25.02%, and 26.13% in the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 10th, and 12th 
periods respectively. However, oil price, OPEC production quota, and cheating 
do not seem to account for any variation over 1% except the 12th period of 
OPEC production quota which accounts for 1.08%. Oil market competition 
accounts for 2.16% in period 1 but reduces to 1.62% in the 2nd period. It 
accounts for less than 2% for the subsequent 4 periods up to period 5. In the 
remaining periods, it only accounts for less than 3%.  
 
7.4.6 Analysis of Oil Market Competition from Non-OPEC 
 
Given the allegation that OPEC operates as a cartel of oil producers that 
restricts crude oil with a view to pushing oil prices high, analysing oil market 
competition becomes useful. Therefore, equation 7.14 is used to demonstrate 
the complex dynamics surrounding the oil market competition and the role of 
OPEC stabilisation policies.  
 
𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0,7 + 𝛽7,1𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,2𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,3𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,4𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 +
𝛽7,6𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,7𝐿𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,8𝑂𝑃𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,9𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽7,10𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + ℯ5,𝑡               7.15 
The results are obtained from table 7.15 where all the lagged values of 
independent variables are positively related to the oil market competition. Oil 
market is positively influenced by the lagged values of oil price which implies 
increase in the oil price drives oil market (i.e. 0.002764). This is not coming 
as a surprise when the results in table 7.10 show that oil market competition 
is the main driver explaining variation in the oil prices with an account of 
between 1.12% and 11.85%. Also, the results in table 7.14 show that oil 
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market competition is positively influenced by the OPEC production quota 
(i.e. at 0.025792). Oil market competition is usually increased by the 
increase in OPEC production quota. As explained earlier, this situation is very 
possible where oil price rise is the main motivation for OPEC to increase its 
quota in an attempt to cushion oil prices down within the target band. Oil 
market competition responds to either assist with the cause of calming oil 
prices or penetrating to grab their own market share from the rising oil 
prices.  
In the same manner, we read the influence of the lagged values of OPEC 
production cheating on the oil market competition (i.e. 0.005479) which 
might also take a similar interpretation as that of OPEC production quota. For 
the OPEC spare capacity, we earlier had a logical argument that low capacity 
for OPEC might drive oil market competition high most particularly where 
high oil prices are projected. This evidence is supplemented by the Granger 
causality results running from OPEC spare capacity to the market 
competition. The results based equation 7.15 and table 7.9, a positive 
relationship is found between OPEC spare capacity and oil market competition 
(i.e. 0.004558).    
Furthermore, oil market competition is positively influenced by its lagged 
values (i.e. 0.782969) and the lagged values of OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption (0.008711) and stockpiling (i.e. 0.091418) as earlier expected. 
This implies that increased OECD/IEA demands for consumption and 
stockpiling in the previous period become important driver to increase the 
current supply from non-OPEC. Other exogenous variables are found to have 
influence on the oil market competition in the following ways. OPEC OPB 
policy is found to have a positive relationship with the market competition 
(i.e. 0.004004). This implies that the introduction of the policy attracts more 
production from non-OPEC given that the policy was specific as to what 
should be expected in the event of changes in the market conditions. Also, 
we document evidence of some degree of compliance by OPEC members that 
might be a motivation for non-OPEC to see an advantage to increase the oil 
production and supply. War in Iraq is found to be positively related with the 
market competition (i.e. 0.006910). This result is also expected given the 
fact that if the motivation of the non-OPEC is to take advantage of the war by 
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increasing supply to accrue the benefits from the high oil prices just like 
explained in the case of OPEC production cheating during the war periods. 
However, the economic recession as earlier discussed affects demand which 
forcefully reduces supply. Therefore, the negative relationship between global 
economic recession and the market competition (i.e. -0.001418) is not 
coming in as a surprise.  
In order to generate more evidence about the dynamics, the impulse 
responses of the variables to the shock in the oil market competition are 
analysed and presented by seven panels in figure 7.11. 
Figure 7.11: Impulse Response Functions for One Standard Deviation 
Innovation in Oil Market Competition (LOMC) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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From panel 1 of figure 7.11 above (i.e. response of LOPR to LOMC), it can be 
observed that the response of oil price begins with being negative in period 1 
but it crosses to positive from the 2nd period up to the end of the 12th period 
considered in the computation. The response of OPEC production quota to the 
shock in the oil market competition (i.e. response of LOPQ to LOMC) is 
presented in panel 2. The response is positive throughout the periods 
considered. It begins from period 1 and steadily increases to reach its 
maximum from periods 7 to 10 and later begins to gradually decline towards 
the remaining 2 periods. The 3rd panel presents the response of OPEC 
production cheating to the oil market competition (i.e. response of LOPC to 
LOMC). The response is negative and begins from period 1 and to its lowest 
level in period 4. Thereafter, it begins a gradual move towards positive region 
from period 5 to period 12. OPEC spare capacity responds negatively at the 
start of period 1 but immediately move and stays constant along the “0” line 
up to the 3rd period. Thereafter it moves to respond negatively to the shock in 
the oil market competition and remains constant over remaining periods. In 
panel 4, oil market competition responds positively to the shock in the oil 
market competition. It starts highly positive and begins to gradually reduce 
with time, but stays positive throughout the periods considered. In the 6th 
panel, we observe that OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling responds negatively to 
the shock in the oil market competition (see response of LOOS to LOMC). The 
response which begins from period 1 reaches its lowest level in period 3 
before it begins to steadily move towards positive region. The closeness to 
the positive region can be seen in period 12. This implies that OECD/IEA 
stockpiling responds to the shock in the oil market and if additional periods 
were added, the positive response could have been possible. In the last 
panel, a positive response of OECD/IEA crude oil consumption to the shock is 
observed in the oil market competition in the first 2½ periods before turning 
to be negative in period 3 up to the remaining periods considered.   
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Table 7:16: Variance Decomposition of Oil Market Competition (LOMC) 
                  
 Period S.E. LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 1  0.083760  0.606740  1.320349  0.098813  0.091082  97.88301  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.115528  0.481672  1.611747  0.100962  0.185855  97.30661  0.294969  0.018181 
 3  0.138800  0.407840  1.863065  0.089083  0.564105  95.86059  1.194729  0.020585 
 4  0.157121  0.360702  2.056039  0.078191  1.108974  93.62029  2.756821  0.018978 
 5  0.171663  0.329032  2.185635  0.081318  1.736621  90.77750  4.852731  0.037160 
 6  0.183101  0.308233  2.258096  0.105112  2.390878  87.59101  7.257699  0.088974 
 7  0.191995  0.296702  2.285839  0.149734  3.037963  84.31059  9.744442  0.174736 
 8  0.198857  0.293863  2.282493  0.211116  3.660211  81.12734  12.13890  0.286082 
 9  0.204150  0.299192  2.259858  0.283545  4.250002  78.16065  14.33487  0.411886 
 10  0.208271  0.311831  2.226785  0.361465  4.805089  75.46866  16.28406  0.542110 
 11  0.211550  0.330563  2.189281  0.440379  5.325632  73.06674  17.97803  0.669377 
 12  0.214244  0.353946  2.151095  0.517083  5.812622  70.94463  19.43154  0.789088 
                  
 Cholesky Ordering: LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOS LOOC 
                  
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
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In the same way, table 7.16 presents the analysis obtained from the 
variance decompositions of the oil market competition. It can be observed 
that oil market remains the major variable accounting for variation in itself 
97.88% in the first period to about 70.94% in the 12th period. The second 
major variable that accounts for the variation is the OECD/IEA crude oil 
stockpiling which in the first period accounts for nothing but grows to be 
responsible for up to 19.43% in the 12th period. 
 
7.5 Diagnostic Tests of the VAR Models 
Diagnostic tests otherwise known as misspecification/robustness tests are 
usually conducted on the basis of test statistic. Diagnostics are usually 
carried out to avoid or minimise the risk of misspecification of the models 
by proper examination of the residuals. In other words, by diagnostics or 
robustness checks, we are concerned with examining the appropriateness 
of the VAR estimates within the framework of BLUE (best linear unbiased 
estimators). Applying Q-Statistics, the autocorrelations/partial 
autocorrelations of the residuals for the VAR equations up to the specified 
number of lags within the context of Ljung-Box Q-statistics can be viewed. 
The main essence of testing for the correlograms of the squared residuals 
is to examine the degree of ‘autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity’ 
(i.e. ARCH) from the model residuals. The simple interpretation of the 
results is that, absence of the ARCH in the model equations residuals 
indicates “0” in all the specified lags which is not expected to be significant 
at each level. In this connection, the results for the above tests are 
presented in appendix XV-XXIV.  
There are basically two most popular approaches that are fully integrated 
in most statistical packages, namely: the Wald test and the LM test 
(Brooks, 2008). It should be noted that the diagnostics of LM test statistics 
take a χ2 (chi-squared) distribution where the degrees of freedom are 
equal to the number of restrictions on the model (m). However, the Wald 
test takes on F-distribution with (m, T − k) degrees of freedom. Brooks 
(2008) notes that the results are usually not different from each other in 
the real large samples (i.e. when sample size increases towards infinity); 
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however some differences might be found between the two if small 
samples are used. For this purpose, as mentioned in the fifth chapter of 
the study, LM test statistics is employed. More specifically, we ca carried 
out tests for autocorrelation LM test on both models. After normality test 
on the residuals88, the white heteroskedasticity test89 was also analysed. 
However, prior to the tests, it is worth noting that important steps below 
were taken to enhance the results of the models. 
 
A number of procedures were applied to ensure the model is free from 
mis-specification by examining some diagnostic tests at different stages of 
building and estimating the model (i.e. before and after). The process 
involved subjecting all the variables to unit root tests (see section 6.4.1 of 
Chapter 6 for more details). Two stationarity tests (for parametric and 
non-parametric) are applied on the series after the results of the 
descriptive statistics revealed that the datasets were not normally 
distributed (see section 6.3 of Chapter 6). Augmented Dickey Fuller tests 
for the parametric and Philips Perron for the non-parametric were carried 
out but no significant difference between the two sets of results at both 
level and first difference.  
 
Furthermore, cointegration test was carried out based on Johansen (1988) 
system cointegration where both Trace and Max Eigen statistics were 
considered for choosing the number of cointegrating equations. Also, due 
to sensitivity of VAR estimates to included lag, appropriate lag selection 
procedures were applied and followed by a check based on inverse roots of 
                                                          
88 As part of the description of the data for modelling processes, effort is made in Chapter 6 
to analyse the descriptive statistics and properties which includes the graphical pattern, 
histogram and normality assumptions, on the raw data. In this part of diagnostics, we 
revisit the normality tests but this time around on the residuals to view evidence of any 
normal distribution in the residuals and including the Jarque-Bera statistics. In this case, it 
is assumed a normally distributed row data or residuals should be bell-shaped when 
presented in histogram. Second, the Jarque-Bera statistics are not expected to be any 
significant.  
 
89 As part of effort to minimise or remove the heteroscedasticity, there is need for the data 
to be rescaled for the potential extreme values to be “pulled in” (Brooks, 2008). This was 
achieved where the raw data were transformed by considering their natural logs. In this 
research, all the variables were transformed to their natural logs except for the dummies as 
“logarithms of a variable cannot be taken in situations where the variable can take on zero 
or negative values, for the log will not be defined in such cases” (Brooks, 2008: 138).  
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AR characteristic polynomial to ensure that the VAR has satisfied the 
stability condition. 
   
On the basis of the generated R-squared90 (R2), the degree of variability 
for the two models can be viewed and analysed to obtain evidence about 
thefitness of the model. Starting with the first model, each of the equations 
in the model has its corresponding R-squared as shown in table 7.4. Each 
of the dependent variables namely: LOPR (logged values of the oil price), 
LOPQ (logged values of OPEC production quota), and LOPC (logged values 
of OPEC production cheating), and LOSC (logged values of OPEC spare 
capacity) have the corresponding R-squared as 0.972481, 0.917363, 
0.762502, and 0.918587 respectively. They showed high R2 which is 
additional indication of evidence for the fitness of the model. Consistent 
with the results from the first model, the second model showed R-squared 
of 0.974319, 0.919912, 0.769023, 0.926232, 0.877056, 0.658552, and 
0.961400 for LOPR, LOPQ, LOPC, LOSC, LOMC, LOOC, and LOOS 
respectively. These results are impressive in terms of the high R-squared 
they produced couple with low standard errors as can be observed from 
both model outputs in tables 7.2 and 7.9.  
 
Furthermore, the diagnostic tests were carried out on the residuals in order 
to obtain further evidence about the models. Part of the diagnostic 
procedures involved evaluation of serial autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, and normality tests for the residuals. The results of the 
diagnostic tests for the two models are discussed under sub-sections 7.5.1 
and 7.5.2. However, detailed figures of the tests are presented in Appendix 
XV through Appendix XXIV. The results showed evidence of non-normality 
for the residuals in line with the initial findings in Chapter 6 under 
normality test. The LM serial correlation tests showed not much correlation 
to worry about regarding the two models.    
 
 
                                                          
90 R-squared (otherwise known as coefficient of multiple determination) is a statistical 
measurement of closeness of data to the fitted regression line. It explains the percentage of 
variability of the response data in relation to its mean based on the computed model.  
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7.5.1 First Model Diagnostics 
As mentioned earlier, various tests for lag length selection were carried out 
to ensure that the estimated VAR is stable at the selected lag. VAR has 
been estimated in the first instance for such analysis on the basis of which 
the appropriate lag was computed and applied in estimating the VAR 
output produced in table 7.2. Having computed the model in this category 
based on the recommended VAR lag, some improvements were observed 
on the R-squared, standard errors, and the VAR coefficients. Prior to the 
above tests, the variables were subjected to normality tests based on their 
logged as recommended by Brooks (2008) but were mostly found to be not 
normally distributed. In addition, logging the variables often minimises or 
removes the heteroskedastity as argued by Brooks (2008). However, the 
residuals were also subjected to various tests. Full graphical picture of the 
residuals are produced in appendix XV. The LM serial correlation test shows 
averagely good results as most of the null hypotheses of serial correlation 
were rejected at 5% level of significance for most of the lags (see appendix 
XVI). The results therefore confirm the absence of problem for missing 
variables as earlier established from the descriptive analysis in Chapter 6. 
Also for test of heteroskesdacity (see Appendix XVIII), nearly 50% of the 
null hypotheses were rejected implying no residual heteroskesdasticity. For 
the normality tests, the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are presented 
in appendix XIX. However, we fail to reject in any case the null 
hypotheses. 
7.5.2 Second Model Diagnostics 
This analysis begins with the normality tests on the residuals by applying 
three different tests of Skewness, Kurtosis, and Jarque-Bera. The null 
hypothesis states that the residuals are normally distributed which is 
rejected at 5% level of significance. The results are presented in appendix 
XXIII. Further tests for LM serial correlation reveal some good results (see 
Appendix XXII). In this regard, the p-values above 5% render confirmation 
for accepting null hypothesis there is no serial correlation. For the most of 
the LM-Stats, the p-values are beyond 5% acceptance level except only for 
the 1st, 5th, 6th, the 12th lags. On the overall, we can conclude that there is 
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no much to worry about on the serial correlation. Similarly, the most of the 
results from the residual heteroskedasticity are fairly ok as revealed in 
appendix XXIV. 
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the data based on two vector autoregressive models 
with a view to answering two main research questions as stated in section 
1.4 of Chapter 1. For each of the research questions, Granger causality 
tests, impulse response functions, and forecast error variance 
decompositions were computed based on the estimated VAR coefficients 
results. In view of the fact that VAR property tests carried out in Chapter 6 
revealed some interesting findings, attention was given to carry out some 
diagnostic tests on the model error terms to minimise any risk of model 
misspecifications (Brooks, 2008). Although the results disclosed very 
interesting dynamics between OPEC and non-OPEC players, evidence 
suggests that OPEC had taken various degrees of actions which aimed at 
oil price stability within a target price band. On the basis of impulse 
response functions, it responded positively to oil price shocks for 
reasonable period aiming to reduce the shocks over time. The main 
rationale for OPEC taking such an action was to bring down oil prices so 
that it would not lose demand from mainly the OECD/IEA nations who 
could redirect investments for alternative energy sources such as fracking, 
renewables and nuclear.  OPEC cheating also responded positively to the 
shocks in oil prices. This result indicates how weak OPEC is in coordinating 
its members to achieve its objective of oil price stability. Further evidence 
suggests that OPEC spare capacity was affected by many factors including 
war in Iraq and global economic recession. These exogenous events have 
also affected OPEC’s ability in many other ways. More concisely, the next 
paragraphs present summary of key findings of the chapter based on the 
above analysis. 
 
a. OPEC responded positively to shocks in oil prices by increasing its 
production quota with the intention of bringing oil prices back within the 
target price band. OPEC’s reaction to the shock was to increase its 
production quota however the evidence from the analysis shows that this 
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did not strongly Granger cause changes in oil prices. This implies that 
changes in OPEC production quota might not be a key factor in causing 
changes to oil prices. However, changes in the OPEC allocation of 
production quota accounted for less than 5% of the variation in oil price in 
the first five periods and less than 10% in the subsequent periods 
considered. It was found that OPEC production quota was Granger caused 
by changes in oil prices (significant at 1% level). This further evidence 
implies that OPEC had responded to changes in oil prices by an upward 
review of its quota to suit the market needs as often documented in its 
monthly oil market reports and also reiterated by its officials. This finding 
supports the view that OPEC could not have acted as an effective cartel 
over the last decade because of the relatively small change in oil price 
resulting from the OPEC action. Similarly, it is found that changes to OPEC 
production quota was Granger caused by the changes in OPEC spare 
capacity. This implies that the volume of OPEC production quota is 
dependent upon the existing members’ crude oil excess capacity. Spare 
capacity of OPEC has, arguably, been hindered by many factors. For 
example, the U.S. led invasion/war in Iraq, Libya, and political sanctions 
on Iran as OPEC’s major reserve holders next to Saudi Arabia clearly 
affected OPEC’s access to oil reserves. However, the analysis showed that 
OPEC production cheating did not Granger cause changes in OPEC 
production quota at a statistically significant level. This implies that 
cheating behaviour of OPEC members does not necessarily partly 
determine the basis for setting OPEC’s production quota. 
 
b. OPEC production cheating responded to the shocks in the oil price in 
a slightly different way. It initially responded positively in the first three 
periods of the entire periods considered in the impulse response function 
but changed to respond negatively in the remaining nine periods. This is 
connected with the effect of reduced spare capacity during the periods. 
This is because when the spare capacity began to rise towards the positive 
region in the subsequent periods, OPEC cheating also became sensitive to 
that change over such periods. Despite this response, there was no 
significant evidence that OPEC cheating Granger caused changes to oil 
prices. Similarly, further evidence supported this position that less than 
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3% of the variation in the oil price was due to the changes in production 
cheating behaviour in OPEC. There is significant statistical evidence that 
OPEC production cheating was Granger caused by the amount of available 
spare capacity. This empirical finding lends support to opinions of some oil 
market analysts and commentators that high crude oil spare capacity often 
generates high cheating behaviour in OPEC (see Abraham, 2000). This is 
consistent with the positive response of OPEC cheating to the shock in 
OPEC crude oil spare capacity as noted by the impulse response functions 
in figure 7.14. Also evidence based on joint probability level (at 1%) 
implies that the entire OPEC policies and oil prices Granger caused changes 
in OPEC cheating behaviour. This implies that changes to: the allocation of 
OPEC production quota; OPEC spare capacity; and oil prices could cause 
changes in cheating by OPEC members. 
 
c. OPEC crude oil spare capacity responded negatively to the shocks in 
oil prices. There is insufficient evidence to believe that such negative 
response was deliberate. Initial evidence showed that pressure from OPEC 
cheating played an important role in shrinking the spare capacity. Increase 
in positive response for cheating and for allocation of OPEC production 
quota should be capable in reducing oil prices significantly if OPEC 
operated as an effective cartel.  Although it has been argued in the 
literature that investments in new capacity and high costs of maintaining 
such stocks/capacity have been responsible for the negative relationship, 
IEA in general and the U.S. in particular often capitalised upon this low 
capacity for any short-term projections of future high oil prices. It was also 
found that oil prices were not significantly Granger caused by changes in 
OPEC spare capacity. Further to this evidence, changes in the spare 
capacity contributed to less than 1% of the variation in the oil prices. 
There is evidence that OPEC’s policies and the oil price Granger caused 
OPEC spare capacity individually and jointly. This might imply that 
although OPEC spare capacity might not influence high oil prices directly, 
the speculation surrounding such a situation might be critical as often 
noted by key energy consumers (e.g. IEA).  
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d. Given the above finding that OPEC’s coordinated policies could 
exercise significant influence on high oil prices, oil prices for the year 2013 
were forecast and compared with the actual results (as part of the out-of-
sample test) to investigate how accurate OPEC’s coordinated policies might 
predict oil prices. This is based on the general assumption that such 
policies could be controlled by OPEC leadership to a significant degree. On 
the bases of the OPEC stabilisation policies, oil prices should have been 
maintained within a band of $73.96-$96.87 (near the implied oil price band 
of $80 - $90) as against $88-$109 that actually prevailed. In the periods 
(i.e. month five to month twelve) when the actual oil prices exceeded $95 
per barrel, OPEC’s policies were predicted to have maintained oil prices 
within a band of between $73.96 and $85.51. This finding implies that 
while OPEC does take coordinated actions to stabilise oil prices within a 
target price range, the market power to stabilise the prices at such desired 
level might be unrealistically outside the control of the organisation. This 
finding lends support to Khan (2009) who concluded that oil prices in 2008 
should have been within the range of $80-$90 as against $147 in the 
absence of the market speculation. 
 
i. In the second model where the actions of other key market players 
were introduced into the system, almost similar responses from OPEC 
stabilisation policies were observed. Slight changes in the response of 
OPEC policies could be attributed to the reaction to other policies. For 
example, forecast error variance decompositions have changed to 
presumably allow the most important factor to take lead position in 
accounting for the variation in oil prices. It was noted that the effects of 
the actions of the newly introduced players into the market system on the 
oil prices have contributed in understanding some of the key answers that 
were not available in the first model. More specifically, the following points 
were found pertinent: 
 
a. Non-OPEC production policies responded negatively to the shocks in 
the oil prices during the four periods in the entire twelve periods 
considered. In the remaining eight periods, non-OPEC production policy 
began to respond positively. Despite the fact that this group satisfy nearly 
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60% of the global oil demand and that there has been an apparent shift in 
the balance of power from the OPEC to non-OPEC producers based on 
developments in the new reserves (e.g. Canadian sand oil reserves and 
Norway’s new oil reserves), their response to the initial shock in oil prices 
remains a debatable issue. This conclusion is based on the premise that 
non-OPEC producers appear to have had the capacity to respond positively 
to reduce oil prices during all 12 periods but failed to do so. This shows 
that the response of OPEC to the shocks in the oil prices appeared to be 
much higher than that of non-OPEC. One possible reason for this situation 
might be that OPEC possesses more reserves than the non-OPEC 
producers as claimed by OPEC (i.e. nearly 80% based on the Annual 
Statistical Bulletin, 2013). The important implication of this finding is that 
OPEC stabilisation policies might be rendered ineffective without support of 
the non-OPEC producers. If this is true then the responsibility for stable oil 
prices must be shared between OPEC and OPEC producers for meaningful 
stability of prices to be achieved. Also further evidence was found that 
non-OPEC production policy significantly Granger caused changes in the oil 
prices (i.e. 5% p.value). When all factors were considered in the forecast 
error variance decomposition of oil prices, non-OPEC production policy 
accounted for the highest variation in the oil prices (i.e. up to nearly 12% 
in the 12th period). 
 
b. OECD/IEA crude oil consumption policy responded negatively to the 
oil price shocks in the initial periods (i.e. up to first eight periods) of oil 
price shock as expected under normal circumstances. Subsequently, the 
response became positive in the remaining four of the periods considered. 
This implies that, in the initial period of the shock, reduction in the 
OECD/IEA consumption due to high oil prices should be expected to bring 
prices down. This helps explain why less than 2% of the variation in the oil 
prices was accounted for by the changes in the OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption policy in each of the initial six periods. In the remaining six 
periods, the consumption policy accounted for only less than 3% in each of 
the periods. Also, there was no significant evidence that OECD/IEA crude 
oil consumption Granger caused changes to the oil prices. Although, 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption had declined over the sample period in 
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this study, it did not seem to produce any substantial impact on oil prices. 
This could be due to intervention of other consumers (such as China, India, 
Brazil) to consume what had not been fully consumed by OECD/IEA. This 
finding is consistent with that of Gallo et al. (2010) who also employed 
Granger causality and VAR for their analysis of supply-demand dynamics. 
OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling policy also responded to the shock in the oil 
prices in almost similar pattern to the OECD/IEA crude oil consumption 
policy. However, it accounted for less than 2% of the variation in the oil 
prices in the first four periods. Thereafter the increase did not exceed 
2.5% in each of the subsequent periods. Similarly, OECD/IEA crude oil 
stockpiling policy did not produce any significant evidence in Granger 
causing changes to oil prices. The main point of contention in this regard is 
similar to that in OPEC spare capacity. Although, there was insufficient 
evidence to linky this policy with high oil prices, it might be implied that 
speculation around the variable might be a basis for high oil prices.  
 
ii. The study documented evidence that changes in the non-OPEC and 
OECD/IEA policies influenced OPEC stabilisation policies in different ways 
which might affect oil prices indirectly. Despite the introduction of the 
actions of the new players into the market system, the following findings 
are noted. 
 
a. Evidence was established that oil prices and OPEC crude oil spare 
capacity Granger caused changes in OPEC production quota. It was also 
found that OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling policy was significant in Granger 
causing changes in OPEC production quota. This might imply that OPEC’s 
quota allocation could be altered when OPEC perceived that OECD/IEA is 
engaged in stockpiling rather than regular consumption. Evidence was also 
found that non-OPEC production policy responded positively to the shock in 
OPEC production quota in the early periods considered but gradually 
reduced and became negative as the periods increased. This implies that 
OPEC might have more reserves than the non-OPEC and that competition 
with OPEC in this regard might not seem economically viable presumably 
due to the low production costs in OPEC nations. Where the response of 
non-OPEC countries could be related to the claim of a shift in the balance 
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of power, this evidence might support the view that non-OPEC producers 
could have engaged in an action to promote high oil prices. This position 
was supported by evidence from the forecast variance decompositions.  
 
As expected, both OECD/IEA crude oil consumption and stockpiling 
responded positively to the shock in the OPEC production quota in the 
initial stage of the shock before turning negative in the subsequent 
periods. While the positive response remained longer for the consumption 
policy, it was found to be very short for the stockpiling policy. This 
evidence is consistent with the theory that when OPEC released more oil 
than it might have currently supplied to the market, OECD/IEA 
consumption is likely to be high. This might happen because OECD/IEA 
stockpiling policy did not place any maximum limit on oil consumption that 
could be maintained. Similarly, the positive response of OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption to the initial shock in the OPEC production quota might imply 
that OECD/IEA might respond positively to the shock even when the 
concern was to make up the shortfall created in the past. This might be 
justifiable considering OPEC’s oil is a cheaper option than alternative 
sources. Oil prices, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and OPEC spare 
capacity were the major variables accounting for variation in OPEC 
production quota based on the variance decomposition analysis. 
 
b. Furthermore, there was insufficient evidence that OPEC production 
cheating was Granger caused by any of the newly introduced variables in 
the second model. However, there was evidence that non-OPEC production 
policy responded negatively to the shocks in OPEC production cheating in 
the initial periods but the response turned positive in the later periods. This 
could imply that, given low extraction costs of OPEC oil, competition from 
non-OPEC was often low if the cheating in OPEC was high. Alternatively, it 
could imply low availability of reserves and capacities in the non-OPEC 
nations. However, for the consumers (i.e. OECD/IEA), both consumption 
and stockpiling responded positively to the shocks in OPEC production 
cheating. This clearly implies that OECD/IEA members increased their 
consumption and stockpiling behaviour when OPEC cheating became high. 
This could possibly be part of a strategy to reduce the impact of any future 
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oil price increase. Further evidence on the variation in the OPEC production 
cheating showed how important OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and OPEC 
spare capacity were in promoting cheating in OPEC. This supported ealier 
findings that most of the oil consumption during increase in OPEC 
production cheating was being stockpiled rather than going regular 
consumption in the OECD/IEA nations. This action might increase pressure 
on the production cheating in OPEC and more pressure on OPEC crude oil 
spare capacity could be expected.  
 
c. As noted in the previous findings, a clear connection from OPEC 
production quota and cheating to OPEC spare capacity was established. 
More specifically, the findings above were reinforced by analysing response 
of the three variables to the shocks in the OPEC spare capacity. Non-OPEC 
responded positively to the shocks in the spare capacity throughout the 
periods considered. Similarly, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling responded 
positively to the shocks in spare capacity. However, the OECD/IEA crude 
oil consumption responded negatively to the shocks in spare capacity. 
Evidence from the variance decomposition further confirmed that apart 
from the spare capacity itself, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling and oil prices 
appeared to be most important variables accounting for variation in OPEC 
spare capacity with up to nearly 22% in the last period for each variable.  
 
It was also found that there existed a wide discrepancy between 
disclosures about OPEC reserves and oil supply in the oil market. While 
disclosure by BP and OPEC were nearly identical, with only immaterial 
differences, the U.S.-EIA’s disclosure was hugely different in most of the 
periods compared to the two mentioned databases (i.e. OPEC and BP). In 
the same direction, OPEC crude oil supply to the oil market was under-
reported by the U.S.-EIA compared with the IEA counterpart. This finding 
is consistent with Sornette et al. (2009). These variations might have 
promoted speculation based on potentially wrong/biased market analysis 
and often propagated by the media (see Koomey et al., 2002). For 
example, analysis using different datasets might potentially show different 
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results as suggested by the findings from the summary statistics in 
Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
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Chapter Eight Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.1 Conclusion and Original Contributions to Knowledge 
This study has extended the VAR methodology by applying Granger 
causality, VAR impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decompositions to describe the complex dynamics between various players 
with diverse objectives in the oil markets. The evidence obtained is 
consistent with OPEC not being an effective cartel for controlling oil prices. 
This finding is an important contribution to the OPEC and oil price literature 
and is consistent with the elements of the prior literature which have been 
quoted previously (see Kepplinger and Roth, 1979; Botcheva and Martin, 
2001; Bentzen, 2007; Reynolds and Pippenger, 2010; Cairns and 
Calfucura, 2012; Colgan, 2014).  
The study has presented evidence that tensions between the 
implementation of the competing policies of IEA/OECD members and other 
non-OPEC producers may have neutralised the apparent power over oil 
prices that OPEC has allegedly had. On reflection I have formed the view 
that whilst this modelling analysis has made inroads into settling the OPEC 
cartel issue, it has also revealed the depth of complexity existing in the 
real world environment that helps determine oil prices. Human behaviour 
based on personal gain or on national interests interacts with basic 
economic issues relating to supply and demand. This research may well 
have raised many more issues requiring research than the ones it has 
solved. But since oil and gas energy access is central to most companies’ 
economies I find this insight also to be a significant finding. It opens the 
door for future research. 
I have also reflected on the reasons why most observers of OPEC 
behaviour have concluded that OPEC is an effective cartel. In essence, the 
anser is simple: OPEC has acted as if it were a cartel which could actually 
control oil prices; that was why it formulated an oil price band policy. The 
analysis in this thesis shows that OPEC was wrong to have held that belief. 
I further believe that the analysis presented calls into question the 
transparency and effective passing of information between countries which 
have signed up to the principles of the Joint Organisations Data Initiative 
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Therefore, a need to introduce a mandatory disclosure framework for 
information providers is a crucial step towards enhancing transparency of 
the market which Joint Organisations Data Initiative members generally 
believed could reduce the risk premiums arising from speculative activities 
in the oil markets.  
My conclusion is that the VAR methodology is applicable for producing 
research that is useful for market regulators and accounting standard 
setters; this result arguably has significant economic and political 
consequences.  This innovative contribution to the research methodology 
by utilising VAR impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decompositions enables regulators to better understand the political, social 
and economic interaction between key players in the oil markets, thereby 
increasing chances of policy embracement by all parties. Hence this can 
result in establishing optimal solutions to issues that otherwise might 
present intractable difficulties.  
8.2 Policy Implications 
OPEC has failed to control oil prices within its target band policy set by the 
organisation in the year 2000. In view of this failure OPEC needs to be 
more proactive in engaging publically about its objectives and actions 
taken to achieve those objectives. 
Consistently, evidence suggests that further actions need to be carried out 
by regulatory bodies on the data/information disclosure to international oil 
markets. Unless this important issue is well addressed, descrepancies in 
the information supplied by other players about OPEC and the information 
supplied by OPEC about itself would continue to promote speculative 
activities that could lead to higher oil prices. OPEC in this regard would 
need to do more to restore confidence in the quality of data it provides to 
the market. 
8.3 Limitations of the Study  
The study was based on analysis of historic data and any limitations 
inherent in the data are thus also a limitation of this research. Attempts 
were made to cross-check data sets and in this way any limitation due to 
inaccuracy of data has been minimised. The econometric analysis revealed 
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interesting outcomes; however there are limitations in interpreting these 
results. Although the explanations given are logical there may be other 
interpretations that are equally valid. Overcoming this limitation will be the 
subject of future research.   
In retrospect, the study could perhaps have provided more detailed 
dynamics if panel data models had been used to explore the specific 
actions of some core nations in oil consuming and producing nations (for 
example Saudi Arabia (in OPEC) or the U.S. (in OECD/IEA) respectively). 
The model has limitations relating to its failure to capture the effect of 
important geo-political events. This reflects the approach taken was not 
primarily an events study approach. But, on reflection, some exoginous 
events such as the Syrian war had the potential to promote speculative 
activities around actions of the market players. Subsequent studies could 
improve the model’s prediction by capturing these exogenous events. 
The findings of the study may have been more persuasive if the 
interpretations of the findings based on the statistical models had been 
supplemented by some qualitative data. In view of the fact that some 
cointegration results were observed between variables, VEC models should 
have been estimated with a view to estimating long-term dynamics 
between the variables. This would have allowed this study to describe 
differences between short and long term dynamics in the variables. 
However, the main focus of this study is on the short-term dynamics which 
were adequately covered using unrestricted VAR. Extending the framework 
to examine the long-term dynamics would be an exciting area for further 
research. 
8.4 Future Research Opportunities 
As mentioned above my future research approach will adopt a more 
qualitative approach. Also a panel data approach will be applied to provide 
greater insight into the above findings. These methods will help overcome 
the limitations of VAR models. 
The study has considered the short-run dynamics of some key actors in the 
oil market. The findings showed evidence of cointegration between oil 
prices and other cointegrating variables in the vectors which imply the 
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existence of a long run relationship between oil prices and the 
cointegrating variables of interest. Applying vector error correction models 
(VECM) in future studies might reveal these long-run dynamics between 
variables and provide a possible comparison with the results obtained in 
this study.   
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Appendices 
Appendix I: (Analysis and Graphs Relating to Chapter 6: 
Descriptive and Time Series Properties Analysis) 
For ease of reading and to aid comprehension, the numbering 
system/pattern in this appendix will be as it would appear if it were 
appearing in the main body of the thesis. The results of the analysis are 
summarised in the actual Chapter 6 in the main body. The analysis and 
results in the summary justifies the model findings presented in Chapter 7.  
152 
 
Chapter Six Descriptive and Time Series Properties 
Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents data, descriptive statistics and other preliminary 
empirical analysis that helped inform the additional empirical investigation 
that is reported in Chapter 7. The chapter starts by presenting the data 
and descriptive statistics which assists in understanding the properties of 
the data and the appropriateness of the tools for modelling the data 
(Huisman, 2009; Saunders et al., 2012). The subsequent analysis helps to 
identify adjustments and inferences prior to constructing the final models. 
Moreover, the issue of normality of the distribution of the datasets does 
not necessarily pose any challenge at this stage because VAR models 
(unrestricted VAR and VECM) are not usually based upon normality of data 
(see Brooks, 2008).  
There are five sections in this chapter. The first section, deals with the 
summary descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation). In the 
second section, various tests are carried out to understand how normally 
distributed the series used in this study are before being subjected to the 
modelling process. Therefore, graphical and other forms of formal tests of 
normality are performed. Similarly, graphical representations of data are 
made in the third section to identify the pattern of the data and 
observations are noted on the need to explore beyond ordinary descriptive 
statistics in order to understand the properties of the series. The time 
series properties tests (including both parametric and non-parametric 
tests) together with cointegration tests are outlined in the fourth section. 
The fifth section concludes the chapter with particular reference to how the 
results obtained are specifically linked to the next stage of analysis. In the 
process of examining the pattern of the data, an exploration is made of the 
differences (where applicable) from different datasets with a view to 
establishing any potential implications on further analysis.  
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Datasets 
Descriptive analyses are provided in this section by exploring summary 
statistics with a view to describing the datasets and detecting any potential 
problems (such as inconsistencies, missing observations, outliers). 
Understanding and interpretation of the empirical analysis of data are 
enhanced when the natural pattern of the variables are well described. 
Descriptive statistics of the series obtained from the various databases (as 
discussed in Chapter 5) are summarised in tables 6.1 to 6.6 (i.e. summary 
statistics). Furthermore, two periods namely: official and implied oil price 
band periods, are identified and data in respect of each period and the 
entire sample period are analysed. Table 6.1 presents summary statistics 
for six variables (OPR [oil price], OPQ [OPEC production quota], OSC 
[OPEC spare capacity], OMC [Oil market competition], OOC [OECD/IEA 
crude oil consumption], and OOS [OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling]).   
Table 6:1: Summary Statistics for the Datasets [OPR, OPQ, OSC, 
OMC, OOC, and OOS] 
 OPR OPQ OSC OMC OOC OOS 
 Mean  59.95096  25.84942  2.652885  41.54854  48.41700 4.090288 
 Median  59.18000  25.30000  2.305000  41.72879  48.40466 4.133730 
 Maximum  133.8800  30.00000  6.830000  43.94868  52.81538 4.351867 
 Minimum  19.39000  21.07000  0.710000  39.15836  44.30346 3.734640 
 Std. Dev.  28.17862  2.403361  1.423432  0.988658  1.866524 0.160965 
 Skewness  0.384610  0.082526  0.655347 -0.627771 -0.013912 -0.390273 
 Kurtosis  2.166592  2.320392  2.716310  2.987292  2.293031 2.013430 
       
 Jarque-Bera  8.360742  3.179204  11.68961  10.24754  3.253762 10.28672 
 Probability  0.015293  0.204007  0.002895  0.005954  0.196542 0.005838 
       
 Sum  9352.350  4032.510  413.8500  6481.572  7553.052 638.0849 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  123075.4  895.3022  314.0548  151.5038  540.0065 4.016011 
       
 OBS  156  156  156  156  156 156 
Key 
OPR: Oil prices in U.S. dollar ($) 
OPQ: OPEC production quota in million barrels per day 
OSC: OPEC spare capacity in million barrels per day 
OMC: Oil market competition in million barrels per day 
OOC: OECD/IEA crude oil consumption in million barrels per day 
OOS: OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling in million barrels per day 
OBS: Observations 
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Table 6.1 presents the summary statistics for the entire series (except 
OPEC production cheating91 which receives further consideration in table 
6.2 below). The six series (variables) appearing in the first row of table 6.1 
are used for building the first and second models specified in Chapter 5 of 
this study. 156 observations are used for each of the series (representing 
monthly observations over a 13 year period [12 x13=156]). Over the 
entire sample period, it can be observed that the mean oil price is $59.95.  
This is similarto the median value of $59.18. The minimum and maximum 
values are however $19.39 and $133.88 respectively. The standard 
deviation of 28.18, as a measure of dispersion, shows how volatile the 
prices are from the average during the period (see Brorsen et al., 1989; 
Guidi et al., 2007). The skewness is a normality tool which assesses “the 
extent to which a frequency distribution is asymmetric” (Collis and Hussey, 
2009: 248). The standard for a normally distributed data should be “0” 
(Bai and Ng, 2005). From the results above, the skewness for the oil prices 
is positive at 0.3846, which shows that the series slightly skews to the 
right.  
Furthermore, the Kurtosis is another tool for measuring normality of a 
distribution which assesses “the extent to which frequency distribution is 
flatter or more peaked than a normal distribution” (Collis and Hussey, 
249). Theoretically, “0” is also assumed for a normally distributed dataset. 
The Kurtosis for the oil price distribution in table 6.1 is 2.1666 which 
indicates that oil price distribution might be flatter than normally 
distributed data. Similarly, the Jarque-Bera (JB) statistic is expected not to 
be significant at 5% for a series to be normally distributed. In this case, 
the result is 8.3607 which is significant at 5% (i.e. 0.0152) indicating that 
the series are not normally distributed based on the JB test. In this case, 
further tests based on graphical representation/properties (i.e. histogram, 
boxplots) are carried out to explore more details (which are considered in 
the later part of this chapter, see normality tests section). 
                                                          
91 OPEC production cheating (i.e. OPC) receives separate analysis due to the discrepancy 
discovered in the data sources between IEA and EIA. Therefore, their implications are 
highlighted for oil markets. 
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Similarly, it can be observed that the mean distribution of OPEC production 
quota is 25.84942 (i.e. in million barrels per day). It is not also different in 
absolute value from the median of 25.30 mb/d over the period of the 
sample. The minimum and maximum values stand at 21.07 mb/d and 
30.00 mb/d respectively. The standard deviation for the OPEC quota is 
2.403361. The indicators of normality (i.e. skewness, Jarque-Bera) show 
that this series appears to be normally distributed with skewness of 
0.082526 and Jarque-Bera statistic of 3.179204 which is not statistically 
significant at 5% (i.e. 0.204007).   
OPEC spare capacity has a mean of 2.65 million barrels per day (mb/d) 
which is quite different from the median at 2.30 mb/d. With a high 
skewness of 0.6553 and Jarque-Bera statistics of 11.6896 (and significant 
at 1% [e.g. 0.002]), it can be concluded that the series does not appear to 
be normally distributed.  
Oil market competition averages 41.5485 mb/d for mean, and 41.7288 
mbd for median. Relating the means for the OPQ and OMC, it can be 
observed that on average OPEC’s average market share is around 40% 
(i.e. 26 mb/d for OPEC over the total from both OPEC and non-OPEC [67 
mbd]). The minimum and maximum values are 39.1584 and 43.9487 
respectively. While OPEC quota’s percentage change from mean to 
maximum value is 16%, the same value for OMC is just 6%. This shows 
that there is more volatility in OPEC quota than is non-OPEC.  
Furthermore, the skewness (-0.6278) and Jarque-Bera statistics (10.2475) 
together with the probability value of 0.0060 also suggest that OMC series 
is skewed to the left and not normally distributed based on JB statistics. It 
can be observed that the mean of the distribution for OECD/IEA crude oil 
consumption, is 48.4170 mb/d slightly around same with the median value 
of 48.4047 mb/d. The mean value of OOC (i.e. 48.4170 mb/d) is over 70% 
of the global consumption based on average production from both OPEC 
and non-OPEC as summarised in table 6.1. The minimum and maximum 
values are 44.3035 mb/d and 52.8154 mb/d respectively. The skewness is 
slightly to the left (i.e. not far from “0” [-0.013912]), however, the 
Jacque-Bera statistic of 3.2538 is not significant at 5% (i.e. 0.1965). This 
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suggests strong closeness of the series to normality. In this regard, further 
evidence to normality is obtained based on the closeness of difference 
between mean average and median (i.e. 48.4170 mb/d and 48.4047 mb/d 
for mean and median respectively). Finally, the last column from table 6.1 
reveals the summary statistics for OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling. The 
mean and media are almost similar (i.e. at 4.09029 mb/d and 4.1337 
mb/d respectively). The minimum and maximum values are 3.7346 mb/d 
and 4.3519 mb/d respectively. The standard deviation is 0.1610 which 
comparably indicates low variability. The series is skewed to the left with a 
value of -0.0139 and JB statistics of 3.2538 which is not significant at 5%. 
All observations considered in table 6.1 showed no evidence of missing 
data, and this is important for the serial correlation test discussed in 
Chapter 5 for which analysis is considered in Chapter 7. 
The descriptive statistics for OPEC production cheating and OPEC oil supply 
are considered in table 6.2 based on two different databases namely: IEA 
and EIA as part of the robustness checks. It should be noted that EIA 
database is used based on section 5.5.2: definition of variables and 
measurement strategy. Analysing the discrepancies, if any, based on the 
two databases is crucial particularly when dealing with factors that 
influence oil prices from speculative activities (see Sornette, et al., 2009; 
Cifarelli and Paladino, 2010) and political motivation of oil market players 
(Mauro and Peri, 2011; Radetzki, 2012). Therefore, table 6.2 presents 
specifically OPEC production cheating and OPEC actual oil supply as 
reported by both organisations whose data are reputable sources for oil 
market analysis. 
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Table 6:2: Summary Statistics for OPEC Production Cheating and 
Opec Crude Oil Supply (EIA and IEA Data) 
 OPC-EIA OPC-IEA OSS-EIA OSS-IEA 
 Mean  7.556923  7.680769  33.40635  33.53019 
 Median  7.035000  7.555000  34.17500  34.12000 
 Maximum  11.37000  11.95000  37.20000  38.04000 
 Minimum  4.190000  3.910000  27.73000  27.21000 
 Std. Dev.  1.642911  1.672271  2.371312  2.789373 
 Skewness  0.592395  0.316012 -0.628740 -0.354761 
 Kurtosis  2.538024  2.624695  2.298752  2.181784 
     
 Jarque-Bera  10.51146  3.512005  13.47455  7.623830 
 Probability  0.005218  0.172734  0.001186  0.022106 
     
 Sum  1178.880  1198.200  5211.390  5230.710 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 418.3691  433.4559  871.5834  1205.994 
     
 Observations  156  156  156  156 
Key 
OPC-EIA: OPEC production cheating-Energy Information Administration 
mb/d 
OPC-IEA: OPEC production quota-International Energy Agency mb/d 
OSS-EIA: OPEC crude oil supply-Energy Information Administration mb/d 
OSS-IEA: OPEC crude oil supply-International Energy Agency mb/d 
 
It can be observed from table 6.2 that average OPEC production cheating 
for mean and median are quite different for both EIA and IEA. The mean 
for EIA is 7.5569 mb/d while that of IEA stands at 7.6808 mb/d. 
Furthermore, the medians are 7.0350 mb/d and 7.5550 mb/d for EIA and 
IEA respectively. The minimum and maximum values for EIA and IEA are 
4.1900/11.3700 (mb/d) and 3.9100/11.9500 (mb/d) respectively. 
However, a more interesting difference emerges from skewness and 
Jacque-Bera results. EIA data source shows that OPEC production is over 
skewed to the right (i.e. 0.5924), and with a high Jacque-Bera statistics of 
10.5115 which is significant at 1% (i.e. 0.0052). However, IEA data rather 
shows a skewness of 0.3160 which is much less than the one obtained 
from the EIA by almost a 100%. Also, the IEA indicates a Jacque-Bera 
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result of 3.5120 which does not appear to be significant at 5% (i.e. 
0.1727).  
In this regard, the entire period is divided into two namely: official and 
implied OPB periods with a view to comparing the sample by exploring 
similarities/variations in the periods. Table 6.3 presents summary statistics 
for the series, during the official OPB period, except OPC which is 
separately analysed in table 6.4. 
Table 6:3: Summary Statistics for All Datasets except OPC in 
Official OPB Sample Period 
 OPR OPQ OSC OMC OOC OOS 
 Mean  31.51806  24.06048  3.083065  40.84532  49.07922 3.916414 
 Median  29.63500  24.35000  2.885000  40.90240  49.07473 3.931343 
 Maximum  53.28000  27.00000  6.830000  42.66872  52.36961 4.085536 
 Minimum  19.39000  21.07000  0.710000  39.15836  46.32043 3.734640 
 Std. Dev.  7.246080  1.785227  1.717106  1.025707  1.366910 0.083378 
 Skewness  1.009403 -0.092131  0.345453  0.001607  0.301740 -0.323485 
 Kurtosis  3.882468  1.905790  2.044249  1.843002  2.746510 2.300136 
       
 Jarque-Bera  12.54034  3.180724  3.592930  3.458192  1.106815 2.346646 
 Probability  0.001892  0.203852  0.165884  0.177445  0.574987 0.309337 
       
 Sum  1954.120  1491.750  191.1500  2532.410  3042.911 242.8177 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 3202.846  194.4091  179.8557  64.17658  113.9750 0.424063 
       
 OBS  62  62  62  62  62 62 
Key 
OPR: Oil prices in U.S. dollar ($) 
OPQ: OPEC production quota in million barrels per day 
OSC: OPEC spare capacity in million barrels per day 
OMC: Oil market competition in million barrels per day 
OOC: OECD/IEA crude oil consumption in million barrels per day 
OOS: OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling in million barrels per day 
OBS: Observations 
 
From table 6.3, the mean average for the oil prices stands at $31.5181 
during the official OPB period. The median (i.e. $29.6350) however is 
different from the mean which indicates likelihood of non-normality of the 
series. The minimum and maximum values stand at $19.3900 and 
$53.2800 respectively. The standard deviation is $7.2461 compared with 
that of the entire sample period in table 6.1 (i.e. $28.1786). The series is 
skewed to the right (i.e. 1.0094) and has Jacque-Bera statistic of 12.5403 
which is strongly significant at 1% (i.e. 0.00189). This is also a further 
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indication that the series is not normally distributed. OPEC production 
quota has mean average of 24.0605 mb/d with median of 24.35 mb/d. The 
minimum and maximum values are 21.07 mb/d and 27 mb/d respectively. 
Standard deviation is 1.7852 mb/d compared with 2.4034 mb/d for the 
entire sample period. As stated earlier, the Jacque-Bera statistic is not 
significant even at the weakest form of 10% (i.e. 0.2034).  
OPEC spare capacity has a mean of 3.0831 mb/d for the sub sample period 
which is higher than that computed for the entire sample period (i.e. 
2.6528 mb/d) in table 6.1. The median is 2.885 mb/d, while the minimum 
and maximum values stand at 0.71 mb/d and 6.83 mb/d respectively. The 
standard deviation is 1.7171 mb/d indicating that variation in the sub-
period is much more than that of the entire period i.e. with standard 
deviation of 1.4234 mb/d as can be observed in the minimum-maximum 
values.  However, the Jarque-Bera indicates the series is normally 
distributed (i.e. not significant at even 10%) as shown by the probability 
value of 16.59%. Oil market competition has average mean of 40.8453 
mb/d and median of 40.9024 mb/d. Comparing the results with the entire 
period sample in table 6.1, it can be observed how static the oil market 
competition has been and improvement in the subsequent period which 
makes the entire sample period mean and median to be 41.5485 mb/d and 
41.7288 mb/d respectively. This low variation is confirmed by the 
minimum-maximum values and standard deviation computed at 39.1584 
mb/d - 42.6687 mb/d and 1.0257 mb/d respectively. On the basis of the 
Jarque-Bera statistic (3.4582) and probability level of 17.74%, it can be 
concluded that series is near to normality.  
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption has average mean and median of 
49.0792 mb/d and 49.0747 mb/d respectively and higher than the 
corresponding average mean and median for the entire sample period (i.e. 
48.4170 mb/d and 48.4047 mb/d respectively). This is consistent with 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption falling in the later sub- period. The 
minimum and maximum values are 46.3204 mb/d and 52.3696 mb/d 
respectively. The standard deviation for the sub-period is 1.3669. 
Consistent with the earlier statement, Jacque-Bera statistic (1.1068) and 
probability (57.50%) suggest that the series is close to normality. 
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Furthermore, OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling is analysed based on the 
figures in table 6.4. The mean and median averages stand at 3.9164 mb/d 
and 3.9313 mb/d respectively. The minimum and maximum values for the 
sub-period are 3.7346 mb/d and 4.0855 mb/d respectively. The standard 
deviation is very low at 0.0834 which confirms the low difference between 
the minimum and maximum values. It is slightly skewed to the left (i.e. -
0.3235) but Jacque-Bera statistic (2.3466) and probability (30.93%) 
indicate that the series is normally distributed. In the same manner, the 
summary statistics for OPEC production cheating and actual OPEC supply 
are computed and presented in table 6.4.  
Table 6:4: Summary Statistics for OPEC Production Cheating and 
OPEC Crude Oil Supply in Official OPB Period (IEA vs EIA Datasets) 
 OPC-IEA OPC-EIA OSS-EIA OSS-IEA 
 Mean  6.630323  6.915645  30.97613  30.69081 
 Median  6.445000  6.870000  30.84500  30.62000 
 Maximum  10.10000  10.23000  34.39000  34.29000 
 Minimum  3.910000  4.190000  27.73000  27.21000 
 Std. Dev.  1.329930  1.314163  1.717963  1.758491 
 Skewness  0.456429  0.356809  0.277805  0.195731 
 Kurtosis  3.275434  3.207659  2.251804  2.312807 
     
 Jarque-Bera  2.348698  1.426960  2.243620  1.615813 
 Probability  0.309020  0.489936  0.325690  0.445790 
     
 Sum  411.0800  428.7700  1920.520  1902.830 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 107.8916  105.3485  180.0353  188.6297 
     
 Observations  62  62  62  62 
Key 
OPC-EIA: OPEC production cheating-Energy Information Administration 
mb/d 
OPC-IEA: OPEC production quota-International Energy Agency mb/d 
OSS-EIA: OPEC crude oil supply-Energy Information Administration mb/d 
OSS-IEA: OPEC crude oil supply-International Energy Agency mb/d 
 
It can be observed from table 6.4 that the mean and median averages 
stand at 6.6303 mb/d and 6.4450 mb/d respectively for the IEA data. 
However, corresponding mean and median for the EIA data show 6.9156 
mb/d and 6.87 mb/d respectively. Unlike the statistics for the entire 
sample period, the sub-period Jacque-Bera results show that both IEA and 
EIA data are normally distributed with probability values of 30.90% and 
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48.99% respectively. For the OPEC oil supply from the EIA data, it can be 
observed that the average mean and median at 30.9761 mb/d and 
30.8450 mb/d respectively. The corresponding figures for the IEA data 
stand at 30.6908 mb/d and 30.62 mb/d respectively. However, since our 
primary intention revolves around understanding how OPEC stabilisation 
policies work, particularly during the official and implied OPB periods, table 
6.5 below presents the summary statistics for the implied OPB period 
except for the OPEC production cheating which is covered in table 6.5. 
Table 6:5: Summary Statistics for all Series Except OPC (Implied 
OPB Period) 
 OPR OPQ OSC OMC OOC OOS 
 Mean  78.70457  27.02936  2.369149  42.01236  47.98022  4.204970 
 Median  76.35500  27.50000  2.190000  41.96407  47.61101  4.198266 
 Maximum  133.8800  30.00000  4.570000  43.94868  52.81538  4.351867 
 Minimum  39.09000  24.85000  0.860000  39.99631  44.30346  4.018896 
 Std. Dev.  19.86251  1.998931  1.112771  0.626001  2.023809  0.071937 
 Skewness  0.442092  0.185711  0.386976  0.133348  0.263330 -0.011239 
 Kurtosis  3.018623  1.519385  1.889983  3.879665  2.065954  2.415524 
       
 Jarque-
Bera 
 3.063342  9.126524  7.171967  3.309337  4.503431  1.339960 
 Probability  0.216174  0.010428  0.027709  0.191155  0.105219  0.511719 
       
 Sum  7398.230  2540.760  222.7000  3949.162  4510.141  395.2672 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 36690.28  371.6024  115.1581  36.44453  380.9096  0.481267 
       
 OBS  94  94  94  94  94  94 
Key 
OPR: Oil prices in U.S. dollar ($) 
OPQ: OPEC production quota in million barrels per day 
OPC: OPEC production cheating 
OSC: OPEC spare capacity in million barrels per day 
OMC: Oil market competition in million barrels per day 
OOC: OECD/IEA crude oil consumption in million barrels per day 
OOS: OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling in million barrels per day 
OBS: Observations 
 
It can be observed from table 6.5 that for oil prices, the mean and median 
average are $78.7146 and $76.3550 respectively. It is clear that the 
averages during the implied OPB are much larger than the official OPB 
periods which stand at $31.52 and $29.64 for the mean and median 
respectively. This implies that during the implied OPB period average price 
exceeds that of official OPB by $47.19 (i.e. $78.71 - $31.52). The prices 
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are also more volatile in the implied OPB period with standard deviation of 
$19.8625 compared with official OPB which has standard deviation of 
$7.2461. The maximum value for the implied OPB period is $133.88 as 
against the $53.28 in the official OPB period. However, official OPB appears 
to be more skewed to the right (i.e. 1.0094) than the implied OPB period 
(o.4421), which together with the Jarque-Bera statistics (3.0633) and 
probability of 21.62% indicates the normality of the series for the implied 
OPB period. 
OPEC production quota in the implied OPB period (i.e. 27.0292 mb/d) is 
higher than official OPB period (i.e. 24.0605 mb/d). However the Jarque-
Bera statistics is significant at 1% which suggests that the series during 
the sub-period is not normally distributed. OPEC spare capacity during the 
implied OPB sub-period has mean and median average of 2.3692 mb/d and 
2.19 mb/d respectively. It also shows evidence that the series is not 
normally distributed as suggested by the Jarque-Bera statistics of 7.1720 
significant at 5% (0.0277). Oil market competition averages 42.0124 mb/d 
in mean, and 41.9641 mb/d in median. These figures are slightly higher 
than official OPB period which stand at 40.8453 mb/d and 40.9024 mb/d 
for corresponding mean and median respectively. This evidence shows that 
there is little difference between average means for both periods (i.e. 
41.9641 mb/d and 42.0124 mb/d for official and implied periods 
respectively). During this sub-period, the series appears to be normally 
distributed based on Jarque-Bera statistic of 3.3093 with probability of 
19.12%. 
Similarly, OECD/IEA crude oil consumption in the implied OPB period has 
mean average of 47.9802 mb/d which is less than 49.0792 mb/d in the 
official OPB period. The standard deviation in the implied OPB period is 
2.0238 mb/d. As in the official OPB period, the Jarque-Bera statistic is 
4.5034 which is not significant (i.e. 10.52%). For the same period, 
OECD/IEA crude oil stockpiling averages 4.2050 mb/d in mean and 4.1983 
mb/d in median. The standard deviation for the implied OPB period is 
0.07194 mb/d which is not greatly different from the official OPB period 
with 0.0834 mb/d. The series skews slightly to the left with skewness 
value at -0.0112. Jarque-Bera statistics is 1.3400 which is not significant 
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(i.e. probability value of 51.17%). This suggests that the crude oil 
stockpiling series is normally distributed. The difference between OPEC 
production cheating during the implied OPB period (in table 6.6) and that 
of the official OPB period are examined. 
 
  
Table 6:6: Summary Statistics for OPEC Production Cheating and 
OPEC Crude Oil Supply in Implied OPB Period (IEA and EIA 
Datasets) 
 OPC-IEA OPC-EIA OSS-EIA OSS-IEA 
 Mean  8.373617  7.979894  35.00926  35.40298 
 Median  8.120000  7.325000  34.90000  35.00000 
 Maximum  11.95000  11.37000  37.20000  38.04000 
 Minimum  5.800000  5.350000  33.33000  32.52000 
 Std. Dev.  1.509923  1.706115  0.949607  1.421131 
 Skewness  0.324274  0.490386  0.397774  0.374298 
 Kurtosis  2.322636  1.865076  2.507900  1.965488 
     
 Jarque-Bera  3.444462  8.812358  3.427321  6.386568 
 Probability  0.178667  0.012202  0.180205  0.041037 
     
 Sum  787.1200  750.1100  3290.870  3327.880 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 212.0276  270.7069  83.86305  187.8242 
     
 Observations  94  94  94  94 
Key 
OPC: OPEC production cheating 
OSS: OPEC crude oil supply 
OPC-EIA: OPEC production cheating-Energy Information Administration 
mb/d 
OPC-IEA: OPEC production quota-International Energy Agency mb/d 
OSS-EIA: OPEC crude oil supply-Energy Information Administration mb/d 
OSS-IEA: OPEC crude oil supply-International Energy Agency mb/d 
 
From table 6.6, it can be observed that the mean and median values for 
both IEA and EIA are quite different (i.e. IEA-mean [8.3736 mb/d] median 
[8.1200 mb/d] and EIA-mean [7.9799 mb/d] median [7.3250 mb/d]). This 
difference is an indication of non-normality of a distribution. Similarly, the 
Jarque-Bera statistics are different for the two data sources. For the IEA, 
OPEC production cheating in the implied OPB period indicates that the 
series is normally distributed with probability value of 17.87%. EIA data 
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shows results contrary to that of IEA with a significant value at 1%. While 
average EIA data on OPC appears to be higher than the IEA during the 
official OPB period, it can therefore be observed that in the implied OPB 
period, the average IEA data exceeds that of the EIA. Similarly for the 
OPEC actual supply, this shows EIA data source to be normally distributed 
based on JB statistics which is not significant (i.e. 18%) as against the IEA 
with JB statistics significant at 5%. 
Having examined the summary statistics of different series that made up 
the sample for this study, the graphical properties of the series are 
presented in figures 6.1 and 6.2. For this purpose, all the series are taken 
at the logged values in line with the reasons stated in Chapter 5 above. 
However, the raw data of the variables do not exhibit much physical 
difference with the logged values (although a few differences are found 
between the two sets of data) as shown in figure 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. 
Figure 6.1: Graphical Representation of the Monthly Series for the 
Full Sample (Unlogged Values) 
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OPQ: OPEC production quota  
OPC: OPEC production cheating 
OSC: OPEC spare capacity 
OOC: OECD crude oil consumption 
OMC: Oil market competition 
OOS: OECD crude oil stockpiling 
Horizontal axis stands for periods in years 
Vertical axis stands for the units of measurement (i.e. U.S. dollar for OPR, 
and million barrels per day for all other variables 
 
Figure 6.1 presents results based on the raw (i.e. unlogged) datasets. The 
sample period for each series starts from January, 2000 to December, 
2012 (indicating 156 observations). Based on the graphical representation 
of the series in seven panels of figure 6.1, it can be observed that there 
are various trends in the variables that will be of interest in terms of 
pattern and direction of the series in relation to others. These dynamics in 
particular are set to be explored using VAR models in Chapter 7. 
Furthermore, figure 6.2 shows graphical representation of series in seven 
panels but after being transformed to their logged values. 
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Figure 6.2: Graphical Representation of the Series for the Full 
Sample (Logged Values) 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
Horizontal axis stands for periods in years 
Vertical axis stands for unit of measurement for the logged values of the 
series 
 
Figure 6.2 presents seven panels, one for each series, over the entire 
sample period (i.e. January, 2000 to December, 2012). Comparing the two 
figures (i.e. 6.1 and 6.2), it can be observed that in few cases such as in 
the first panel of figure 6.1 (i.e. OPR) and the last panel (OOS), taking the 
variables at logged values has minimised, to some extent, the outliers that 
can be observed from the graphical results for unlogged values (presented 
in figure 6.1). 
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
LOPR
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
LOPQ
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
LOPC
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
LOSC
3.66
3.68
3.70
3.72
3.74
3.76
3.78
3.80
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
LOMC
3.76
3.80
3.84
3.88
3.92
3.96
4.00
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
LOOC
1.28
1.32
1.36
1.40
1.44
1.48
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
LOOS
167 
 
Furthermore, it can be observed from panel 1 of figures 6.1 and 6.2 that 
oil prices were comparably lower in the official OPB period (i.e. 2000 to 
2005). During same period, OPEC production quota was low at the 
beginning but rose up sharply in the subsequent two periods before falling 
in the end of second year. However, it can also be observed that, although 
the period showed low production quota, OPEC cheating in the 3rd panel 
increased sharply in the first period before falling at the end of the first 
year (i.e. 2000). It subsequently rose again in year 2 and 3 and later fell 
while OPEC production quota rose again at the end of the 3rd year. OPEC 
spare capacity appears to be at its peak during the period before it fell 
down sharply at the end year three. OPEC spare capacity was grossly 
weakened during the period which coincided with the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
(which happened to be one of the largest reserve holders after Saudi 
Arabia). The effect of the war still remains an important factor that might 
influence not only the capacity of OPEC, but also its production decisions. 
In this case, considering war as exogenous variable when estimating the 
model could yield important results and control based on the sharp 
changes that appeared in most variables which might be due to the war.   
Interestingly, oil market competition in panel 4 appeared to be very low at 
the beginning of the period (when oil prices were lower as shown in the 
previous analysis of the official OPB period), but continued to rise with the 
oil prices in the latter period of the official OPB regime. At the same time, 
OECD/IEA crude oil consumption seemed to be swinging within a specific 
range but the stockpiling behaviour was building up with the growing oil 
prices. One of the interesting questions that might be raised at this stage 
is: what would have promoted high oil prices during this period when OPEC 
production quota, OPEC production cheating and oil market competition 
were increasing to compensate for OECD/IEA consumption? While 
discussing this issue in the review, two important answers were raised. 
First, some literature attributed the escalation of prices to the sharp rise in 
oil demand from emerging economies such as China, India, Brasil (see 
Campolmi, 2007; Hayat and Narayan, 2011). Others (such as Cigarelli and 
Pladino, 2010) believed that speculative activities surrounding events such 
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as war in Iraq, and the build-up of U.S. strategic reserves, were mainly 
some explanatory factors.  
Furthermore, considering the regime of oil prices when implied OPB regime 
exists, it can be observed that oil prices are higher in the implied period 
than the official OPB period as mentioned earlier. Despite the fact that 
OPEC cheating was high from year 2009 to the early 2012 and also high 
spare capacity and oil market competition, oil prices remain higher than 
the implied OPB of $70 - $80 as suggested by Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev during the G8 meeting which received supports from OPEC 
officials (see for example Fattouh, and Allsopp, 2009). Consistent with the 
earlier question raised in the previous paragraph, it can also be argued 
that if market fundamentals were responsible for the sustained high oil 
prices, the decreased OECD/IEA crude oil consumption (see panel 6) which 
is backed up by increased non-OPEC reserves discoveries (see, Russell and 
Ibrahim, 2013) should have forced the oil prices low within a target band 
despite the increased demand from the emerging economies. Instead, 
what the market experienced was increasing stockpiling in the subsequent 
periods (see panel 7) despite the rising oil prices (see panel 1). For 
instance, the U.S. alone has, by the provision of its Energy Policy Act of 
2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-158), increased its stockpiling to towards the 1 
billion barrels per its SPR capacity; although the law authorises such 
behaviour only if it will not generate upward pressure on the oil prices (see 
Bamberger, 2010). As mentioned earlier, the normality tests are extended 
with sets of more formalised tests in an attempt to understand the 
category of the data for modelling which is important in the interpretation 
of the diagnostic results (which is discussed in Chapter 7). 
6.3 Normality Tests 
In the above descriptive analysis, attempt is made to test for some 
normality properties of the datasets. This subsection provides further tests 
to ascertain the position of our distribution as to normal (bell-curve) or 
leptokurtic (otherwise called ‘fat tailed risk’ is characterised with more 
peaked and thin curve than normally distributed observations)92. Kurtosis 
                                                          
92 See Fraser et al. (2001) for more details about Leptokurtic distribution. 
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is used and described as a measure to assess the size of the tails of the 
based on their probability distribution with a view to ascertaining the peak 
or fat tails. A number of arguments have been advanced challenging 
Kurtosis ability to provide sound information to measuring normality of a 
particular distribution (see Hammad, 2011). Similarly, the Jarque-Bera 
tests is another important tool for measuring normality of the distribution 
as noted above, although the test does not suggest further information as 
to whether a variable found to be Leptokurtic should be used or not (see 
Huisman, 2009, Hammad, 2011).   In this connection, studies (such as 
Lewis, 2005) recommend relaxing this assumption and employing 
Student’s-t distribution assumption to address the fat-tails in most 
financial series. In this regard, histograms and quartiles are presented for 
each of the variables in order to give an important picture of the 
distributions by having a view of most of the results in terms of skewness 
of the distributions and the nature of the tails as shown by the histograms 
and the quartiles respectively (see appendices I to XIV). 
Furthermore, visual representations of the series were made in figure 6.0 
using histograms likely to provide additional explanations about the 
frequency and randomness of the data (Huisman, 2009).  The wider the 
histograms the wider the uncertainties expected due to higher standard 
deviation. Low standard deviation coefficients indicate lower volatility and 
uncertainty which usually represent thinner histograms. The importance of 
skewness is to obtain relevant information relating to likelihood of results 
producing extreme events (positive and/or negative) from the sample 
data. Therefore a “0” skewness (skewness = 0) is an indication of a 
symmetric distribution of our sample data. Positive skewness is an 
indication that our sample carries large positive values relative to the 
negative ones (i.e. skewness > 0). The reverse is the case for negative 
skewness which indicates the likelihood of more negative values relative to 
the positive ones (i.e. skewness < 0). From appendices I to VII, 
histograms show that variables except LOPR, LOPC, LOMC, LOOS exhibit 
resemblance to normal distribution. Some scholars (such as Huisman, 
2009) believed that within the statistical context, that the JB test is rich as 
a standalone test on data for normality assumption. However, for the 
170 
 
purpose of this research, the analysis of the series is extended to consider 
the Boxplot to highlight other descriptive properties of the data. In this 
regard, figure 6.3 provides results of the Boxplot to explain fat-tails as 
earlier described. 
Figure 6.3: Boxplot for the Full Sample Dataset 
 
 
From figure 6.3, it can be observed that only two variables have their plots 
located at the centre, while all other exhibit evidence of flat tails.  
In order to enhance understanding of the dataset for empirical analysis, 
general grounds guiding statistical technique (whether parametric or non-
parametric) are applied to ascertain the nature of the distribution. Some 
robust models such as unrestricted VAR or VECM do not necessarily 
depend upon an assumption of normality but the error terms need to be 
normally distributed (see Brooks, 2008). It should be noted, however, that 
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normal distribution tests might help in describing the data. It will also 
guide in explaining diagnostics of a model in terms of input and output. A 
more important consideration in relation to empirical analysis with regards 
to normality of the distribution in more robust models (such as VAR) is 
“whether the error components in the abstract theoretical model for the 
test are independent and identically distributed normal random variables” 
(Totton and White, 2011:1). In this connection, Totton and White (2011) 
noted that paying attention to normality of the data and not the residuals 
might be a bit deceptive. 
6.4 Initial Empirical Analysis 
Having carried out the descriptive analysis, the graphical results suggest 
further analysis be carried out for the purpose of examining relationships 
(short run or long run). On this basis, unit root tests, cointegration tests, 
lag length selection criteria are carried out as part of the initial empirical 
analysis to estimate VAR. 
6.4.1 Stationarity/Unit Root Tests 
Having discussed the various patterns (based on descriptive statistics and 
normality tests) and forms of graphical representations of the series in 
figures 6.1 and 6.2 above, the need to carefully examine the variables for 
modelling purposes becomes essential at this juncture. Considering the 
trend in the panels, it might be difficult to capture the dynamics under the 
unit root assumption (see section 5.5.3.4 in Chapter 5). It can be observed 
that the variables might not have constant mean and variance for any 
meaningful future forecast to be carried out. In this connection, the 
variables were subjected to stationarity tests using both parametric and 
non-parametric methods as mentioned in the fifth chapter of this study. 
More specifically, stationarity tests were carried out using Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) under parametric assumption and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
tests under non-parametric assumption. The null hypothesis states that a 
particular series has a unit root present. The hypothesis is rejected at 5% 
level of significance. It should be noted that for the purpose of modelling, 
the logged values were considered in line with the reasons highlighted in 
Chapter 5. Furthermore, the tests were carried out at two different stages 
namely, intercept, and intercept & trend. More detailed summary of the 
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entire tests are presented in appendix XXV. Table 6.7 presents the ADF 
test on the full sample at both level and first difference with intercept.  
Table 6:7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests at Level and 
1st Difference (Full Sample) 
ADF Unit root test with intercept          
 Level 1st difference 
Variables t-Statistics Prob. t-Statistics Prob. 
LOPR -1.456096 0.5532 -9.535024 0.0000* 
LOPQ -1.901745 0.3309 -11.87369 0.0000* 
LOPC -3.512900 0.0089 -13.74155 0.0000* 
LOSC -2.484358 0.1213 -10.29674 0.0000* 
LOMC -2.275863 0.1811 -13.76482 0.0000* 
LOOC -2.970695 0.0400 -13.48131 0.0000* 
LOOS -1.991889 0.2902 -12.94143 0.0000* 
* indicates the probability level (which rejects the null hypothesis at 5% 
level of significance). 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
From table 6.7, the results indicate that all variables (except two – LOPC 
and LOOC) have the presence of unit root at level but become stationary 
after taking the first difference. In view of the fact that probability levels 
are greater than 5%, we fail to reject the hypothesis that each of the 
series has a unit root. For the other variables, the results are expected 
because first, LOPC is derived from the difference between OPEC’s actual 
production and its officially allocated quota for the given period.  There 
exists a high tendency for the mean of the series to evolve around zero 
equilibrium level. Also, for the LOOC, it can be observed from the graph 
that OECD/IEA consumption over the sample period fluctuates around a 
particular range due to the existing policy. However, all the variables 
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(including LOPC and LOOC) become stationary at first difference with 
strong probability levels (0.0000).  
Therefore, given the fact that ADF is a parametric test, similar tests using 
a non-parametric test were carried out (i.e. based on Philips Perron test) 
and presented in table 6.8. 
Table 6:8: Philips Perron Unit Root Tests at Level and 1st 
Difference (Full Sample) 
Philips Perron Unit root test with intercept          
 Level 1st difference 
Variables t-Statistics Prob. t-Statistics Prob. 
LOPR -1.475652 0.5434 -9.574391 0.0000* 
LOPQ -2.074605 0.2553 -11.88067 0.0000* 
LOPC -3.512900 0.0089 -14.96707 0.0000* 
LOSC -2.184315 0.2129 -10.20409 0.0000* 
LOMC -2.183271 0.2133 -14.06643 0.0000* 
LOOC -3.954558 0.0022 -13.13522 0.0001* 
LOOS -1.980740 0.2951 -12.94043 0.0000* 
* indicates the probability level (which rejects the null hypothesis at 5% 
level of significance). 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
It can be observed from table 6.8 that near similar results were obtained 
when a non-parametric Philips Perron test was applied on the series. In 
this regard, the trend and intercept are considered as indicated by table 
6.9. 
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Table 6:9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests at Level and 
1st Difference (Full Sample) 
ADF Unit root test with trend and intercept          
 Level 1st difference 
Variables t-Statistics Prob. t-Statistics Prob. 
LOPR -3.037166 0.1256 -9.503507 0.0000* 
LOPQ -2.326061 0.4171 -11.83686 0.0000* 
LOPC -3.717692 0.0240 -13.70890 0.0000* 
LOSC -2.456407 0.3494 -10.28237 0.0000* 
LOMC -3.644641 0.0293 -13.71906 0.0000* 
LOOC -3.755356 0.0216 -13.44839 0.0000* 
LOOS -2.522877 0.3168 -12.98932 0.0000* 
* indicates the probability level (which rejects the null hypothesis at 5% 
level of significance). 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
Considering the trend and intercept in the computation of the unit root 
test, table 6.9 presents results for all the series based on the full sample 
period using ADF test. In this connection, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis for four out of seven variables at a 95% confidence level. 
However, the null hypothesis at first difference for the entire variables is 
rejected which implies that the variables become stationary at first 
difference. Having established the stationarity of the series at first 
difference based on ADF test which is parametric, non-parametric (i.e. 
based on Philips Perron test) were carried out and the results are 
presented in table 6.10. 
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Table 6:10: Philips Perron Unit Root Tests at Level and 1st 
Difference (Full Sample) 
Philips Perron Unit root test with trend and intercept          
 Level 1st difference 
Variables t-Statistics Prob. t-Statistics Prob. 
LOPR -2.858232 0.1792 -9.543404 0.0000* 
LOPQ -2.552305 0.3029 -11.84434 0.0000* 
LOPC -3.699602 0.0252 -14.94390 0.0000* 
LOSC -2.144177 0.5168 -10.18582 0.0000* 
LOMC -3.483394 0.0447 -14.01406 0.0000* 
LOOC -5.293559 0.0001 -31.12573 0.0001* 
LOOS -2.783600 0.2056 -12.98932  0.0000* 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged values of oil price 
LOPQ: Logged values of OPEC production quota  
LOPC: Logged values of OPEC production cheating 
LOSC: Logged values of OPEC spare capacity 
LOOS: Logged values of OECD crude oil stockpiling 
LOOC: Logged values of OECD crude oil consumption 
LOMC: Logged values of oil market competition 
 
From table 6.10 it can be observed that near similar results to ADF are 
obtained by PP. In other words, the outcome for the same variables under 
ADF test are reinforced by the results obtained from the PP test in table 
6.11.  All the variables (except LOPC, LOMC, and LOOC) have unit root in 
log level with significance level of 5%. However, the entire seven variables 
become stationary after taking the first difference. 
Figure 6.4 presents seven panels for the seven series indicating based on 
the first difference with a view to observing the constant distance in mean 
and variance for modelling purpose.  
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Figure 6.4: 1st Difference of the Logged Values for the Full Sample 
 
Key: 
LOPR: Logged Values of Oil Prices 
LOPQ: Logged Values of OPEC Production Quota 
LOPC: Logged Values of OPEC Production Cheating 
LOSC: Logged Values of OPEC Spare Capacity 
LOMC: Logged Values of Oil Market Competition 
LOOC: Logged Values of OECD/IEA Crude Oil Consumption 
LOOS: Logged Values of OECD/IEA Crude Oil Stockpiling 
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Based on figure 6.4 above, it can be observed that the entire seven panels 
exhibited evidence of constant mean and variance when first differences 
were considered. This makes it much easier for the dynamics to be 
captured by VAR models. 
6.4.2 Cointegration Tests and Selection of Lag Length 
Having satisfied the important condition of stationarity test for VAR, 
cointegration tests were carried out to investigate the long run relationship 
between the variables. The effect of the cointegration results is that it 
could establish the need to estimate the vector error correction models 
(VECM) for the series where the long run dynamics in the series are of 
interest. As mentioned earlier, Johansen system cointegration is used for 
this study. The results of Johansen system cointegration tests are 
presented in tables 6. 11 through 6.14 based on the two models identified 
in Chapter 5.  The three exogenous variables (i.e. OPB, WAR and GER) are 
included in each of the models. For each of the two models, Trace and 
Max-Eigen statistics are analysed and reported.  
6.4.2.1 Cointegration Tests (First Model) 
Johansen cointegration test is carried out on the first model where four 
endogenous variables (namely: OPQ, OPC, OSC, and OPR) and three 
exogenous variables (i.e. OPB, WAR and GER) are computed and Trace and 
Max-Eigen statistics are presented in tables 6.11 and 6.12 respectively.  
Table 6:11: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.196313  72.64145  47.85613  0.0001 
At most 1 *  0.134981  39.64112  29.79707  0.0027 
At most 2 *  0.089894  17.74547  15.49471  0.0225 
At most 3  0.023056  3.522225  3.841466  0.0605 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
Table 6.11 presents the results of the Johansen system cointegration test 
for Trace statistics where the long run relationships for three cointegrating 
equations are established. The null hypothesis states that there is no 
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cointegrating equation at different stages (namely: none, at most 1, and at 
most 2) which is rejected at 5% level of significance. A similar decision can 
be reached based on excess of Trace statistics over the critical values for 
the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
From table 6.11 above, the hypothesised number of cointegrating 
equations for “none” is rejected at 5% and with the Trace statistics being 
greater than the critical values (i.e. 72.64 > 47.86).  Similarly, 
hypothesised “at most 1” and “at most 2” equations are cointegrated are 
also rejected at a 5% level. Also for both, the Trace stats are greater than 
the respective critical values (39.64 > 29.80 and 17.75 > 15.50 
respectively). Failure to reject the null hypothesis of hypothesised number 
of cointegrating equations of “at most 3”, a decision can therefore be taken 
based on the earlier stage significant at 5% level, and indicating that three 
equations are cointegrated.  
In addition to Trace statistics, table 6.12 below presents the Maximum- 
Eigenvalue which lends support to the Trace statistics in table 6.11 above 
but with slight difference in results. This is expected due to the 
conservative approach of Maximum-Eigenvalue over the trace statistics 
(see Bockem, 2004). 
Table 6:12: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
          
None *  0.196313  33.00033  27.58434  0.0091 
At most 1 *  0.134981  21.89565  21.13162  0.0390 
At most 2  0.089894  14.22324  14.26460  0.0507 
At most 3  0.023056  3.522225  3.841466  0.0605 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 
level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table 6.12 shows the Max-Eigen statistics are in agreement with Trace 
statistics. At 5% significant level, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected with the Max-Eigen statistics greater than the critical value (i.e. 
33.00 > 27.58). Hypothesised number of cointegrating equations “at most 
1” is rejected at 5% significance level and Max-Eigen statistics of 21.90 
greater than the critical value of 21.13. On the basis of 5% significance 
level decision criteria, the hypothesised number of cointegrating equations 
of “at most 2” cannot be rejected. Therefore, decision can be made at “at 
most 1” level suggesting two cointegrating equations.  
On the basis of tables 6.11 and 6.12, it can be concluded that at least 2 
cointegrating equations exist. The implication of the results for this study is 
that VECMs, which are effective in exploring the long-run dynamics, can be 
estimated. However, the fact that this study is much interested in the 
short-run relationships to explore the impact of OPEC’s stabilisation policies 
and the claim that OPEC acted as a signaller during the sample period (see 
Fattouh, 2012), VAR is considered more appropriate. In this regard, 
unrestricted VAR is considered superior to the restricted VECM in supplying 
the short run forecast variance (see Clements and Hendry, 1995; Hoffman 
and Rasche, 1996; Park and Ratti, 2008). Naka and Tufte (1997) also 
found that results from both unrestricted VARs and VECMs are almost 
identical over the short-run for impulse response analysis. In this regard, 
unrestricted VARs are employed in this study given their superiority in 
prediction over the VECM, where the interest of investigation is the short-
term dynamics (see Park and Ratti, 2008). 
6.4.2.2 Second Model (Cointegration Tests)  
Similarly, Johansen system cointegration tests for the second model are 
analysed in the same way the first model was analysed. In the second 
model, other series are introduced to adjust for the effects of the policies 
of other oil market players (i.e. competition from non-OPEC and crude oil 
consumption and stockpiling from the OECD/IEA).  Therefore, ten variables 
are considered for the test in total where seven are endogenous variables 
and three are exogenous variables. The Trace and Max-Eigen stats/results 
are summarised in tables 6.13 and 6.14 respectively. 
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Table 6:13: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
          
None *  0.323584  177.1443  125.6154  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.308345  118.1113  95.75366  0.0006 
At most 2  0.203541  62.44245  69.81889  0.1682 
At most 3  0.087711  28.07796  47.85613  0.8103 
At most 4  0.062462  14.21640  29.79707  0.8283 
At most 5  0.028998  4.477161  15.49471  0.8616 
At most 6  0.000223  0.033719  3.841466  0.8543 
          
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
The Trace statistics are presented in table 6.13 with recommendation for 2 
cointegrating equations. In this regard, the null hypothesis that there is no 
cointegrating equations at “none”, or “at most 1” stages is rejected. The 
Trace statistics also at both stages are greater than the corresponding 
critical values (177.14 > 125.62, and 118.11 > 95.75 respectively), 
confirming the decision taken earlier. Since decision cannot be made where 
the probability value is beyond the 5% criteria, then the more appropriate 
stage based on table 6.13 is “at most 1” level which interprets that 2 
cointegration equations exist. 
Similarly, table 6.14 presents the results of Max Eigen statistics. 
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Table 6:14: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
          
None *  0.323584  59.03304  46.23142  0.0014 
At most 1 *  0.308345  55.66881  40.07757  0.0004 
At most 2 *  0.203541  34.36448  33.87687  0.0437 
At most 3  0.087711  13.86156  27.58434  0.8321 
At most 4  0.062462  9.739238  21.13162  0.7687 
At most 5  0.028998  4.443442  14.26460  0.8098 
At most 6  0.000223  0.033719  3.841466  0.8543 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 
level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
From table 6.14, the null hypotheses of no cointegration, at “none”, “at 
most 1”, and “at most 2” cointegrating equations are rejected at 5% 
significance levels. The Max-Eigen statistics shows that at the three stages 
the corresponding Max-Eigen values are greater than the critical values 
(59.03 > 46.23; 55.67 > 40.08; 34.36 > 33.88 respectively). 
Interpretation similar to the one made under Trace statistics is found 
useful to conclude that three cointegrating equations are present based on 
the results.  
6.4.3 Lag Length Selection Criteria 
Having carried out the unit roots and cointegration tests in the previous 
sections, another critical stage in VAR model estimation is the 
determination of appropriate lags selection that will optimise the values of 
the estimates. Consequently, as mentioned in Chapter 5 of this study, the 
series were subjected to lag selection process tests based on five 
approaches (namely: Sequential modified LR test statistic, Final prediction 
error, Akaike information criterion, Schwarz information criterion, and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion). On this basis the roots of 
characteristic polynomial are viewed both in table and graph to confirm the 
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stability/stationarity of the VAR estimates. A separate VAR model is first 
estimated with a view to identifying various lag section criteria appropriate 
for the estimation of the final VAR models (i.e. 1st and 2nd models) from 
which the impulse response and variance decompositions are estimated in 
Chapter 7. In this regard, table 6.15 presents lag length selection criteria. 
 
Table 6:15: Lag Length Selection Criteria 
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0  223.7562 NA   6.12e-07 -2.955564 -2.792079 -2.889137 
1  766.5180  1040.913   4.50e-10*  -10.17148*  -9.681024*  -9.972196* 
2  781.5523  28.00917  4.56e-10 -10.15825 -9.340825 -9.826112 
3  793.8438  22.22562  4.80e-10 -10.10745 -8.963052 -9.642454 
4  807.3068  23.60632  4.99e-10 -10.07270 -8.601328 -9.474845 
5  815.3681  13.69328  5.58e-10 -9.963947 -8.165609 -9.233241 
6  830.2785  24.51022  5.70e-10 -9.949021 -7.823712 -9.085459 
7  847.6514  27.60616*  5.64e-10 -9.967827 -7.515547 -8.971410 
8  859.5208  18.21059  6.04e-10 -9.911243 -7.131993 -8.781970 
9  870.1125  15.66990  6.59e-10 -9.837157 -6.730936 -8.575028 
10  881.0766  15.62014  7.19e-10 -9.768172 -6.334981 -8.373188 
              
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
 
From table 6.15 above, the asterisk (*) indicates each of the selected 
criteria in relation to a given lag order. four criteria (namely: FPE, AIC, SC, 
and HQ) present results in support of “1” lag for estimating the final 1st 
VAR model for the purpose of analysis considered in Chapter 7. This finding 
is similar to similar to King et al. (2012). The four asterisks represent 80 
percent of the total criteria while “7” lag is recommended by LR criterion. 
Based on the results, the majority of the criteria to apply one lag for the 
VAR estimation are considered more appropriate and objective. In this 
connection, the roots of characteristic polynomial are analysed for the 
stationarity of the VAR based on table 6.16 and figure 6.5 below. 
 
 
 
183 
 
Table 6:16: Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
    
     Root Modulus 
    
 0.939652  0.939652 
 0.904805 - 
0.089715i 
 0.909242 
 0.904805 + 
0.089715i 
 0.909242 
 0.742019  0.742019 
    
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
  
 
From table 6.16, none of the roots is up to “1” in absolute value which 
indicates that the estimated VAR has satisfied the stability condition. This 
result can further be viewed using AR roots graph which confirms the 
results in table 6.16. 
 
Figure 6.5: Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
 
 
Figure 6.5 gives a graphical representation of results similar to those 
obtained in table 6.14. All the roots are located within the circle and all less 
than “1” which confirms that the estimated VAR with “1” lag has satisfied 
the stability condition. 
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Furthermore, a lag exclusion wald test was carried out to test the null 
hypothesis that inclusion of the selected lag (i.e. “1 lag” as recommended 
by the different criteria) is significant, and this is rejected on the basis of 
the p-values for each variable and for the joint variables as shown in table 
6.17 below.  
Table 6:17: VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests 
            
Chi-squared test statistics for lag exclusion:   
Numbers in [ ] are p-values    
      
      
 LOPC LOPQ LOPR LOSC Joint 
      
      
Lag 1  342.637  1886.85  4734.86  1840.04  12309.6 
 [ 0.0000] [ 0.0000] [ 0.0000] [ 0.0000] [ 0.0000] 
      
      
Df 5 5 5 5 25 
      
      
 
Based on table 6.17, it can be concluded that selection of one “1” lag is 
supported for individual variables and the joint ones. 
Furthermore, the results for the lag length selection criteria for the 2nd 
model are presented in the following table, 6.18.  
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Table 6:18: Lag Length Selection Criteria 
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0  1467.315 NA   6.45e-18 -19.71665 -19.14445 -19.48415 
1  2200.097  1355.143  5.53e-22 -29.08352  -27.50997*  -28.44415* 
2  2259.502  104.1621  4.83e-22 -29.22605 -26.65115 -28.17981 
3  2316.677  94.76980   4.38e-22* -29.33804 -25.76180 -27.88493 
4  2346.006  45.80151  5.89e-22 -29.06857 -24.49098 -27.20859 
5  2394.113  70.51398  6.22e-22 -29.05635 -23.47741 -26.78950 
6  2460.106  90.40021  5.25e-22 -29.28912 -22.70883 -26.61540 
7  2518.629   74.55692*  5.03e-22 -29.41957 -21.83794 -26.33898 
8  2573.329  64.44198  5.23e-22 -29.49766 -20.91469 -26.01020 
9  2627.590  58.72025  5.70e-22 -29.56973 -19.98540 -25.67539 
10  2680.755  52.43635  6.60e-22  -29.62678* -19.04110 -25.32557 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information 
criterion 
    
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
On the basis of the results presented in table 6.18, different positions are 
presented with SC and HQ agreeing on one lag as the best criterion to 
estimate the 2nd VAR model. At this stage the two criteria constitute the 
majority because all other criteria identified a single lag order not 
supported by any other. In this regard, further tests are carried out to 
ensure the stability of the VAR at the selected criterion (see table 6.19 and 
figure 6.6 below). 
Table 6:19: Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
 
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
 0.955552  0.955552 
 0.894720 - 0.084641i  0.898715 
 0.894720 + 0.084641i  0.898715 
 0.727663 - 0.074662i  0.731483 
 0.727663 + 0.074662i  0.731483 
 0.686296 - 0.082262i  0.691209 
 0.686296 + 0.082262i  0.691209 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Table 6.19 confirms the appropriateness of the lag selected for VAR 
estimation, given that no root is up to “1”. To find some supportive 
evidence for this test, figure 6.6 examines whether any of the roots lies 
outside the circle. 
Figure 6.6: Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
 
 
Figure 6.6 indicates that all the dots/roots are located within the circle 
confirming that the estimated var is stable at the selected lag (i.e. “1” lag) 
is appropriate. Therefore as mentioned in relation to the results noted in 
1st model, the 2nd model is to be estimated using “1” also. Exploring the lag 
exclusion tests (in table 6.20), it can be concluded that the null hypothesis 
that “1” lag should be excluded for the estimation, is rejected for each of 
the variables and also jointly.  
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Table 6:20: VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests 
         
         Chi-squared test statistics for lag 
exclusion:      
Numbers in [ ] are p-values       
         
         
 LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOC LOOS Joint 
         
         
Lag 1  1240.642  803.8628  355.3420  800.2103  467.4382  194.4840  852.0101  5498.034 
 
[ 
0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] 
[ 
0.000000] [ 0.000000] 
         
         
Df 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 49 
         
         
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
   
6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter presented data with a view to carrying out initial analysis prior 
to VAR estimations. Descriptive statistics were considered with particular 
attention to measures of central tendencies (the mean and the median) 
and the measures of dispersion (i.e. standard deviation) of the datasets. 
Similarly, the Kurtosis, skewness, and Jarque-Bera statistic were evaluated 
alongside other normality test procedures with a view to determining the 
nature of the distribution before the VAR estimation. This finding enables 
easy comparisons to be made once VAR diagnostic results have been 
produced (see Chapter 7 for details). In some cases, series were found to 
be normally distributed while in other cases they were found to be 
exhibiting leptokurtic distribution. Consequently, the series were suitable 
for inclusion in the models the results of which are analysed in Chapetr 7. 
Furthermore, initial empirical analysis including stationarity tests using 
both parametric and non-parametric tests, cointegration tests, lag length 
selection criteria were considered with a view to estimating VAR models 
(considered in further empirical analysis chapter). Although, this chapter 
does not discuss the findings and their potential implications, it should be 
noted that our findings of evidence of cointegration between oil prices and 
other variables in both models are similar to the conclusion reached by 
Kaufmann et al. (2008).  
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Appendix II: Histograms of the LOPR 
 
Appendix I: Histogram of the LOPQ 
 
Appendix II:  Histogram of the LOPC 
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Appendix III: Histogram of the LOSC 
 
 
Appendix IV: Histogram of the LOMC 
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Appendix V: Histogram of the LOOC 
 
Appendix VI: Histogram of the LOOS 
 
 
Appendix VII: Quantiles of the LOPR Series 
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Appendix VIII: Quantiles of the LOPQ Series 
 
Appendix IX: Quantiles of the LOPC Series 
 
 
Appendix X: Quantiles of the LOSC 
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Appendix XI: Quantiles of the LOMC 
 
 
Appendix XII: Quantiles of the LOOC 
 
 
Appendix XIII: Quantiles of the LOOS 
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Appendix XIV: Graphical Representation of VAR Residuals (1st 
Model) 
 
 
 
Appendix XV: Correlation Matrix of the VAR Residuals (1st Model) 
 LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC 
LOPR  1.000000  0.055225  0.068653 -0.125134 
LOPQ  0.055225  1.000000 -0.763502 -0.127076 
LOPC  0.068653 -0.763502  1.000000 -0.276215 
LOSC -0.125134 -0.127076 -0.276215  1.000000 
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Appendix XVI: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests (First 
Model) 
 
      
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
      
1  30.32684  0.0164 
2  21.25848  0.1688 
3  20.96508  0.1799 
4  17.93356  0.3278 
5  28.98746  0.0240 
6  27.49153  0.0363 
7  15.44945  0.4920 
8  9.497233  0.8915 
9  13.47773  0.6376 
10  8.678488  0.9261 
11  13.40837  0.6427 
12  26.60972  0.0460 
      
Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
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Appendix XVII: VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross 
Terms (Only Levels and Squares) – First Model 
            
      
   Joint test:     
            
Chi-sq df Prob.    
            
 189.7532 110  0.0000    
            
      
   Individual components:    
            
Dependen
t 
R-squared F(11,143) Prob. Chi-sq(11) Prob. 
            
res1*res1  0.275722  4.948901  0.0000  42.73686  0.0000 
res2*res2  0.159832  2.473092  0.0073  24.77393  0.0098 
res3*res3  0.141723  2.146623  0.0206  21.96704  0.0246 
res4*res4  0.189956  3.048514  0.0011  29.44320  0.0019 
res2*res1  0.112999  1.656126  0.0894  17.51483  0.0935 
res3*res1  0.108468  1.581645  0.1101  16.81257  0.1135 
res3*res2  0.145480  2.213221  0.0167  22.54942  0.0204 
res4*res1  0.165572  2.579538  0.0051  25.66369  0.0073 
res4*res2  0.048167  0.657854  0.7761  7.465841  0.7602 
res4*res3  0.081985  1.160994  0.3194  12.70773  0.3129 
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Appendix XVIII: VAR Residual Normality Tests (Lutkepohl) – 1st 
Model 
          
     
Compone
nt 
Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
          
1 -0.712651  13.12002 1  0.0003 
2  2.163327  120.8996 1  0.0000 
3 -1.227104  38.89943 1  0.0000 
4 -1.536421  60.98186 1  0.0000 
          
Joint   233.9009 4  0.0000 
          
     
Compone
nt 
Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
          
1  3.979544  6.196809 1  0.0128 
2  18.25539  1503.028 1  0.0000 
3  6.973188  101.9527 1  0.0000 
4  12.34416  563.8988 1  0.0000 
          
Joint   2175.076 4  0.0000 
          
     
Compone
nt 
Jarque-
Bera 
Df Prob.  
          
1  19.31683 2  0.0001  
2  1623.927 2  0.0000  
3  140.8521 2  0.0000  
4  624.8807 2  0.0000  
          
Joint  2408.977 8  0.0000  
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Appendix XIX: Graphical Representation of VAR Residuals 
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Appendix XX: Residual Correlation Matrix (Second Model) 
 LOPR LOPQ LOPC LOSC LOMC LOOC LOOS 
LOPR  1.000000  0.042808  0.085142 -0.101559 -0.077894 -0.018494 -0.090599 
LOPQ  0.042808  1.000000 -0.757358 -0.113967  0.111467  0.038332  0.017240 
LOPC  0.085142 -0.757358  1.000000 -0.302148 -0.114347  0.031234  0.006093 
LOSC -0.101559 -0.113967 -0.302148  1.000000 -0.010254 -0.215332  0.031681 
LOMC -0.077894  0.111467 -0.114347 -0.010254  1.000000  0.154202 -0.054738 
LOOC -0.018494  0.038332  0.031234 -0.215332  0.154202  1.000000 -0.645586 
LOOS -0.090599  0.017240  0.006093  0.031681 -0.054738 -0.645586  1.000000 
 
 
 
Appendix XXI: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests (2nd Model) 
      
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
      
1  111.2667  0.0000 
2  72.34477  0.0167 
3  67.76071  0.0391 
4  62.94273  0.0870 
5  70.82683  0.0223 
6  122.6807  0.0000 
7  66.55062  0.0482 
8  41.93099  0.7528 
9  35.97449  0.9171 
10  61.61076  0.1066 
11  51.82012  0.3644 
12  145.8113  0.0000 
      
Probs from chi-square with 49 df. 
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Appendix XXII: VAR Residual Normality Tests 
          
     
Compone
nt 
Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
          
1 -0.621728  9.985766 1  0.0016 
2  1.840063  87.46735 1  0.0000 
3 -1.245963  40.10426 1  0.0000 
4 -1.273558  41.90037 1  0.0000 
5 -0.263073  1.787857 1  0.1812 
6  0.093757  0.227083 1  0.6337 
7 -0.014623  0.005524 1  0.9408 
          
Joint   181.4782 7  0.0000 
          
     
Compone
nt 
Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
          
1  4.047699  7.089138 1  0.0078 
2  16.98175  1262.535 1  0.0000 
3  6.944421  100.4817 1  0.0000 
4  10.60353  373.3796 1  0.0000 
5  3.336599  0.731722 1  0.3923 
6  2.754752  0.388447 1  0.5331 
7  2.683907  0.645282 1  0.4218 
          
Joint   1745.251 7  0.0000 
          
     
Compone
nt 
Jarque-
Bera 
Df Prob.  
          
1  17.07490 2  0.0002  
2  1350.003 2  0.0000  
3  140.5860 2  0.0000  
4  415.2800 2  0.0000  
5  2.519579 2  0.2837  
6  0.615530 2  0.7351  
7  0.650807 2  0.7222  
          
Joint  1926.729 14  0.0000  
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Appendix XXIII: VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross 
Terms (Only Levels and Squares) – 2nd Model 
            
      
   Joint test:     
            
Chi-sq df Prob.    
            
 581.6537 476  0.0006    
            
      
   Individual components:    
            
Dependen
t 
R-squared F(17,137) Prob. Chi-sq(17) Prob. 
            
res1*res1  0.286068  3.229119  0.0001  44.34053  0.0003 
res2*res2  0.218468  2.252750  0.0052  33.86256  0.0087 
res3*res3  0.210541  2.149205  0.0081  32.63381  0.0125 
res4*res4  0.230454  2.413349  0.0026  35.72030  0.0050 
res5*res5  0.128614  1.189461  0.2809  19.93520  0.2776 
res6*res6  0.165770  1.601371  0.0717  25.69436  0.0802 
res7*res7  0.153363  1.459804  0.1187  23.77125  0.1258 
res2*res1  0.209889  2.140783  0.0084  32.53276  0.0129 
res3*res1  0.169912  1.649579  0.0600  26.33644  0.0685 
res3*res2  0.205414  2.083338  0.0107  31.83911  0.0158 
res4*res1  0.199926  2.013771  0.0143  30.98849  0.0200 
res4*res2  0.085949  0.757778  0.7380  13.32209  0.7144 
res4*res3  0.177079  1.734125  0.0435  27.44723  0.0518 
res5*res1  0.131843  1.223852  0.2540  20.43560  0.2526 
res5*res2  0.145373  1.370809  0.1603  22.53274  0.1651 
res5*res3  0.116139  1.058927  0.4003  18.00155  0.3887 
res5*res4  0.090409  0.801010  0.6896  14.01342  0.6662 
res6*res1  0.144793  1.364417  0.1637  22.44288  0.1683 
res6*res2  0.225172  2.341963  0.0036  34.90161  0.0064 
res6*res3  0.183152  1.806931  0.0328  28.38854  0.0406 
res6*res4  0.145789  1.375408  0.1579  22.59730  0.1628 
res6*res5  0.098271  0.878255  0.6004  15.23199  0.5788 
res7*res1  0.126786  1.170096  0.2969  19.65180  0.2924 
res7*res2  0.256546  2.780884  0.0005  39.76463  0.0014 
res7*res3  0.181082  1.781991  0.0362  28.06765  0.0442 
res7*res4  0.149698  1.418782  0.1366  23.20325  0.1427 
res7*res5  0.120831  1.107583  0.3527  18.72875  0.3443 
res7*res6  0.160844  1.544662  0.0881  24.93080  0.0963 
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Appendix XXV: Unit Root Tests-Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests at 
level (Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: LOPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.456096  0.5532 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: LOPQ has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.901745  0.3309 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: LOPC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.512900  0.0089 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOSC 
Null Hypothesis: LOSC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.484358  0.1213 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: LOMC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.275863  0.1811 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOOC 
 
Null Hypothesis: LOOC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.970695  0.0400 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: LOOS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.991886  0.2902 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
318 
 
Appendix XXVI: Unit Root Tests-Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests at 
1st Difference (Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.535024  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPQ) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.87369  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.74156  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOSC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOSC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.29674  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOMC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.76482  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOOC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.48131  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473382  
 5% level  -2.880336  
 10% level  -2.576871  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOS) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -12.94143  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
Appendix XXVII: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests at Level (Trend 
and Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: LOPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.037166  0.1256 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: LOPQ has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.326061  0.4171 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: LOPC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.717692  0.0240 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOSC 
Null Hypothesis: LOSC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.456407  0.3494 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: LOMC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.644641  0.0293 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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LOOC 
 
Null Hypothesis: LOOC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.755356  0.0216 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: LOOS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.522877  0.3168 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
Appendix XXVIII: Unit Root Tests-Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests 
at 1st Difference (Trend and Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.503507  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.503507  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.70890  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOMC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.71906  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LOOC 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.44839  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.019151  
 5% level  -3.439461  
 10% level  -3.144113  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOS) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -12.98932  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Appendix XXIX: Unit Root Tests-Philips Perron Tests at level 
(Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: LOPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -1.475652  0.5434 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.007603 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.011641 
     
     
 
LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: LOPQ has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.074605  0.2553 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000903 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.001055 
     
     
 
LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: LOPC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 0 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -3.512900  0.0089 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.012697 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.012697 
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LOSC 
Null Hypothesis: LOSC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 0 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.184315  0.2129 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.031574 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.031574 
     
     
 
LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: LOMC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.183271  0.2133 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  7.49E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  6.90E-05 
     
     
 
LOOC 
Null Hypothesis: LOOC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -3.954558  0.0022 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000595 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000493 
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LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: LOOS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -1.980740  0.2951 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.472813  
 5% level  -2.880088  
 10% level  -2.576739  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  6.49E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  6.22E-05 
     
     
 
Appendix XXX: Unit Root Tests-Philips Perron Tests at 1st 
Difference (Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -9.574391  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.007206 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.007434 
     
     
 
LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPQ) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -11.88067  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000929 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000951 
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LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 12 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -14.96707  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.013586 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.007046 
     
     
 
LOSC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOSC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 5 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -10.20409  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.031578 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.028117 
     
     
 
LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOMC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -14.06643  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  7.69E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  5.92E-05 
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LOOC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 21 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -30.13522  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000573 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000109 
     
     
 
LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOS) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -12.94043  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473096  
 5% level  -2.880211  
 10% level  -2.576805  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  6.66E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  6.69E-05 
     
      
Appendix XXXI: Unit Root Tests-Philips Perron Tests at Level 
(Trend and Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: LOPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.858232  0.1792 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.007440 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.012207 
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LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: LOPQ has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.552305  0.3029 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000892 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.001073 
     
     
 
 
 
LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: LOPC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -3.699602  0.0252 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.012560 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.012437 
     
     
 
LOSC 
Null Hypothesis: LOSC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 0 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.144177  0.5168 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.031501 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.031501 
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LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: LOMC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -3.483394  0.0447 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  7.12E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  6.42E-05 
     
     
 
LOOC 
Null Hypothesis: LOOC has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 5 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -5.293559  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000559 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000532 
     
     
 
LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: LOOS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.783600  0.2056 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018349  
 5% level  -3.439075  
 10% level  -3.143887  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  6.36E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  7.61E-05 
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Appendix XXXII: Unit Root Tests-Philips Perron Tests at 1st 
Difference (Trend and Intercept) 
LOPR 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -9.543404  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.007205 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.007434 
     
     
 
LOPQ 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPQ) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -11.84434  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000929 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000951 
     
     
 
LOPC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOPC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 12 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -14.94390  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.013571 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.006987 
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LOMC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOMC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -14.01406  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  7.69E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  5.92E-05 
     
     
 
LOOC 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOC) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 21 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -31.12573  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000572 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000100 
     
     
 
LOOS 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOOS) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 0 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -12.98932  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.018748  
 5% level  -3.439267  
 10% level  -3.143999  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  6.61E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  6.61E-05 
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APPENDIX XXIVIII: COVARIANCE ANALYSIS (ORDINARY) 
  
    
    Covariance   
Correlation OPRFUTURES  OPRSPOT   
OPRFUTURES  792.1444   
 1.000000   
    
OPRSPOT  790.5250 788.9447  
 0.999977 1.000000  
    
    
 
 
